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Summary 
 
The aim of the thesis has been to describe the nature of al-Qaeda’s interest in non-
conventional weapons, as reflected by the network’s own statements and activities in the 
period from 1996-2006. The analysis has been divided into two parts: First, I have critically 
examined primary and secondary source material in order to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the history of al-Qaeda’s pursuit for non-conventional weapons. Second, I 
have discussed why there is a lack of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
innovation within the al-Qaeda network. 
 
The conclusion to the first part is that the al-Qaeda network’s interest in using unconventional 
means appears much lower than commonly anticipated. Al-Qaeda’s efforts have been 
concentrated on crude and easily obtainable CBRN materials, not on developing actual 
warfare agents. Also, a preference for conventional weapons and tactics is evident on all 
levels within the network. There are no strong indications that al-Qaeda’s interest for non-
conventional weapons has increased after 2001. 
 
With regards to the lack of CBRN innovation, I conclude that the al-Qaeda network clearly 
lacks some of the characteristics typical of past ‘CBRN terrorists’, such as a millenarian 
ideology or an ‘expressive attachment’ to this particular type of weapon. In addition, 
however, I argue that al-Qaeda’s networked structure itself prevents innovation, rather than 
promoting it. There are at least two possible explanations for this: first, the global nature of 
the network makes mobility an alternative to innovation; and second, al-Qaeda’s loose 
organizational structure increases the need for carrying out operations that can immediately be 
identified with the al-Qaeda ‘brand’. 
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this thesis. First and foremost, I am indebted to my colleagues in FFI’s terrorism research 
group for sharing with me their insights and sources on al-Qaeda and militant Islamism, and 
for creating an inspiring and friendly working environment which I find truly unique. 
Secondly, my analysis of al-Qaeda’s chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
documents would not be complete without an evaluation of their technical quality. Since I do 
not have the scientific background to make such an evaluation myself, I am indebted to 
Monica Endregard and her colleagues at the FFI’s protection division for giving me 
comments and feedback on the nature of al-Qaeda’s online CBRN manuals and discussions. 
Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor, Albrecht Hofheinz, for his useful comments on 
the draft of this thesis.  
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A note on transliteration 
Arabic names and words appearing in the text have been transliterated according to the 
standard indicated below: 
ء ᾽ ḍ Short vowels: a  i  u  ض
b ṭ ب ط Long vowels: ā  ī  ū t ẓ ت ظ
ṯ ῾ ث ع tā᾽ marbūṭa: -a (but -at in iḍāfa) 
j ġ ج غ
 ḥ f ح ف
ḫ q خ ق  
d k د ك
 ḏ l ذ ل
r m ر م  
z n ز ن
 s h س ﻩ
š w ش و  
ṣ y ص ي
 
Exceptions have been made for Arabic names with an established spelling standard in the 
English press, such as al-Qaeda (al-qā῾ida) and Osama bin Laden (Usāma bin Lādin), as well as 
for Arabic words that have been imported into the English language, such as jihad (jihād) and 
the Koran (al-qur᾽ān). “Sun letters” have not been assimilated. In the literature list, the titles of 
Arabic documents are written with the Arabic script, with an English translation in 
parenthesis. Names of authors, newspapers, journals etc. are transliterated. 
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1 Introduction 
“We judge that there is a high probability that Al Qaida will attempt an attack using a CBRN 
weapon within the next two years.” 1
-US government report to the United Nations (April 2003) 
 
Presumably, few topics have been associated with more hype than al-Qaeda’s alleged quest 
for weapons of mass destruction. Ever since the late 1990s, it has been claimed that al-Qaeda 
is the ideal candidate for carrying out a destructive attack with non-conventional weapons 
against the West. The assumption is not based on hard evidence, such as the discovery of 
these weapons in al-Qaeda’s possession, or any evidence of serious efforts to obtain them. 
Neither is the assumption based on a critical or objective analysis of the role of chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons in al-Qaeda’s ideology and strategy. 
Rather, it appears that the assumption is based on a widely held belief that al-Qaeda belongs 
to a ‘new breed of terrorists’ who would not hesitate to kill thousands of people in one single 
attack. While this label certainly helps demonize and dehumanize the ‘enemy’, it contributes 
neither to a very accurate understanding of the actor, nor to the real nature of the threat. 
To date, few academic studies have aimed to thoroughly investigate the history behind this 
hype, based on a critical analysis of historical sources about the al-Qaeda network. This is not 
very surprising, however. Studies of terrorism and political violence have often tended to be 
policy-oriented, rather than aiming at contributing to the academic field. Literature on al-
Qaeda and CBRN weapons, therefore, tends only to consider factors that ‘confirm’ al-Qaeda’s 
CBRN ambitions, while sources that reveal a more complex reality are ignored. Also, there 
have been few attempts to discuss the case of al-Qaeda in relation to other academic research 
into CBRN terrorism or innovation processes. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to answer the following research question: What is the nature 
of al-Qaeda’s interest in CBRN weapons, as reflected by statements and activities on various 
levels within the network between 1996-2006? I do not intend to write a purely descriptive 
thesis, however; but also to discuss possible explanatory factors for why the al-Qaeda network 
has not been more innovative in the field of CBRN weapons. In order to create a framework 
for my analysis, I have reviewed existing literature on CBRN terrorism, and literature 
                                                 
1 “Letter dated 17 April 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United 
Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee”, United Nations Security Council (22 April 2003),   
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2003/n0335167.pdf (accessed 14 Novemebr 2007). 
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describing the process of innovation in militant organizations. While the existing literature 
considers a number of case studies of militant groups, the groups selected are relatively 
homogenous, hierarchical and locally based. In other words, there is currently a lack of 
empirical research into the process of innovation in diffuse and trans-national militant 
networks, and this is where I believe my case study of al-Qaeda will fill an important gap. 
However, the innovative capabilities of the al-Qaeda network have been discussed on a 
theoretical level, in particular in an article by Calvert Jones, “Al-Qaeda’s innovative 
improvisers: Learning in a diffuse transnational network” from 2006. Jones’ main argument, 
which is based on organizational theory research rather than on an empirical case study of al-
Qaeda, is that al-Qaeda’s networked structure makes al-Qaeda more prone to innovation, but 
less capable of succeeding in its innovative efforts. My thesis will discuss the validity of 
Jones’ argument, and, on a more general level, contribute to a better understanding of how 
organizational dynamics affect the process of innovation. 
My analysis is divided into two parts. First, I will examine al-Qaeda’s statements and 
activities on various levels within the network in order to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the history of al-Qaeda’s interest in CBRN weapons. The sources include al-
Qaeda’s official statements and publications, documents and equipment found in al-Qaeda’s 
camps in Afghanistan, accounts from witnesses and insiders, legal documents and CBRN-
related discussions and training manuals posted on jihadi web pages. I have deliberately used 
a variety of different sources in order to better assess their validity and accuracy. The analysis 
is qualitative, but supported by statistics wherever appropriate. Second, I will discuss why 
there is a lack of CBRN innovation within the al-Qaeda network. The discussion will be based 
on three hypotheses that have been formulated based on existing literature about CBRN 
terrorism and innovation. 
1.1 Terms and definitions 
The object of this study has been labelled ‘al-Qaeda’, which is not a very good term to use 
analytically, but it has been used for a lack of a better and equally short alternative. What I 
mean by ‘al-Qaeda’ or ‘the al-Qaeda network’ is militant islamists who follow Osama bin 
Laden’s ideology for a global jihadi struggle. For the purposes of the analysis, I wanted not 
only to look at ‘traditional’ al-Qaeda, but also the diverse network of al-Qaeda-inspired 
groups and individuals. However, I did not want to include all types of militant islamist 
groups and individuals, because this would be too broad a group. Thomas Hegghammer has 
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defined three types of militant islamists: socio-revolutionary groups (Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 
etc.); national-separatist groups (Hezbollah, Hamas, Chechen separatists etc.); and finally 
global jihadists (al-Qaeda), which will be the focus of this study.2 The study will therefore not 
include groups such as Chechen separatists or the Taliban, even though there has allegedly 
been cooperation between these groups and the al-Qaeda network. However, I shall include 
regionally based groups who fight for local agenda if they describe themselves as an ‘al-
Qaeda branch’; today this is usually marked by incorporating the word ‘al-Qaeda’ into the 
group’s name, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (tanẓīm al-qā῾ida bi-bilād al-maġrib al-
islāmī).   
Al-Qaeda can be described as a relatively loose network of individuals and groups who share 
the same ideology. One premise for my analysis is that operational decisions (such as the 
decision to acquire or use CBRN materials) can be initiated at any level in the network.3 For 
the purpose of my analysis, therefore, I have chosen to divide the al-Qaeda network into four 
distinct ‘layers’, adapted from Bruce Hoffman:4
1. Al-Qaeda central: Osama bin Laden and his close circle of aides and lieutenants, as 
well as prominent ideologues, strategic thinkers and theologians. 
2. Al-Qaeda affiliates: Regionally based groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat 
al-῾Irāq al-᾽Islāmiyya) or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 
3. Al-Qaeda locals: Semi-independent or independent small cells, including ‘home-
grown radicals’. 
4. Al-Qaeda sympathizers: Individuals supportive of al-Qaeda’s cause, but not 
necessarily through violent activity. An example of this category would be individuals 
who manage jihadi websites or online ‘media agencies’. 
When referring to individuals, groups, websites and so forth associated with the al-Qaeda 
network, I have used terms that have been established in the research literature, such as 
‘militant islamist’ or ‘jihadist’. The Arabic word jihād literally means ‘struggle’ or ‘effort’, 
but in this thesis I have used ‘jihad’ exclusively to denote al-Qaeda’s military struggle against 
                                                 
2 Thomas Hegghammer, “En oversikt over islamistiske terroristgrupper”, in Bjørn Erik Rasch (ed.), Islamistisk 
terrorisme (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag, 2005): 20-52. 
3 History shows that although operations were sometimes ordered, or at least approved by bin Laden’s close 
aides, it was often up to the local cell members to decide on the spesific tactics and weapons to be used. 
4 While Hoffman’s fourth level is labeled ‘Al-Qaeda network’ and consists of home-grown militants, I have 
labeled it ‘al-Qaeda symphatizers’, defined as individuals supporting al-Qaeda’s cause, but not necessarily 
through violent activity. I have used the term ‘Al-Qaeda network’ to refer to the four categories as a whole. It 
should be stressed that these categories first and foremost serve analytical purposes, and that it is not my 
intention to stigmatize anyone by labeling them ‘al-Qaeda’. Bruce Hoffman, Inside terrorism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006): 285-288. 
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Islam’s enemies, which is how al-Qaeda affiliates themselves most often use the term. Yet 
this particular use of the term ‘jihad’ in Western literature has been subject to much debate 
and criticism.5 Religious literature points out that the word is used in a variety of meanings, 
most of which are not related to physical violence. Overall, jihad “... may express a struggle 
against one’s evil inclinations or an exertion for the sake of Islam and the Umma, e.g. trying 
to convert non-believers or working for the moral betterment of Islamic society”.6 The notion 
of jihad as a struggle with oneself (jihād al-nafs) is often referred to as al-jihād al-akbar (the 
greater jihad) while jihad in the sense of ‘physical struggle’ is referred to as al-jihad al-aṣġar 
(the smaller jihad), indicating that the former should be seen as much more important than the 
latter. Many would argue that it is the peaceful forms of jihad that are most important today.7 
The use of ‘jihad’ by Western scholars to describe the violent activities of al-Qaeda, therefore, 
is seen as misleading at best. It has also been viewed as an attempt by the West to defame and 
stereotype Islam by indicating that there is a connection between the Islamic concept of jihad 
and modern-day ‘terrorism’. In an article from 2001, three Pakistani scholars held that jihad 
had been “distorted with deliberate intent”, and that “it is never, as popularly represented, a 
religiously-motivated aggressive war against ‘innocent’ non-Muslims, with the aim of 
spreading Islām by force”.8
To take an apologetic stance towards the concept of jihad is, however, also to disregard the 
actual use of the concept throughout Islamic history. In order to understand how militant 
Islamists use the term jihad today, it is useful to be aware of the origins and the historical uses 
of the term. In classical Islamic doctrine, it is the ‘militant’ interpretation of jihad which is 
dominant: the Encyclopaedia of Islam states that “[i]n law, according to general doctrine and 
in historical tradition, the djihād consists of military action with the object of the expansion of 
Islam and, if need be, of its defence”.9 The Koran is ambiguous with regards to the concept of 
jihad and under what circumstances jihad is to be fought. While early verses describe the jihād 
as a defensive struggle, verses later revealed order Muslims to fight the unbelievers 
unconditionally.10 This ambiguity can be interpreted as corresponding to the various stages of 
the Prophet Muḥammad’s life, reflecting the need for policy modifications based on specific 
historical circumstances. In classical Koran interpretation, however, only the later verses were 
seen as valid, thus legitimizing armed struggle against non-believers even if Muslims are not 
                                                 
5 See for example, Richard Bonney, Jihād: From Qur’ān to bin Lāden (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2004): 320. 
6 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in classical and modern Islam, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005): 1. 
7 Peters, Jihad in classical and modern Islam, 116-117. 
8 Bonney, Jihād: From Qur’ān to bin Lāden, 320. 
9 B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat and J. Schacht (eds.), The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4th ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991): 538. 
10 Peters, Jihad in classical and modern Islam, 2. 
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attacked first.11 As Peters notes, this was not a radical interpretation at the time, but 
corresponded to the ideas of war that already existed among Arab tribes in the pre-Islamic 
society, in which war was seen as the ‘normal state’ unless a truce existed.12 Later, there were 
attempts to modify this interpretation by describing jihad as defensive only, by prohibiting 
jihad during the sacred months, etc.13 Modernists reject the classical method of Koran 
interpretation (i.e. that verses revealed later abrogate the earlier, contradictory verses14), and 
have instead sought to interpret verses according to their context.15 One of the first modernist 
interpretations of the jihadi doctrine was developed in the nineteenth century by the Indian 
thinker Sayyid Aḥmad Ḫān. He described jihad as obligationary only when Muslims were 
actively prevented from exercising their faith (as defined by the five pillars of Islam). 
Therefore, it was not a duty for Indian Muslims to fight against the British colonial 
administration. The doctrine was formulated after the 1857 revolt in India, at a time of great 
distrust between Britain and her Indian Muslim subjects. By formulating the doctrine, Khan 
“... wanted to show that Islam was a respectable religion and that the doctrine of jihad was no 
obstacle for the loyal service of the British Empire.”16 In the Middle East, reformers like 
Muḥammad ῾Abduh (1849-1905) and Muḥammad Rašīd Riḍā (1865-1935) held that jihad is a 
defensive, military struggle against any type of foreign occupation, thus modifying the 
classical interpretation of jihad, but not as radically as did Khan.17  
In any case, however, the Encyclopaedia of Islam article shows that the ‘militant’ 
interpretation of jihad (as opposed to a ‘spiritual’ interpretation of jihad) originated with 
classical Islamic doctrine. Furthermore, the militant interpretation has been used throughout 
history in Islamic writings and in fatāwā to mobilize Muslims to fight against colonial rule 
and against Israel;18 it is not an original invention of al-Qaeda or a product of modern militant 
Islamist rhetoric. The most important argument for me to use the concept of ‘jihad’ and its 
derivatives (jihādī, mujāhidūn and its anglicized version, ‘jihadist’) in the strictly militant 
sense, is that members of al-Qaeda frequently use these terms to describe themselves and their 
own activities. 
                                                 
11 Lewis, Pellat and Schacht, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 538. 
12 Peters, Jihad in classical and modern Islam, 1-3. 
13 Lewis, Pellat and Schacht, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 538. 
14 The method is known as the theory of nasḫ (abrogation). Ibid. 
15 An example of such an interpretation is Maḥmūd Šaltūt, “لﺎﺘﻘﻟاو نﺁﺮﻘﻟا” (The Koran and fighting), published in 
1948. Maḥmūd Šaltūt was the sheikh of al-Azhar University in Cairo from 1958-63. The treastise is available in 
English translation in Peters, Jihad in classical and modern Islam, 60-101. 
16 Peters, Jihad in classical and modern Islam, 6, 123-124. 
17 Ibid., 6. 
18 Ibid., 103-105. 
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The phenomenon to be studied, ‘CBRN terrorism’, also needs closer definition. Initially, I 
wanted to avoid using the term ‘terrorism’ due to the political nature of the term and the 
negative connotations associated with it. A more neutral alternative would be ‘violence’ or 
‘political violence’. However, when referring to violent acts involving the use of chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear materials I found it hard to come up with a short and simple 
term, and the widely used term ‘CBRN terrorism’ has therefore been employed. ‘CBRN 
terrorism’ is understood as ‘the tactic of using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
materials in a violent act to communicate a message to an audience.’19  
I have deliberately used the term ‘CBRN’ (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) instead 
of the more common term ‘WMD’ (weapons of mass destruction) due to the ambiguities 
connected to the latter. WMD has traditionally been understood as ‘nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons’ and often been associated with state-run weapons programmes. Recent 
definitions of WMD used in the US, however, have started to include radiological agents, and 
even conventional ways of causing mass destruction.20 The most recent NATO definition of 
WMD does not specify what kinds of weapons are involved, only that such weapons consist 
of “a weapon that is capable of a high order of destruction and of being used in such a manner 
as to destroy people, infrastructure or other resources on a large scale”.21 The aim of this 
thesis, however, is not to analyze the phenomenon of ‘mass-casualty’ or ‘catastrophic’ 
terrorism per se, but rather to consider the whole spectrum of incidents involving the use of 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear means, including the tactical and low-end use 
of such materials.22
The acronym CBRN is used in various constructions such as ‘CBRN materials’, ‘CBRN 
weapons’ and so forth. From a technical perspective, it is important to make a distinction 
                                                 
19 In addition, definitions of ‘terrorism’ often specify that the perpetrators have to be ‘sub-state’ and that the 
attack has to be directed against civilians. The question of whether states should be labelled ‘terrorist’ or not is a 
very political one, and I did not see the need to take a position of this in my thesis. When I discuss trends 
connected to ‘CBRN terrorism’, however, I have only included incidents associated with non-state actors, 
because this is how existing literature usually defines the term. I did not find it relevant to specify the type of 
target in my definition, because I wanted to consider the whole spectrum of incidents associated with al-Qaeda. 
In the past, al-Qaeda have targeted both civilian and military targets.  
20 “WMD411”, Nuclear Threat Initiative homepage, http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1a1.html (accessed 19 July 
2007). 
21 “NATO glossary of terms and definitions, AAP-6 (2007)”, NATO Standardization Agency (2007), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-6-2007.pdf (accessed 19 December 2007). 
22 Most sources agree that no more than twelve people have ever died in a single CBRN terrorist attack; namely 
Aum Shinrikyo’s attack on the Tokyo subway with sarin gas on 20 March 1995. See for example, Jonathan B. 
Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2000), 221. 
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between materials or agents on the one hand23, and devices or weapons on the other. When 
talking about the CBRN capabilities of sub-state actors, these terms are often used 
interchangeably, leading to confusion. Put simply, a CBRN device or weapon is CBRN 
material plus a delivery system or dispersal mechanism for that material. Although CBRN 
materials may have a terrorizing effect even if they are not weaponized, the presence of a 
delivery system usually indicates a quite different level of sophistication. At the same time, 
CBRN materials as well as CBRN delivery systems can be of very different quality and 
effectiveness. It is also therefore useful to make a distinction between materials and weapons 
produced by states (here referred to as ‘state-level’ or ‘state-produced’), and those produced 
by sub-state actors (here referred to as ‘improvised’ or ‘home-made’). In fact, the “NATO 
glossary of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terms and definitions” indicates that 
only devices produced by state-sponsored weapon programmes can be referred to as CBRN 
weapons: A ‘CBRN weapon’ is “a fully engineered assembly designed for employment by the 
armed forces of a nation state to cause the release of a chemical or biological agent or 
radiological material onto a chosen target or to generate a nuclear detonation”[emphasis 
added].24 A CBRN device, on the other hand, is “an improvised assembly or process intended 
to cause the release of a chemical or biological agent or substance or radiological material into 
the environment or to result in a nuclear detonation.”25 Non-technical literature is seldom that 
accurate, as indicated above, and the word ‘weapon’ is applied broadly. A range of other 
terms is also used such as WMD and CBW (chemical and biological weapons). Al-Qaeda’s 
own texts and statements are no exception, as will become clear in chapter four. When 
quoting or discussing existing literature on the topic, I have chosen to reflect the authors’ own 
terminology, but in my own analysis I have tried to use terms that are as technically accurate 
as possible. For example, if I talk about a specific chemical device that was described on the 
Internet, I refer to it as a device and not a weapon. However, I use the term ‘CBRN weapons’ 
when talking in general terms, referring to the whole class of CBRN weapons, devices and 
materials. I also use the term ‘non-conventional weapons’ as a synonym to “CBRN weapons’. 
                                                 
23 The terms ‘materials’ and ‘agents’ are used interchangeably, however; while ‘material’ is a generic term, 
‘agent’ usually applies to chemical and biological materials only. 
24 “NATO glossary of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terms and definitions, AAP-21 (B)”, NATO 
Standardization Agency (July 2006): I-9. 
25 Ibid., I-10. 
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1.2 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis has been divided into seven chapters. Chapter two will review and discuss existing 
literature and outline a framework for my approach. Chapter three describes the methods used 
in the research, as well as the selection and reliability of the sources. Chapter four gives some 
brief background information about the phenomenon of CBRN terrorism as well as some 
history about the al-Qaeda network to place the research topic within a broader historical and 
thematic context. Chapter five is the longest chapter, as it consists of both a summary of the 
source material, as well as containing the first part of my analysis, which aims to describe the 
history of al-Qaeda’s quest for CBRN weapons, as reflected by statements and activities on 
various levels within the network. The chapter is divided into four sub-chapters corresponding 
to the four ‘levels’ of al-Qaeda as defined above. Chapter six contains the second part of my 
analysis which aims to answer the question why is there a lack of CBRN innovation within the 
al-Qaeda network. The analysis is based on discussing the strengths and weaknesses of three 
hypotheses in relation to the empirical evidence outlined in chapter four. Chapter seven 
presents the final conclusion and gives suggestions for further research. 
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2 Framework for my approach 
2.1 Foundational problems related to the study of militant Islamism 
One of the pitfalls when analyzing militant Islamism is the tendency to view the phenomenon 
as something inherently ‘Islamic’, ‘religious’ or connected to ‘Arab culture and tradition’, 
while failing to interpret the violent acts in a broader social and political context. Mahmood 
Mamdani has noted that the September 11 attacks in particular gave rise to a new round of 
“culture talk”, understood as “... the predilection to define cultures according to their 
presumed ‘essential’ characteristics, especially as regards politics”.26 Through this culture 
talk, al-Qaeda and 9/11 was popularly explained in terms of Wahhabism (an orthodox 
interpretation of Islam, predominant in Saudi Arabia), without placing the event in a broader 
historical or political context.  
Mamdani criticizes the very premise of culture talk, saying that “[b]y equating political 
tendencies with entire communities defined in non-historical political terms, such 
explanations encourage collective punishment and discipline – a practice characteristic of 
colonial encounters”.27 Post-9/11 culture talk can be regarded in relation to an earlier 
tendency to view the world as a struggle between primitivism and civilization, which serves to 
‘justify’ Western hegemony. This is illustrated for example in Robert Kaplan’s article “The 
Coming of Anarchy” (1994), which is said to have had a “... deep impact on the US 
administration.”28
Mamdani argues that militant Islamist movements must be understood as a product of 
modernity itself, rather than as a pre-modern residue defined by ‘culture’. In order to properly 
understand the al-Qaeda network, therefore, one has to move away from culture and Islamic 
doctrine and instead look at the historical and political context. This does not mean that Islam 
is unimportant, however, but Mamdani’s argument is that one should consider historical 
Islam instead of doctrinal Islam. In addition, he argues that one has to “… broaden the focus 
beyond Islam to include larger historical encounters.”29 Al-Qaeda, therefore, should be seen 
as a product of specific historical developments during and since the Cold War. In other 
words, as a “... modern political project, not a traditional cultural left-over”, even if it uses 
                                                 
26 Mahmood Mamdani, ”Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism”, 
American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (2002): 766-775. 
27 Ibid., 767. 
28 Dag Tuastad, “Neo-orientalism and the new barbarism thesis: aspects of symbolic violence in the Middle East 
conflict(s)”. Third World Quarterly 24, no. 4 (2003): 593. 
29 Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim”, 768. 
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traditional phrases and images in its rhetoric.30 In my thesis, therefore, I have placed most 
emphasis on the modern political and historical context, rather than on Islamic doctrine and 
culture, in analyzing the al-Qaeda network’s interest in non-conventional weapons. This is 
both to avoid the pitfall of culture talk, but also because I view al-Qaeda as a relatively 
pragmatic and adaptable network that makes use of religious texts as a justification, rather 
than a blueprint, for its choice of weapons and tactics. Al-Qaeda has itself demonstrated this 
pragmatism on several occasions, as will be demonstrated in Chapters four and five.  
2.2 Review of existing literature 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a large amount of literature arguing that al-Qaeda is 
an ideal candidate for using CBRN weapons to achieve its goals, in spite of the lack of 
empirical evidence to support this. In this subchapter I will review existing literature in order 
to describe the state of current research into the topic, and to create a basis for my further 
analysis. Regarding current research, I found two types of studies to be of particular interest to 
my topic of research: first, literature on the phenomenon of CBRN or WMD terrorism, which 
often attempts to make a typology of a ‘typical CBRN/WMD terrorist’; second, literature 
discussing the process of innovation in militant groups. I have selected two books and one 
article to be used as a framework for my analysis: Jonathan B. Tucker’s Toxic Terror (2000); 
Adam Dolnik’s Understanding Terrorist Innovation (2007); and Calvert Jones’ “Al-Qaeda’s 
innovative improvisers: Learning in a diffuse transnational network” (2006). In the following 
I will provide a brief overview of this literature, with an emphasis on describing the three 
selected works. First, however, I will briefly examine the state of research into the history of 
al-Qaeda and its quest for non-conventional weapons, based on a selection of well-known 
secondary literature. 
2.2.1 Literature describing al-Qaeda’s quest for CBRN weapons 
I have not found any study that provides a thorough analysis of al-Qaeda’s quest for non-
conventional weapons. The topic is mentioned, however, in several of the more general books 
describing the history of the al-Qaeda network.31 Efforts related to non-conventional weapons 
                                                 
30 Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim”, 772.  
31 The summary in this sub-chapter is based on a review of the following books on al-Qaeda: Anonymous, 
Through our enemies’ eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the future of America (Washington D.C.: 
Brassey’s, 2003); Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden, 4th ed. (London: 
Phoenix, 2003); Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda: Global network of terror (New York: Berkley, 2003); Bruce 
Hoffman, Inside terrorism (New York: Columbia University, 2006); Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I 
know: An oral history of al Qaeda’s leader (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).  
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are usually attributed to the three following periods in al-Qaeda’s history: the Sudan period 
(1991-96), the Afghanistan period (1996-2001) and the period after the fall of the Taliban 
(November 2001 and beyond). 
Most accounts agree that Osama bin Laden’s interest in non-conventional weapons started in 
the early 1990s, when he allegedly tried to purchase uranium in Sudan.32 Most of this 
information stems from the trial following the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania on 7 August 1998.33 Apart from the uranium procurement attempts, there is 
little evidence of al-Qaeda’s CBRN efforts in this early period. 
In the Afghanistan period, it is widely agreed that al-Qaeda conducted experiments with crude 
chemicals, that they reviewed literature on biological weapons, and that bin Laden continued 
to show an interest in radiological and nuclear materials.34 Osama bin Laden’s statements to 
Western journalists in late 1998, when he said that obtaining chemical and nuclear weapons is 
not a crime but a “religious duty”, are frequently quoted in order to illustrate al-Qaeda’s 
determination to obtain WMD,35 but there have been few attempts to analyse these statements 
in the context of what we now know about al-Qaeda’s actual activities in Afghanistan. 
Overall, the brief historical accounts provide little analysis of the nature of al-Qaeda’s efforts 
in Afghanistan, except for the conclusion that the programme had not been developed very 
much by the end of 2001, and that the invasion of Afghanistan thwarted its further 
development. Bruce Hoffman goes into somewhat more detail, as he notes that al-Qaeda’s 
activities in Afghanistan in fact consisted of two parallel efforts: one effort on the training-
camp level (experiments with crude chemicals, such as ricin and cyanide) and another effort 
on the top leadership level (efforts to obtain more viable warfare agents, such as anthrax).36   
Some of the more speculative accounts related to the Afghanistan period are claims that al-
Qaeda, at this stage, was cooperating with Iraqi scientists and the Sudanese government to set 
up chemical weapons factories in Sudan, and that the organization was already in possession 
of various military warfare agents.37 Of the most dubious accounts is a story that appeared in 
al-Waṭan al-῾Arabī  in November 1998, which was quoted by Michael Scheuer in Through our 
                                                 
32 Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda, 49. 
33 “United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., Defendants”, United States District Court, Southern 
district of New York (see transcripts from 7, 13 and 20 February, 2001), http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-dt.htm 
(accessed 19 December 2007). 
34 Two Pakistani nuclear scientists were arrested and charged with providing support to bin Laden, but were later 
released. Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 243-244. 
35 For example, in Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 243; Anonymous, Through our enemies’ eyes, 187. 
36 Hoffman, Inside terrorism, 275. 
37 Anonymous, Through our enemies’ eyes, 191-192. 
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Enemies’ Eyes: the story held that in September 1998, Osama bin Laden bought “more than 
twenty” nuclear warheads from the Chechen mafia for US$ 30 million and two tonnes of 
heroin.38 Such stories are widely disregarded by experts, however, as no hard evidence has 
ever been presented to verify the claims. Another controversial claim is that the al-Shifa 
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, which was bombed by the US in 1998, was producing 
chemical warfare agents for Osama bin Laden. While Michael Scheuer defends the attack in 
his account, Peter Bergen refers to it as an “intelligence fiasco” and argues that according to 
independent evidence, the plant was simply a pharmaceutical factory, and never a front for 
bin Laden.39
In The Osama bin Laden I Know, Peter Bergen deals more extensively with the subject of ‘al-
Qaeda’s quest for WMD’ by providing a range of primary sources on the subject, mostly 
quotes from al-Qaeda members and associates.40 The sources range from often quoted 
accounts such as bin Laden’s interviews with Western media in 1998, to less known sources 
such as Abū Walīd al-Maṣrī’s account of al-Qaeda’s Shura Council’s discussions of WMD 
(see Chapter five). This account differs considerably from those discussed above, many of 
which aimed at simply ‘proving’ al-Qaeda’s interest in non-conventional weapons. Bergen’s 
account paints a more complex picture of reality, quoting sources that even contradict each 
other. However, he mostly lets the sources speak for themselves without providing any deeper 
analysis or explanation.41
In general, the books I have reviewed concentrate on the history of al-Qaeda up until 
November 2001. Few of them, therefore, discuss al-Qaeda’s non-conventional weapons 
ambitions after the loss of Afghanistan. But there are various articles analyzing the period 
after 2001. They are mostly concerned with two developments: the ‘WMD fatwā’ issued by 
the Saudi radical cleric Nasir bin Hamd al-Fahd in 2003, and attempts by militant Islamist 
cells to carry out attacks with crude CBRN materials in Europe, the United States and the 
Middle East.42 A few individual articles have also been written about al-Qaeda’s online 
                                                 
38 It was perhaps this story that Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī mocked when he allegedly told the Pakistani journalist 
Hamid Mir in late 2001 that “Mr. Hamid Mir it is not difficult [to purchase nuclear weapons]. If you have thirty 
million dollars, you can have this kind of suitcase bombs from the black market of central Asia.” The existence 
of so-called “suitcase nukes” has been widely dismissed by nuclear experts. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I 
know, 348-349; Anonymous, Through our enemies’ eyes, 191-192.  
39 Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 126-129. 
40 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I know, 337-349. 
41 Ibid. 
42 For example, Bruce Hoffman, “CBRN terrorism post-9/11”, in Russell D. Howard and James J. Forest, eds., 
Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism (USA: McGraw-Hill, 2008); René Pita, “Assessing al-Qaeda’s 
chemical threat”, Athena Paper 2, no. 7 (17 April 2007). http://www.athenaintelligence.org/op10.pdf (accessed 
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CBRN literature.43 This literature review shows that most of the topics and sources I will 
discuss in my thesis have to some extent already been mentioned in earlier literature, but have 
seldom been thoroughly analysed or seen in relation to each other.   
2.2.2 Literature on the phenomenon of CBRN terrorism 
The next category of literature deals with the phenomenon of ‘CBRN terrorism’. In general, 
studies within this field usually have one of three approaches, which I have labelled 
‘statistics-based’, ‘weapons-based’ and ‘actor-based’. 
The statistics-based approach looks at all incidents of CBRN terrorism taking place over a 
certain time period, and attempts to identify various development trends. The problem with 
this approach is that the number of CBRN incidents per year is so low that it is hard to draw 
any conclusions from the data. This will be further highlighted in chapter three, in which I 
have used some of these databases to provide a general overview of the phenomenon of 
CBRN terrorism.  
The weapons-based approach intends to calculate the effects of the potential use of various 
CBRN weapons, and is mostly used for contingency planning. It is often conducted 
independently of various actors’ actual capabilities, based on the idea that one should always 
be prepared for the worst-case scenario. It is therefore not relevant to my study, except as 
background reading to get some basic technical knowledge about the various CBRN weapons.  
The actor-based approach is perhaps most useful for getting a comprehensive understanding 
of the phenomenon of CBRN terrorism. In particular, I have reviewed literature that aims to 
explain why some groups choose to pursue the CBRN option, while others do not. Before 
outlining some of these studies, however, it is necessary to clarify that these studies do not 
necessarily look at actors’ willingness to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
means the way I have defined them in this thesis. More often, the focus is on the actors’ 
intention and willingness to cause ‘mass destruction’ per se. As noted in the introduction, 
mass destruction does not necessarily involve the use of CBRN materials, and vice versa. Due 
to this ambiguity, Jerrold M. Post has suggested making the following distinction: a) mass-
casualty attack with conventional weapons; b) tactical use of chemical and biological 
                                                                                                                                                        
18 December 2007); Anne Speckhard, “The new global jihad, 9-11 and the use of weapons of mass destruction: 
Changes in mindset and modus operandi”, Democracy and Security 2 (2006):287-298.  
43 For example, Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, “Does intent equal capability? Al-Qaeda and weapons of 
mass destruction,” Nonproliferation Review 12, no.3 (November 2005): 615-653, and Anne Stenersen, “Chem-
bio cyber-class: Assessing jihadist chemical and biological manuals”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 September 
2007. 
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weapons (CBW); c) catastrophic, mass-casualty use of CBW.44 He argues that one does not 
necessarily imply the other, and that very few group types would be willing to use 
‘catastrophic’ chemical and biological weapons even if they were willing to use ‘tactical 
CBW’ as well as conventional ways of causing mass casualties.45 In order to gain a proper 
understanding of the phenomenon as well as of the actors using CBRN means, it is important 
to be aware of this distinction. 
What are the characteristics of sub-state actors who seek the use CBRN to achieve 
their goals? 
The use of chemical and biological agents by non-state actors is not a new phenomenon, as it 
goes back to at least the 1940s.46 It was not until the 1990s, however, that the subject of 
CBRN terrorism started to draw international attention. This was mainly the result of two 
concurrent developments: Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995,47 
and several incidents of conventional attacks that were more violent and, seemingly, more 
arbitrary than previous attacks, leading researchers to start talking about a ‘new’ kind of 
terrorism previously unheard of. In a 1999 study entitled The Ultimate Terrorists, Jessica 
Stern describes the emergence of a ‘new breed of terrorists’ that are more likely to carry out 
acts of WMD terrorism than traditional terrorist groups. Here, she singles out militant 
islamists as potential WMD terrorists, but the ‘new breed’ also includes right-wing extremists, 
apocalyptic cults and groups motivated by religious conviction or revenge.48  
Statistically, the terrorist attacks of today have become fewer, but more deadly. In that sense, 
the use of the term ‘new terrorism’ is justified. However, this should not lead us to think that 
terrorism is necessarily becoming more high-tech – rather it appears that the contrary is true.49 
Stern opens her book by describing a mass-casualty attack on Manhattan, which, at least in 
retrospect, could make one form ominous associations with the 11 September attacks. The 
difference is that while Stern predicted an attack involving an atomic bomb, the 11 September 
                                                 
44 Tucker’s study only considers the use of chemical and biological materials and weapons, and uses the term 
CBW (chemical and biological weapons) to refer to them. Tucker, Toxic Terror, 288.  
45 Ibid. 
46 In 1946, for example, the group Avenging Israel’s Blood poisoined the bread of German war prisoners. In the 
1970s, several attempts to use biological agents by American right-wing groups were recorded. Tucker, Toxic 
Terror and Anthony H. Cordesman, The challenge of biological terrorism (Washington: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2005).   
47 Aum Shinrikyo was a Japanese cult that carried out a series of attacks with biological and chemical materials 
between 1990-1995. The deadliest and most well-known attack was an attack with Sarin gas on the Tokyo 
subway in March 1995 that killed twelve and injured over a thousand. Tucker, Toxic Terror, 221. 
48 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, 3rd printing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 8. 
49 Adam Dolnik, Understanding terrorist innovation: Technology, tactics and global trends (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 53. 
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attacks were carried out using commercial aircraft. Again, this illustrates that a willingness to 
commit mass-casualty terrorism does not necessarily mean that the actor will actually seek to 
use CBRN materials. The al-Qaeda network has, both before and since 2001, chosen 
conventional methods in an overwhelming majority of its attacks and plots.   
A group’s willingness to use WMD is often explained in terms of the incentives and 
disincentives the group has for carrying out mass-casualty attacks. Groups, such as socio-
revolutionary or nationalist-separatist groups, that seek the support of a larger audience are 
viewed as less likely to carry out acts of WMD terrorism, because this would make them lose 
popular support. Similarly, groups controlling a clearly defined territory are viewed as less 
willing to opt for WMD terrorism due to the danger of retaliation attacks. However, a 
theoretical evaluation of incentives and disincentives does not necessarily explain a group’s 
choice of action on the ground. Fighting for a nationalist-separatist cause did not prevent 
Chechen militants from taking an entire primary school hostage in September 2004, although 
the deliberate targeting of children would most certainly create controversy and alienate 
supporters. The choice of action becomes more ‘logical’, however, when looking at the brutal 
history of the Chechen conflict, especially Shamil Basayev’s earlier choosing of controversial 
targets.50 In order to get a more accurate picture of ‘typical CBRN terrorists’, therefore, it is 
more useful to look at what kinds of groups have actually committed acts of CBRN terrorism 
in the past.  
In Toxic Terror, Tucker et al. have closely examined twelve historical cases of CBW 
(chemical and biological weapons) –terrorism, occurring between 1945-1998, in order to 
pinpoint the characteristics and motivations of such groups.51 The cases selected were those 
“... most often cited in the academic terrorism literature, including religious cults, right-wing 
and left-wing terrorist organizations, and ‘amateur terrorists’”.52 One of the findings of the 
study was that three of the cases, widely believed to be incidents of CBW terrorism, were 
poorly documented and most likely apocryphal. They were therefore disregarded in the final 
                                                 
50 In 1995, for example, a group of militants led by Basayev took an entire hospital as hostage in the city of 
Budyonnovsk, Stavropol (north of Chechnya). In this famous case, Basayev succeeded in making Russia comply 
to separatist demands, greatly contributing to his popularity. 
51 The cases include both suspected, planned and actual use of chemical or biological agents by non-state actors. 
Radiological and Nuclear terrorism have not been included in this study because of the lack of historical 
examples of these kind of cases. Tucker, Toxic Terror.  
52 Tucker, Toxic Terror, 13. The groups examined were Avenging Israel’s Blood (1946), Weather Underground 
(1970), R.I.S.E. (1972), Alphabet Bomber (1974), Baader-Meinhof Gang (1975), Red Army Faction (1980), 
Rajneeshees (1984), The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (1986), Minnesota Patriots Council 
(1991), WTC Bombers (1993), Aum Shinrikyo (1995), Larry Wayne Harris (1995, 1998). 
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analysis.53 Tucker’s Toxic Terror concluded that the groups engaging in CBW terrorism had 
very diverse motivations for doing so, although a set of common characteristics could be 
identified. Rather than having a political motivation, the individuals or groups were motivated 
by “religious fanaticism, supremacist ideology, or apocalyptic prophecy”, and the terrorists 
... manifest personality traits of paranoia and grandiosity, are innovative in their use of 
violence, tend to escalate [their violence] over time, typically have no clearly defined 
base of political support and hence are unconcerned about adverse public opinion, and 
are often convinced that they are fulfilling a divine command or prophecy that 
legitimates murder.54  
One example of a group displaying all of these characteristics is The Covenant, Sword and 
Arm of the Lord (CSA), founded in Arkansas in the 1970s. It was a right-wing, white 
supremacist group inspired by the Christian Identity movement, who planned to commit mass 
murder by poisoning the water supplies of several US cities with potassium cyanide. The 
objective was to “hasten the return of Messiah by ‘carrying out God’s judgements’ against 
unrepentant sinners”.55 It used very selective interpretations of the Bible to justify its 
ideology, in a way resembling the way militant Islamists (ab)use Koranic verses. Apart from 
that, however, there were few resemblances with militant Islamist networks like al-Qaeda. 
The CSA was small and locally based, they did not care about the opinions of anyone outside 
the organization, they did not act to achieve political goals, but were instead driven by a 
paranoid concept that Armageddon was imminent, and they did not have any specific strategy 
to win the ‘war’: Apparently, this was not necessary because of a conviction that God would 
take care of everything, and would even ensure that only “those who were meant to die” 
would be affected by the poisoned water.56 The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, also described 
in detail in Tucker’s study, represents the largest scale effort by a terrorist group to produce 
and disseminate chemical and biological agents. Similar to the CSA, it was also driven by a 
mixture of apocalyptic ideology, paranoia, defensive aggression and a charismatic 
leadership.57  
The bombing of the World Trade Centre (WTC) in 1993 by a group of militant islamists led 
by Ramzi Yusef (a nephew of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, who was later to become al-
Qaeda’s 9/11 mastermind) is included in Tucker’s study because of the alleged plan to 
                                                 
53 The three dismissed cases involved the Weather Underground, and the two cases of Baader-Meinhof Gang/ 
Red Army Faction. All were left-wing socio-revolutionary movements. Tucker, Toxic Terror, 249-252. 
54 Ibid., 266-267. 
55 Jessica Stern, quoted in Ibid., 139.  
56 Ibid., 151. 
57 A detailed account of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW-efforts can be found in Tucker, Toxic Terror, 207-226. 
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incorporate cyanide gas in the attack. A container of sodium cyanide was found in a storage 
shed used by the bombers, but there was no forensic evidence that cyanide had been present in 
the actual bomb. Significantly, sodium cyanide or chemical weapons were not mentioned by 
the prosecution in the case at all. There were, however, strong indications that the group had 
at least considered the use of chemical weapons, either in the WTC bomb or in a later 
attack.58 Interestingly, the study points out Ramzi Yusef’s apparent lack of religious 
motivations for wanting to carry out the attack. While some of his co-defendants expressed 
religious sentiments, Yusef appeared to be “... a secular terrorist who mobilized others by 
playing on their religious zeal”.59 His main motive appears to have been punishment and 
revenge, “... driven by a confluence of anti-American and anti-Israeli rage and a significant 
dose of ego rather than religious ideology”.60 This in contrast to groups like the CSA, who 
believed their use of chemical and biological weapons would fulfil a divine prophecy.  
Other studies based on historical cases of CBRN terrorism tend to support Tucker’s findings. 
In particular, the ‘emotional’ factor tends to be emphasized as decisive in whether or not a 
group will opt for CBRN terrorism. Dolnik and Guanaratna writes:  
Empirically speaking, organizations that have in the past gone beyond merely 
expressing interest in chemical and biological agents have been groups for whom these 
weapons had a strong expressive or emotional value, such as the desire to kill without 
shedding blood or the interpretation of poisons and plagues as God’s tools.61
As Gary Ackerman has pointed out, however, there is still a great lack of research into the 
field of CBRN terrorism.62 In order to thoroughly understand what drives a particular actor to 
use CBRN materials in violent attacks, one should not only compare case studies of groups 
that have attempted to carry out acts of CBRN terrorism, but also consider groups who have 
not carried out such acts so that one can check whether the actor typology is in fact valid. 
Another question is whether creating such actor typologies is sufficient to understand all 
aspects of the phenomenon. A broader approach is to look at the process of how groups 
develop and change their tactics. 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 197-199, 205. 
59 Ibid., 203. 
60 Ibid., 205-206. 
61 Howard and Forest, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, 284.  
62 Gary Ackerman, “WMD terrorism research: Whereto from here?”, International studies review 7 (2005), 140-
143. 
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2.2.3 Literature on the process of innovation in militant organizations 
The ability to learn and transfer knowledge is, of course, vital for any group or organization. 
Ability to learn increases the chance of success, and enhances the ability to adapt to new 
environments. If a group does not learn, its success is determined more by chance.63 In a 
recent study on the topic of innovation in militant groups, Adam Dolnik aims to develop “...a 
comprehensive theory of terrorist innovation, which will attempt to explain the circumstances 
and characteristics that determine the level of a group’s involvement in tactical and/or 
technological innovation”.64 The study also aims to develop a practical tool for use in threat 
assessments. 
Dolnik uses a broad definition of ‘innovation’ adjusted to fit the reality of militant groups. 
Innovation is, put simply, “an act of introduction of a new method or technology or the 
improvement of an already existing capability.”65 He argues that previous research into the 
field can be divided into two ‘schools’: those who hold that militants will always seek to 
innovate in order to increase their chance of success (based on business theories), and those 
who argue that militants are conservative, and that innovation is reactive, not pro-active 
(based on empirical research). Dolnik notes that both schools have their weaknesses. The 
‘business theory approach’ is supported by little empirical evidence, and the ‘empirical 
approach’ has so far failed to explain why some groups still choose to innovate. His study 
aims to fill this gap in current research into innovation.  
Dolnik’s study is divided into two parts: the first part looks at tactics and technologies 
developed by non-state actors so far, identifying when innovation occurred and why; in the 
second part, he conducts a comparative analysis of four case studies aimed at identifying the 
specific conditions and factors that drove the groups to change their modus operandi.66
Trends in tactics and technologies 
First, Dolnik describes the various tactics and technologies used by sub-state actors 
throughout history, including primitive attacks (knives, daggers and arson), firearms, stand-
off weapons (mortars, rockets, surface-to air-missiles etc.), hostage taking, explosions and the 
use of CBRN materials. He observes three trends:   
                                                 
63 Brian E. Jackson et al., Aptitude for destruction: Organizational learning in terrorist groups and its 
implications for combating terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005): iii, xiv. 
64 Dolnik, Understanding terrorist innovation, 146, 173. 
65 Ibid., 6. 
66 Ibid.  
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- First, he notes that most terrorist innovation is incremental, meaning that the actors do 
not innovate new technology and tactics in the true sense of the word, but instead 
improve their ability to use traditional tactics, and make better use of already existing 
technologies.  
- A second, important trend is the “... multiplication and synchronization of traditional 
tactics, rather than the use of new tactics and weaponry.”67 He points out that the 11 
September attack was the “ultimate terrorist attack” not because any of its single 
elements was particularly new or innovative,68 but because it combined so many 
elements in one single attack: primitive weaponry, plane hijacking, synchronization, 
stand-off attack capability (using planes as missiles), explosions, (using plane fuel), 
and suicide operatives.  
- Third, he observes a trend towards more technologically crude modes of attack, 
indicated, for example, by the global rise of suicide bombings. 
Dolnik’s third observation does not imply that militant groups generally shun modern 
technologies. On the contrary, a wide variety of groups have shown an ability to rapidly adjust 
to new technologies that can serve their communications and propaganda purposes, such as 
satellite phones and the Internet.69
What are the characteristics of innovative groups?  
In the second part of his study, Dolnik looks at four case studies of groups: three that are 
known to innovate (Aum Shinrikyo, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the 
Riyadus-Salikhin Suicide Battalion), and one which has never innovated (November 17). He 
compares the four case studies based on 11 variables, each thought to be relevant to the 
process of innovation: 1)the role of ideology and strategy; 2) the dynamics of the struggle; 3) 
countermeasures; 4) targeting logic; 5) attachment to weaponry/innovation; 6) group 
dynamics; 7) relationship with other organizations; 8) resources; 9) openness to new ideas; 
10) durability; and 11) the nature of the technology.  
                                                 
67 Dolnik, Understanding terrorist innovation, 53. 
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He concludes that very few of the variables can universally explain what distinguishes an 
innovative group from a conservative one. However, certain combinations of variables 
increase the likelihood that a group will innovate, and succeed in doing so.70 He identifies 
four “triggers” that in particular might influence a group to innovate:  
- The group has an ideology or strategy that requires innovation in order to obtain 
the goal. 
- Competition with other organizations in the same operational theatre 
- Presence of government countermeasures directly preventing the group from using 
methods used in the past. 
- Incidental or unintended acquisition of a particular human or material resource (if 
consistent with strategic and targeting preferences, if the group has the necessary 
capability to use the resource, and if it is not perceived as too risky, physically or 
politically).71 
He notes that while the presence of one or more of these factors may make innovation more 
likely, none of them require innovation to take place. This is ultimately determined by the 
“non-rational component”, as he puts it:  
The presence of the non-rational component such as the expressive emphasis to 
innovation, overly high ambitions in the operational realm, and ideological or 
expressive attachment to a particular type of weapon or technology serves as the 
strongest and most universal pre-indicator of the propensity of a terrorist group to 
innovate.72  
The literature reviewed so far has identified certain factors that have characterized groups 
who have used CBRN weapons, or who have innovated in their tactics in the past. However, 
the conclusions are mostly derived from case studies of relatively small and homogenous 
groups, and they are therefore not necessarily transferable to the al-Qaeda network. In order to 
cover this aspect I have also reviewed literature that sees organizational structure itself as a 
explanatory factor for whether innovation will take place or not.  
Jones’ hypothesis on how organizational structure affects innovation 
There are several studies within the field of how organizational structure affects innovation, 
but few of them are connected to sub-state actors specifically. Several studies have looked at 
the military innovations of states. Based on a study of the US and the Soviet Union during the 
                                                 
70 Dolnik, Understanding terrorist innovation, 172. 
71 Ibid., 173-175. 
72 Ibid., 175. 
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Cold War, Mathew Evangelista argues that the more centralized an organization is, the less 
innovative it is. However, he also points out that although centralized organizations innovate 
less frequently, the ability to implement is higher.73 Murray and Millet have argued that 
radical innovation is a top-down process, while incremental innovation is a bottom-up 
process, as it depends on “organizational focus over a sustained period of time rather than one 
particular individual’s capacity to guide the path of innovation for a short period of time.”74 
The question is whether these theories are applicable to sub-state actors. In the above-
mentioned study on innovation, Dolnik draws from these theories when formulating a 
hypothesis about how ‘group dynamics’ facilitate innovation. His hypothesis is that “loosely 
knit or heavily factionalized groups that experience strong internal pressures will demonstrate 
a greater desire to innovate, but will have more difficulty in completing this process 
successfully”, while highly structured groups are likely to have a greater capability to 
innovate successfully, but only under the condition that the decision to innovate is made at the 
highest level. The reason to look also at the level of internal pressures and disputes, he argues, 
is that innovation may be seen as a ‘reconciliation tool’.75 When testing the hypothesis on 
four case studies, however, Dolnik did not find any strong correlation between innovation and 
the level of internal disputes. On the contrary, he finds that hierarchical organizations led by 
innovation-prone leaders are more likely both to innovate and succeed in it. He also agrees 
with Murray and Millet’s finding that radical innovation is most likely to be a top-down 
process. This implies that radical innovation is connected to the leader’s personal preferences 
(which in turn is influenced by other factors, such as an ‘expressive attraction’ to a particular 
weapon). He notes, however, that while centralized organizations are generally better at 
succeeding in their innovations, a strong leader may also decrease the ability to succeed. In 
the case of Aum Shinrikyo, the groups’ members were so obsessed with pleasing their leader 
that it affected their rational scientific judgment, making the innovation attempt less 
successful. 
As previously mentioned, Dolnik does not discuss the process of innovation in networked 
organizations at all. Calvert Jones has, however, made an attempt to discuss the innovative 
                                                 
73 Mathew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop 
New Military Technologies (London: Cornell University Press, 1988). 
74 Wiliamson R. Murray and Allan R. Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 264. 
75 Dolnik, Understanding terrorist innovation, 17-18. 
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capabilities of the al-Qaeda network drawing on organizational theory.76 He analyses the 
process of organizational learning within al-Qaeda based on an ‘exploration-exploitation 
framework,’ i.e. discussing both al-Qaeda’s ability to innovate new ideas, as well as the 
ability to exploit them effectively. Exploration includes “... experimentation, search, risk-
taking and innovation; whereas exploitation involves refinement, efficiency, execution and 
professionalism.”77  His main argument is that al-Qaeda’s transnational network structure has 
strengthened the network’s ability to explore and innovate, while the ability to exploit 
resources and expertise has been weakened. Al-Qaeda militants are thus described as 
“innovative improvisers with high creative potential but low professionalism.”78  
The al-Qaeda network’s ability to innovate, Jones argues, is strengthened due to two main 
developments: first, after the loss of their permanent bases in Afghanistan, the network is 
increasingly seeking to ‘outsource’ their activities to other groups, leading to increased 
exposure to outside ideas and expertise; second, the lack of hierarchical decision-making 
promotes a development leading to local cells and individuals acting on their own, without 
having to ask the central leadership for ‘approval’, and without having gone through a 
standardized indoctrination and training programme. 
Given the increase in ‘home-grown’ and largely amateurish al-Qaeda inspired terrorism the 
West has seen since 9/11, Jones’ conclusion initially seems to correspond to reality. However, 
Jones’ hypothesis has not yet been tested against an empirical case study of the al-Qaeda 
network. This is where I believe my thesis will fill a gap in current research, although my 
study is focused on CBRN innovation, and not on innovation in general.   
2.3 How I will use this framework as support for my analysis 
The aim of this thesis is not to develop new theories, but rather to perform an empirical case 
study of the al-Qaeda network, and to discuss the findings in relation to previous studies and 
existing literature on CBRN terrorism and innovation. In particular, I will use the case study 
to test the validity of the argument presented in Jones’ article about “al-Qaeda’s innovative 
improvisers”. On a more general level, the aim of the thesis is to contribute to a better 
understanding of how innovation takes place in networked organizations.  
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77 Ibid., 556. 
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The main research question is: what is the nature of al-Qaeda’s interest in CBRN weapons, as 
reflected by statements and activities on various levels within the network between 1996-
2006? I have divided the analysis into two parts: the aim of the first part is to review and 
analyse the source material in order to describe the history of al-Qaeda’s quest for non-
conventional weapons, and I shall focus on the period of 1996 onwards. 1996 was chosen 
because it marks the beginning of al-Qaeda’s ‘Afghanistan period’, and also because there are 
few indications of any serious efforts to obtain non-conventional weapons before that time 
(with the possible exception of bin Laden’s uranium procurement efforts in Sudan). The aim 
of the second part is to discuss why that particular historical development occurred. Initially, I 
wanted to answer “why has not al-Qaeda used CBRN weapons to achieve their goals?”79 This 
question, however, would require a discussion of both internal as well as external explanatory 
factors (for example, the arrest and capture of al-Qaeda leaders, the loss of Afghanistan as a 
secure haven, the success of non-proliferation regimes, the technical hurdles associated with 
CBRN weapons, etc.). In order to narrow down my analysis, I have chosen to focus on why 
there  is a lack of CBRN innovation within the al-Qaeda network. The question is relevant for 
several reasons: since the late 1990s, and especially since 2001, it has been widely expected 
that al-Qaeda would attempt to obtain CBRN weapons and use them in an attack on the 
United States. Moreover, al-Qaeda has previously demonstrated highly innovative capabilities 
(the 9/11 attacks); and, according to Jones’ hypothesis, al-Qaeda’s networked structure is 
supposed to further promote innovation. 
Part 1: Describing the history of al-Qaeda’s CBRN efforts 
Describing the history of al-Qaeda’s CBRN efforts is no straightforward task, since neither 
‘al-Qaeda’ nor ‘CBRN weapons’ are single variables. As mentioned in the introduction, I 
have defined the al-Qaeda network as consisting of four levels: central, affiliates, locals and 
sympathizers. For the sake of the analysis, CBRN weapons should also be divided into at least 
two levels: ‘low-end/tactical’ vs. ‘high-end/catastrophic’. As Dolnik notes, due to the 
enormous fear associated with CBRN terrorism, various conventional groups might seek a 
low-end CBRN capability and rely on crude agents or dual-use items. However, this “... 
                                                 
79 The question has been discussed in various articles, for example, John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism 
into perspective”, The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 2003):37-50; Chris Quillen, “Three explanations for al-
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should be understood as psychological operations that are aimed at creating disproportionate 
fear, but do not necessarily represent a terrifying shift to catastrophic terrorism”.80 In other 
words, seeking a low-end capability does not necessarily make someone a ‘superterrorist’.81 
When analyzing the source material, therefore, I have to determine what kind of weapons al-
Qaeda seems to be interested in. Do al-Qaeda’s CBRN efforts, in fact, reflect a true desire to 
become a ‘superterrorist’, or do they simply reflect efforts to obtain a tactical CBRN 
capability? And equally interesting, have these efforts changed over time? To guide my 
analysis, I have formulated three sub-questions to be answered in this part of the thesis: 
a) What kinds of CBRN weapons have al-Qaeda been interested in? 
b) What is the relative importance of CBRN weapons in relation to other weapons 
and tactics?  
c) How has the interest in CBRN weapons evolved? 
Part 2: Explaining the lack of innovation 
Tucker and Dolnik’s case studies indicate that there is a number of factors that may influence 
the process of innovation in the field of CBRN weapons, and these need to be taken into 
consideration before drawing any conclusions as to why al-Qaeda has not pursued CBRN 
weapons more actively. One drawback of applying Tucker and Dolnik’s studies to my 
analysis is that factors explaining why innovation occurred in the past do not necessarily 
apply to the present. In addition, the generalizations are based on case studies of relatively 
homogenous groups, thus not reflecting the kind of innovation dynamics that apply to the 
networked structure that al-Qaeda represents. Though there is a lot of theoretical literature 
about innovation in networks, there are few case studies. In order to answer the second sub-
question I have used arguments and findings from the above-mentioned literature to formulate 
three hypotheses regarding al-Qaeda’s lack of CBRN ambitions:  
a) CBRN weapons are not necessary to obtain the goal  
b) There is not sufficient ‘emotional attraction’ in the use of CBRN weapons 
c) Al-Qaeda’s organizational structure prevents innovation 
In other words, the hypotheses seek to explain the lack of CBRN interest both in terms of 
rational choices, ‘irrational’ factors as well as organizational structure. In part two of my 
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analysis, I will discuss the validity of these three hypotheses based on the source material and 
findings from part 1 of the analysis.   
3 Methods and sources 
The method used in this thesis is mainly qualitative analysis of text documents, most of which 
have been accessed via the Internet. I have not conducted any interviews or surveys. 
Interviewing members of the al-Qaeda network about their CBRN interest would obviously 
be a very relevant method to answer my research question; but this would be impossible due 
to the secretive nature of the network and the lack of access to sources. Instead, I have based 
the analysis on oral and written statements by al-Qaeda members, other al-Qaeda 
publications, as well as a variety of secondary sources such as court documents and media 
reports. I have consciously sought to use a variety of different sources in order to confirm the 
accuracy of the information. In some cases, however, I have had to rely on a few or only one 
source, but I have nonetheless included them, although with certain reservations.  
Statements by al-Qaeda members include both statements aimed at a Western audience (such 
as interviews with Western periodicals) as well as statements aimed at potential and current 
supporters. I have also included, to the extent I have been able to access them, documents and 
statements meant for internal use within al-Qaeda.   
In addition to looking at official and unofficial al-Qaeda documents, I have also chosen to 
look at al-Qaeda’s activities in the CBRN field. It is necessary to compare statements and 
actions in order to test whether al-Qaeda-statements reflect actual attitudes, or whether they 
are mere propaganda. Similarly, analyzing al-Qaeda’s statements is important in order to 
correctly interpret al-Qaeda’s actions. For example, it is easy to misinterpret or overestimate 
the importance of a particular action unless we have a thorough understanding of al-Qaeda’s 
expressed intentions. My analysis of al-Qaeda’s activities is mainly based on judicial 
documents and media reports. 
I have aspired to include in my material all of al-Qaeda's statements and actions connected to 
CBRN weapons, but I had to make some selections throughout the work on this thesis. With 
regards to al-Qaeda central, the size of the source material was manageable. However, with 
regards to al-Qaeda affiliates I had to pick only one region (Iraq) and focus on CBRN 
statements and actions in that region only. When analyzing al-Qaeda locals, I have included 
only cases that were relatively well documented, i.e. cases in which cell members were 
arrested and judicial documents were publicly available. On the sympathizer level, I have 
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focused on analyzing texts from a few well-known discussion forums and web pages. Another 
limitation in my study has been to focus on the period from 1996-2006 only. I found it 
relevant to focus on this period because there are few indications that al-Qaeda had any 
CBRN-related activities before that time, although there are claims that Osama bin Laden has 
had certain nuclear and chemical aspirations since the early nineties. Also, as previously 
mentioned, 1996 can be said to represent the beginning of a new stage in al-Qaeda’s 
development, signified by Osama bin Laden’s return to Afghanistan and the issuance of the 
first communiqué in which he declares the United States an enemy. The main part of the 
Internet sources were collected during 2005-2006. I have allowed myself to also include 
material from 2007, however, when it can be used to shed light on the analysis.  
I have mostly used a qualitative approach, because I am seeking to interpret the meaning of 
certain statements and actions relative to a certain context. However, I have also used simple 
statistical methods in a few cases when counting incidents is meaningful, for example in 
analyzing the content of large message boards to determine the most popular topics discussed. 
A large part of my primary sources have been downloaded from jihadi webpages. One of the 
main challenges to this research strategy is the question of the validity and reliability of the 
sources. This is a somewhat problematic question when dealing with the Internet in general, 
and jihadi web pages in particular, where the users are completely anonymous. While most 
jihadi discussion forums require users to register with a username, password and email 
address, there are usually no other screening processes involved.82 In theory, therefore, 
anyone could write a jihadi document and post it on a forum. How do we know that this 
material represents the writings of jihadists? Most importantly, jihadist material is subject to 
internal control. An indicator of a text’s authenticity is that the material is accepted and 
recommended by other jihadists, as well as re-produced and spread to other jihadi webpages. 
There are a few examples that writings perceived as ‘fake’ have been rejected and even 
deleted by the forum administrators, although this mostly concerns ideological and 
propaganda material, not training material.83 Another indicator of authenticity is that the text 
                                                 
82 Different forums have, at different times, operated with various forms of ‘screening,’ such as requiring 
personal references from other members, or a certain amount of message postings. Members within the forum 
may also have different statuses and rights. Some sub-forums are open for everyone to view but posting in them 
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83 Examples of material perceived as ‘fake’ are, in particular, material that may instigate internal strife and does 
not serve the cause of jihad (e.g. a video of a jihadi group torturing a member of another jihadi group in Iraq). It 
seems technical and training material is subject to less control, probably due to the limited technical knowledge 
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carries the logo of an ‘official’ jihadist group or media outlet, or is posted by an active and 
well-known ‘internet jihadist’ as opposed to a new and totally unknown user. Finally, 
probably the best indicator of authenticity is that the material has actually been used in real 
life, for example that it is identical to or resembles documents found in jihadi training camps 
or in the apartments of arrested suspects. The manuals and documents I have downloaded 
from jihadi web pages generally fulfil one or more of these criteria. While this is not full 
‘proof’ of their authenticity, a narrower selection criterion would result in too few sources.     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the participants. Although there is a lot of inaccurate technical information, no example of a deliberately 
falsified training manual has in fact been seen, although it cannot be ruled out. 
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4 Background on CBRN terrorism and al-Qaeda 
4.1 The phenomenon of ‘CBRN terrorism’ 
Several books have already been written examining historical cases of CBRN terrorism and 
providing chronologies of all events taking place throughout history. In this subchapter, I will 
not repeat this information, but instead make some general observations to place to some 
extent the phenomenon in perspective. First, the use of CBRN materials in acts of political 
violence is not a new phenomenon; secondly, that when compared to other types of political 
violence, CBRN terrorism is extremely rare, and has caused very few fatalities.  
4.1.1 The history of CBRN terrorism 
According to some historians, the tactic of using chemical or biological materials in warfare is 
several thousand years old. Already by the sixth century B.C., the Assyrians were thought to 
be poisoning their enemies’ wells with rye ergot. An early example of “biological warfare” is 
when the Tartar army threw plague-infested bodies over the walls of the city of Kaffa during a 
siege in 1346.84 This subchapter, however, will not consider the use of CBRN materials by 
regular armies, or the history of state-run WMD programmes. In order to provide a relevant 
background to the analysis of al-Qaeda’s CBRN interest, the chapter is limited to discussing 
sub-state actors’ use of CBRN material in acts of political violence. One of the earliest well-
documented examples of the use of a chemical poison by a non-state actor dates back to 1946, 
when the group Avenging Israel’s Blood poisoned the bread of Nazi prisoners in an American 
camp outside Nuremberg, Germany. The number of fatalities is unknown, but reportedly 
2,283 prisoners fell ill and 207 were hospitalized. An early attempt to use a biological agent 
occurred in 1972, when an American environmentalist group planned to poison water supplies 
with typhoid bacteria. The group was arrested before it could put the plan into practice, but 
had several bacterial cultures in its possession.85 The use of radiological materials for terrorist 
purposes is a more recent phenomenon. Though no attack with a radiological dispersal device 
(RDD) has actually taken place, sub-state actors have occasionally been in possession of 
radiological materials that could be used in RDDs or so-called ‘dirty bombs’. An infamous 
incident occurred in 1995, when Chechen separatists placed a package with a small amount of 
the radioactive isotope Caesium-137 in a park in Moscow, followed by a tip-off to the 
Russian press. There was no attempt to disperse the material, however.   
                                                 
84 See for example the chronology in Cordesman, The challenge of biological terrorism, 12-17.  
85 For a detailed description of these cases, see Tucker, Toxic Terror. 
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As Dolnik points out, by far the most common type of CBRN terrorism is the use of primitive 
and easily obtainable chemical and biological materials, often dual-use items (potassium 
cyanide, chlorine, salmonella bacteria, insecticides, etc.). The use of actual warfare agents is, 
by comparison, extremely rare. Arguably, there are only two such cases in history, namely 
Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, and the so-called ‘anthrax 
letters’ that caused widespread panic on the East coast of the US in late 2001.86 Although the 
Aum Shinrikyo group managed to manufacture sarin gas themselves, warfare agents normally 
have to be purchased on the black market, obtained from ‘insiders’ or even stolen. 
4.1.2 How significant is the phenomenon? 
A search in some of the biggest ‘terrorism databases’ online reveals that CBRN terrorism is, 
compared to other forms of political violence, neither frequent nor very deadly. The MIPT87 
Terrorism Knowledge Base has recorded more than 23,000 incidents of terrorism in the 
period 1998-2006, of which only 40 incidents (or 0.2 per cent) were connected to a chemical 
or biological agent. The database has not recorded any incidents of radiological or nuclear 
terrorism.88 According to the database, 38,000 people were killed as a result of terrorism in 
this period, out of which 10 were killed as a result of terrorism caused by a chemical or 
biological agent.89 Another and more recently created database, the Global Terrorism 
Database, hosted by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, contains nearly 80,000 terrorist incidents 
since 1970 and is currently updated through 2004.90 This database had recorded only 13 
“CBRN attacks” between 1998-2004. Incidents involving biological and chemical weapons 
reportedly accounted for merely 0.1 and 0.2 per cent respectively of the total number of 
incidents in this period.91  
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87 Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, based in Oklahoma City, United States. 
88 See MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, www.tkb.org (accessed 17 January 2007). 
89 In addition to 4 fatalities [5 according to other sources] caused by the ‘Anthrax letters’ in the US, the database 
has recorded 2 cases of assassination with a toxin in Kashmir, and 4 fatalities caused by a mass poisoning 
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90 The database claims to include “systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist incidents that 
have occurred during this time period”. See “Global Terrorism Database”, START: National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism website, http://www.start.umd.edu/ (accessed 19 December 
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91 See “Distribution by Weapon Types, 1998-2004”, and “Distribution by Attack Type, 1998-2004” START: 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism website, 
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The Monterey WMD Database is maintained by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, California, USA. The database presents itself as 
“the largest open source catalog of worldwide incidents involving the acquisition, possession, 
threat and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by sub-state actors”.92  The database 
does not record incidents of conventional terrorism. As of 1 January 2007, the database 
contained 1,438 CBRN incidents dating from the year 1900 until the present. Registration in 
the database started in 1997, and the majority of the incidents have taken place since 1998 
onwards.93 It needs to be noted, however, that 63 per cent of the events registered in the 
database belong to the categories of hoaxes/pranks, threats, plots and false cases, in which no 
actual CBRN agent was present. The database also includes CBRN events not traditionally 
related to terrorism, such as extortion threats, smuggling attempts and assassinations. 
However, it is possible to exclude these types of incidents when searching in the database. If 
we only include cases coded as “Use of Agent”, the database lists 168 cases, which have 
resulted in 756 fatalities in the period 1998-2006.94  
Database Period Incidents, total Incidents, CBRN Fatalities, total Fatalities, CBRN 
MIPT 1998-2006 23,477 40 38,017 10 
START 1998-2004 80,000 13 40,094 - 
Monterey 1998-2006 - 168 - 756 
Figure 1: WMD terrorism in perspective 
 
The figures from the Monterey WMD database might lead to the overly hasty conclusion that 
CBRN terrorism is far more deadly than conventional terrorism. A closer look at the data 
material reveals, however, that this is not necessarily the case. The number is highly 
influenced by three incidents which took place in Kenya (1998), Uganda (2000) and Nigeria 
(2000), and which claimed a total of 646 fatalities. The exact number of victims in these 
incidents is not clear, however, and it is uncertain whether the cause of death was a CBRN 
agent or conventional weapons.95 Hence, it is too early to conclude that CBRN terrorism has 
in fact become more deadly than conventional terrorism. In any case, the statistics leave no 
doubt that people who intend to cause terror still prefer conventional methods, and that CBRN 
                                                 
92 “About the database”, Monterey WMD Terrorism Database, http://cns.miis.edu/db/wmdt/index.htm (accessed 
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93 “Methodology”, Monterey WMD Terrorism Database, http://cns.miis.edu/db/wmdt/method.htm (accessed 19 
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94 Monterey WMD Terrorism Database, search conducted on 29 December 2006, 
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terrorism as of today remains a marginal phenomenon (if not in the threat perceptions in the 
West, so at least in terms of how terrorism is actually practiced today). 
4.2 Al-Qaeda and the global jihadi current 
The purpose of this thesis is not to explain the rise of al-Qaeda or the global jihadi current. A 
brief overview is necessary, however, in order to provide a basis for further analysis. In this 
overview I have emphasized describing the nature of the al-Qaeda network, its ideology and 
strategy.  
4.2.1 What is al-Qaeda? 
The early history of al-Qaeda is closely connected to the history of the Saudi businessman 
Osama bin Laden. Born in 1957 to a wealthy Saudi family, he travelled to Afghanistan in the 
1980s as one of many thousand Arab volunteers in the war against the Soviet Union. 
Although he reportedly participated in battles, his most important role was as a facilitator, 
sponsor and constructor. Around himself he gathered a small circle of associates and 
followers, but he was not the most prominent jihadi leader at the time. The Soviet withdrawal 
in 1989 gave an enormous moral boost to the jihadi movement, but this also implied that the 
many thousands of the supposedly battle-hardened Arabs in Afghanistan might need to find a 
new cause to fight for. Peter Bergen has argued that bin Laden, even at this point, envisioned 
setting up a contingent of foreign fighters to assist Muslim struggles around the world and to 
‘keep the jihad alive’. According to recovered documents, in 1998 a formation meeting was 
held of a group named al-qā῾ida al- caskariyya (the military base), which, some have argued, 
was the origin of the name al-Qaeda.96 At this stage, however bin Laden had not yet 
formulated his ideology of a global jihad. 
In 1989 he briefly returned to Saudi Arabia, but due to his involvement with militant 
Islamism, his relationship to the Saudi authorities became strained, and he was forced to leave 
the country. After a short period in Afghanistan he went to Sudan, where he stayed from 
1992-1996 with some of his associates from the Afghanistan period. In 1996 he returned to 
Afghanistan, where he could operate relatively freely after the Taliban movement taking 
power in September that year, and he became involved in financing and organizing camps to 
train young Muslims for jihad. At this point, bin Laden also shifted his focus from the ‘near’ 
to the ‘far’ enemy, namely the United States, and started to formulate the idea of a global 
                                                 
96 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know. For more on the origins of the name al-Qaeda, see also Burke, Al-
Qaeda, 1-9.  
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jihadi struggle. In August 1996, he declared war on the Americans on the Arabian Peninsula 
(referring to the US armed forces who were stationed in Saudi Arabia after an agreement with 
the Saudi government), followed in February 1998 by the well-known “Declaration of jihad 
against the Jews and Crusaders”, in which he stated that participating in the jihad is an 
individual duty (farḍ ῾ayn) for all Muslims.97 This represents a shift from traditional jihad 
doctrines, which describe jihad as a collective duty (farḍ kifāya), meaning that “[its] fulfilment 
... by a sufficient number of individuals excuses the other individuals from fulfilling it.”98 In 
the case of a defensive jihad, however, jihad will become an individual duty for fighting-fit 
Muslims living in the territory under attack.99 Bin Laden’s argument for making jihad an 
individual duty for all Muslims is that he defines the whole Muslim world as currently under 
attack by the West. The first major operation connected to al-Qaeda was the bombings of the 
US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998. 
In the period from 1996-2001, however, bin Laden’s group may have acted more like a 
sponsor of other groups and individuals, rather than being a tightly knit organization which 
planned and carried out its own operations. As Burke puts it, al-Qaeda acted as “... a venture-
capitalist firm, sponsoring projects submitted by a variety of groups or individuals in the hope 
that they would be profitable.”100 Reading the history of al-Qaeda, it becomes clear that 
operational plans were often formulated on lower levels in the network, and then presented to 
senior al-Qaeda leaders for approval and funding. The 11 September attacks, for example, 
were not bin Laden’s idea, but were masterminded by a Kuwaiti engineer, Khalid Sheikh 
Muhammad (Ḫālid Šayḫ Muḥammad), in the mid-1990s.101 Muhammad claims to have 
presented his plans to bin Laden as early as 1996, when he was not even a formal member of 
al-Qaeda (in the sense that he had not sworn a bayān, or oath of allegiance, to bin Laden). 
Rather, he acted as an independent ‘entrepreneur’ who, like many other militant Islamists at 
the time, turned to al-Qaeda for material support. Bin Laden initially rejected the plan, but 
decided to support it in March or April 1999, after Muhammad had sworn the oath of 
allegiance to him.102  
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98 Lewis, Pellat and Schacht, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 539, 790. 
99 Ibid., 539. 
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This special group dynamic, which involves operatives on lower levels of the network 
initiating plans and then seeking approval from the leadership, makes al-Qaeda very different 
from traditional top-down organizations. At the same time, neither can the decision-making 
process in al-Qaeda be described as simply bottom-up as the al-Qaeda leadership may modify 
the plans proposed, or even come up with new ones.103 In chapter five, I will discuss how this 
dynamic has influenced al-Qaeda’s CBRN activities. 
Jason Burke argues that al-Qaeda has three dimensions: the ‘al-Qaeda hardcore’ (Osama bin 
Laden and his close circle of associates); the ‘network of networks’ (militant Islamist groups 
and individuals who have some connection to the ‘hardcore’); and ‘the ideology’, which in his 
view has become most important since 2001.104 Bruce Hoffman, on the other hand, does not 
label ideology as a separate dimension of al-Qaeda, but describes al-Qaeda as a physical 
network with four layers: central, affiliates, locals and network, which are also the basis for 
my analysis of the network.105
4.2.2 Al-Qaeda’s goal and strategy  
Al-Qaeda’s goal, in its own words, is to defend Muslim territory from foreign invaders and 
the United States is viewed as the principal enemy because it is the source of both direct and 
indirect suppression of Muslims. The US directly suppresses Muslims due to its military 
presence in Afghanistan, Iraq and other Muslim countries. The US also suppresses Muslims 
indirectly due to its political and economic support to Israel and secular governments in the 
Muslim world. Since 2001, several al-Qaeda members have also expressed a desire not only 
to defend the Islamic nation, but also to punish the United States for atrocities committed 
against Muslims. To obtain its goal, al-Qaeda has as its main strategy to carry out violent 
attacks against the United States and its allies, preferably on the enemy’s own territory. The 
purpose of the attacks is to weaken the United States, but also to awaken the Islamic nation 
(al-umma) to fight against Western suppression. Al-Qaeda has not shown a willingness to 
compromise or negotiate, because brute force is viewed as the only language the United States 
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will understand.106 As bin Laden expressed it in 2004, “... [t]here can be no dialogue with the 
occupiers except with weapons.”107
4.2.3 Are all tactics acceptable? 
Al-Qaeda are often described as having no moral qualms when it comes to using violence 
against civilians. Jerrold M. Post writes in The Psychology of WMD Terrorism that “... there’s 
no ambivalence concerning use of violence that is religiously commanded”.108 This is not 
very descriptive of al-Qaeda’s use of violence, however. The network has demonstrated that 
its approach to the use of violence is not straightforward; it is constantly debated and revised 
in response to external developments and changes. This includes lengthy discussions about 
lawful targets and tactics. 
While many of these discussions are based on interpretations of religious texts (the Koran and 
Hadith), al-Qaeda leaders have also shown a more pragmatic approach. Tactics that do not 
benefit the cause, for example, should be avoided. This was illustrated in a letter sent by 
Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī to al-Qaeda’s local leader in Iraq, Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Zarqāwī, in 2005, in 
which al-Zawahiri condemns al-Zarqāwī’s campaign of beheading and the targeting of Iraqi 
Shi'ite Muslims. Explaining the importance of the Iraqi people’s support to win the war, he 
argues that “... the jihadist movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand 
or approve, if there is no contravention of Sharia in such avoidance, and as long as there are 
other options to resort to...”109 He says al-Zarqāwī is justified in arguing that the enemy 
‘deserves’ the use of such tactics based on the principle of equal retaliation, however, 
... this does not change the reality at all, which is that the general opinion of our 
supporter does not comprehend that, and that this general opinion falls under a 
campaign by the malicious, perfidious, and fallacious campaign by the deceptive and 
fabricated media.110  
Rather than using religious arguments to criticize al-Zarqāwī, al-Zawahiri points to the actual 
situation on the ground and carefully explains why al-Zarqāwī’s brutal methods combined 
with the enemy’s media dominance will give him a strategic disadvantage in the war. Other 
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ideologues have also tended to question the efficiency, rather than the legitimacy, of such 
methods.111 When trying to explain al-Qaeda’s choice of tactics, therefore, it is important to 
remember that this is not necessarily limited by (or inspired by) religious texts, but is simply a 
result of rational judgments and the current needs of the battlefield. Zawahiri’s letter also 
refutes another usual claim, namely that al-Qaeda lacks a constituency, and therefore has no 
constraints with regards to its use of violence. As stated above, al-Qaeda’s goal is not only to 
repel or punish the United States, but to rally the Islamic nations (?) to the common cause. Al-
Qaeda leaders appear to be well aware that the excessive use of violence (killing women and 
children, for example) will be used by the enemy in propaganda to undermine al-Qaeda’s 
cause.112 Therefore, al-Qaeda leaders are making constant efforts to justify their actions in 
order not to isolate themselves from potential supporters within the Islamic nation. How the 
violence is justified, and how effective it is in convincing the Umma, is another discussion. 
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5 The history of al-Qaeda’s quest for CBRN weapons  
“Despite their extreme danger, we only became aware of them [chemical and biological 
weapons] when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that 
they can be produced simply...”113
-Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī (1999) 
 
As stated previously, the aim of this chapter is to examine al-Qaeda’s statements and activities 
on various levels within the network in order to describe the history of al-Qaeda’s efforts in 
the field of CBRN weapons. Grouping the empirical data into four levels is not meant to 
illustrate that there are four different and independent ‘al-Qaedas’ which conduct CBRN 
activities totally independently of each other. As will be illustrated later, the four levels are 
dynamic and in constant interaction. Ideological and strategic guidelines occur at the ‘al-
Qaeda central’ level, and may or may not influence the other parts of the network. ‘Al-Qaeda 
central’ may be involved in planning an operation, but this could also be initiated entirely on 
the ‘locals’ level. Individuals on the ‘sympathizer’ level may never actually have met fellow 
al-Qaeda sympathizers, except in virtual settings, or they might play vital roles as media and 
propaganda agencies for the ‘affiliates’ level. In many cases, it might be hard to attribute a 
statement or an activity to a specific level. This is especially true of the online training 
manuals, which have been placed on the ‘sympathizer’ level, although they can also be 
regarded as reflecting the training courses that were given in jihadi training camps in the 
nineties, or local poison plots carried out by independent al-Qaeda cells that accessed the 
manuals via contacts or via the Internet.  
5.1 Al-Qaeda central  
5.1.1 Written and oral statements 
An insider account of discussions held in al-Qaeda’s Shura Council 
In the late 1990s, there was apparently a debate within al-Qaeda’s Shura Council (majlis al-
šūra) on the necessity of obtaining weapons of mass destruction (asliḥat al-ḍamār al-šāmil). 
According to Muṣṭafā Ḥāmid, better known as Abū al-Walīd al-Maṣri, an al-Qaeda insider 
who wrote a detailed account of the history of the Arab-Afghans, the issue was raised because 
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some members were concerned that the US might attack Muslims, and especially 
Afghanistan, with WMD.114 The al-Qaeda leadership was split in their views, however. 
According to al-Maṣri‘s account, there were several discussions between what he termed the 
‘hawks’ and the ‘doves’ in the Shura council. The ‘hawks’ wing, led by al-Qaeda’s military 
commander Muḥammad ῾Āṭif (aka Abū Ḥafṣ al-Maṣri), argued strongly that obtaining WMD 
was necessary. They viewed the US as a merciless enemy that would not hesitate to crush 
even a weak enemy, as in the case of Japan at the end of WWII. In order to defend Muslims, 
and to retaliate in case of an attack, there was therefore a strategic need for al-Qaeda to obtain 
WMD. The hardliners also argued that the weapons should be stored on American soil in 
order to enable al-Qaeda to answer immediately, should the US invade Afghanistan. The 
‘doves’, on the other hand, were sceptical of the whole idea of moving the battle to the 
enemy’s land, and argued that it was important to retain international sympathy. Others 
pointed to the technical difficulties of producing WMD, and argued that al-Qaeda would only 
be able to obtain “primitive weapons” that could never match the sophistication and 
effectiveness of the West.115 While some argued that these primitive weapons would be 
sufficient to create fear and give the mujāhidūn credibility and prestige, others expressed 
concerns that they might provoke the US into an attack. The ‘hawks’, on their side, argued 
that the US was already attacking the Muslim world with weapons similar to WMD, and 
pointed to the use of depleted uranium in Iraq and the direct and indirect killing of millions of 
Iraqis during the 1990s. Abū al-Walīd al-Maṣri claims that Osama bin Laden did not support 
the hawks’ view on WMD, but neither did he protest, “...because of his extreme politeness 
with those around him and his refrain from discomfiting or offending them.”116 Al-Maṣri 
believes bin Laden was postponing discussing WMD strategy until such weapons were 
actually acquired, and in any case he seemed convinced that the war with the US would be 
won by then, using conventional weapons. Thus, Abū al-Walīd al-Maṣri’s account shows that 
al-Qaeda’s Shura Council was deeply split on the WMD issue prior to 9/11. This seems to 
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have been due to a general reluctance to kill large numbers of civilians and escalate the 
conflict with the West. Al-Maṣri concludes, however, that 
The conclusion reached [within the Shura Council] ... was that al-Qaeda must possess 
weapons for defence, based on what can be obtained or supplied in the nuclear, 
biological, or chemical fields, so that in a crisis, if the other side used weapons of mass 
destruction, it will not escape a deadly punishment.117
There are few other sources that can verify the details of Abū al-Walīd al-Maṣri’s account. 
Recently, however, the former Libyan jihadist Nu῾mān bin ῾Uṯmān wrote an open letter to 
Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī, prompted by al-Ẓawāhirī’s announcement of a merger between the 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (al-Jamā῾a al-᾽islāmiyya al-muqātila) and al-Qaeda in November 
2007.118 In the letter, bin ῾Uṯmān states that he had attended a meeting with al-Qaeda leaders 
in Kandahar, in the summer of 2000, as part of a delegation from the LIFG. At the meeting, 
he claims, he warned al-Qaeda against attacking America with non-conventional weapons, 
arguing that it would result in “an occupation of the whole region, not only Afghanistan.”119 
In the letter he also refers to a dispute he had had with Abū Ḥafṣ al-Kūmandān [an alias for 
Muḥammad ῾Āṭif120] and recalls that ῾Āṭif was “... strongly insisting on the necessity of 
obtaining those weapons and using them as a deterrent against the United States of 
America.”121 Bin ῾Uṯmān‘s brief account thus corresponds to Abū al-Walīd al-Maṣri’s 
portrayal of Muḥammad ῾Āṭif as one of the ‘hawks’ who expressed a strong interest in 
obtaining WMD. It also seems to confirm that there were disagreements between al-Qaeda 
leaders and their close associates about whether to obtain WMD or not. 
Osama bin Laden’s statements 
According to an English translation of the above-mentioned letter by Nu῾mān Bin ῾Uṯmān, 
Osama bin Laden said during the same meeting that the search for and use of weapons of 
mass destruction is a “Sharia obligation”.122 This appears to be based on an incorrect 
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translation of Bin ῾Uṯmān‘s letter. Bin ῾Uṯmān is not referring to a statement uttered by bin 
Laden in the summer 2000 meeting, but to a statement that was made by bin Laden “in one of 
his televised speeches”.123 In fact, I have not come across any account of bin Laden talking 
favourably of non-conventional weapons, except when asked directly about the topic by 
journalists, which occurred on at least five occasions between December 1998-November 
2001. A recurrent topic in his speech is that Muslims have the right to obtain such weapons 
for defensive purposes: 
Acquiring [chemical and nuclear] weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious 
duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do 
so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin 
for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from 
inflicting harm on Muslims.124
Even though bin Laden describes the procurement of non-conventional weapons as a 
“religious duty” (a point often over-emphasized in the West), this should not be interpreted as 
expressing an ‘irrational obsession’ with WMD, but rather as motivated by specific political 
grievances. Bin Laden has on numerous occasions expressed resentment over the US 
domination and humiliation of Muslims, and this is again illustrated by the ‘double standard’ 
reflected by the US in allowing Israel to possess nuclear weapons, while preventing Muslim 
countries from obtaining them. In an interview with al-Jazeera he stated:125
 At a time when Israel stocks hundreds of nuclear warheads and when the Western 
crusaders control a large percentage of this weapon, we do not consider this [seeking 
to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons] an accusation but a right and we 
reject anyone who accuses us of this ... We congratulated the Pakistani people when 
they achieved this nuclear weapon and we consider it the right of all Muslims to do 
so.126
 
Osama bin Laden stresses in several of his statements that the purpose of obtaining WMD is 
defensive only. In October 2001, Abū Ḥafṣ al-Mawrītānī also echoed this view, stating that “if 
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such a weapon is at Al-Qa‘ida’s disposal, then it is a deterrent weapon, and not for initiating 
an action.”127
A shift from defensive to offensive use? 
After 2001, certain al-Qaeda ideologues have expressed a more aggressive attitude towards 
the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as Sulaymān Abū al-Ġayṯ, a spokesman for al-
Qaeda. In an article published in June 2002 entitled “In the Shadow of the Lances” (taḥt ẓilāl 
al-rimāḥ), he points out the atrocities already committed by the US against Muslim 
populations, including the mass killing of people, and the alleged use of biological and 
chemical weapons against Muslims. Based on the principle of equal retaliation, he argues: 
We have not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill four million 
Americans, two million of them children, and to exile twice as many and wound and 
cripple hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical 
and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal and strange diseases that 
have afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical and biological 
weapons.128  
The call for retaliation and revenge against America and Israel’s direct and indirect killing of 
millions of Muslims is echoed by several other statements, usually backed up by quoting from 
the Koranic verse (2:194): “If then any one transgresses the prohibition against you, 
Transgress ye likewise against him.”129 However, the most significant statement regarding the 
legitimacy of WMD was a fatwā issued by well-known militant Islamic scholar in Saudi 
Arabia, Nāṣir bin Ḥamd al-Fahd, in May 2003:  
The attack against [the United States] by weapons of mass destruction [aṣliḥa al-damār 
al-šāmil] is accepted, since Allah said: “If you are attacked you should attack your 
aggressor by identical force.” Whoever looks at the American aggression against the 
Muslims and their lands in recent decades concludes that it is permissible… Some 
brothers have totalled the number of Muslims killed directly or indirectly by their 
weapons and come up with a figure of nearly 10 millions.130
Al-Fahd’s ruling was based on the same argumentation that Sulaymān Abū al-Ġayṯ and others 
had used previously, namely that of equal retaliation, but it carried considerably more weight 
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because it came from a religious cleric with the authority to interpret the Koran and issue 
legal rulings. It is not clear whether there is any connection between al-Qaeda and the issuing 
of the fatwā, but, in any case, should al-Qaeda decide to carry out a WMD attack against the 
US, they would be able to cite this fatwā to deflect criticism for violating Islamic law. It can 
be noted that only Americans (and sometimes Israelis) have been singled out as legitimate 
targets for a WMD attack. There are hardly any examples of attempts to legitimize WMD 
attacks against other Western countries or nationalities. 
It can be argued that al-Qaeda’s various statements on WMD have evolved from expressing a 
defensive view towards a more offensive stance.131 However, these statements are very few in 
number, and made by people with different backgrounds and roles in the network, which 
means that such statements are not necessarily comparable. Rather than interpreting these 
statements as indicative of a shift in al-Qaeda’s attitude towards CBRN weapons, I view them 
more as reflections of historical events and developments: after al-Qaeda lost its permanent 
base in Afghanistan, it has become less relevant to talk about WMD as deterrent weapons. At 
the same time, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq created new and powerful images of 
Muslim suffering, and possibly made it more legitimate to talk about ‘revenge’ against the US 
The Iraqi war in particular was heavily used in jihadi propaganda as yet more ‘proof’ of 
America’s evil intentions, which probably contributed to increasing the general hatred of the 
US.132
Al-Qaeda’s official statements, in any case, cannot be properly analyzed without seeing them 
in relation to other al-Qaeda discourses. A complete analysis of al-Qaeda’s discourse would, 
however, be beyond the scope of this thesis. I have therefore limited myself to giving some 
examples from Osama bin Laden’s communiqués, which might serve to place al-Qaeda’s 
“WMD discourse” in some perspective. As mentioned above, bin Laden does not mention 
WMD in any of his communiqués, either before 2001 or since. In contrast, he tends to depict 
the spiritual strength of the mujāhidūn and their willingness to die as martyrs as the ultimate 
weapon with which to strike fear in Western hearts. In an audiotape issued in 2003, he said: 
Do not be afraid of their tanks and armoured personnel carriers. These are artificial 
things. If you started suicide attacks you will see the fear of Americans all over the 
world.133
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He also tends to contrast the faith of Muslims with the militarily powerful, but spiritually 
weak West (thus playing upon a topic well known from modern Arabic literature, although 
from a more militant point of view): 
Unafraid of the might and size of the infidels, an appreciable small number of 
committed mujahidin, shall prevail upon them. While they pride on their military 
resources, the mujahidin take the field through faith and conviction.134
A strategic rationale for the use of WMD 
Over the years, al-Qaeda ideologues have issued a number of strategic documents and studies, 
many of which give specific guidelines and directions about how to wage the war against the 
West.135 The Syrian theoretician Muṣṭafā bin ῾Abd al-Qādir Sitt Maryam Nāṣar, better known 
as Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Sūrī, is perhaps one of the clearest examples of an al-Qaeda theorist 
providing a strategic rationale for the use of WMD against the United States.136 In his main 
strategy book, the 1,600-page Global Islamic Resistance Call (da῾wat al-muqāwama al-
islāmiyya al-῾ālamiyya), he points out the extreme imbalance of power between the Muslim 
world and the US, and argues that obtaining and using WMD against the West is the only way 
to redress this balance. In the same study he also suggests the jihadi movement establish four 
types of military units (sarāyā), one of which should be dedicated to “strategic operations” (al-
῾amaliyyāt al-istrātījiyya) and possess WMD capabilities.137 The topic of WMD is mentioned 
in several other publications of his, one of his more infamous statements being  
... if I had been consulted in such an operation [referring to 11 September], I would 
have suggested that the planes were international routes, and that they were filled with 
weapons of mass destruction.138
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In a lecture held in Kabul, 1999, al-Sūrī described WMD as “... quick and easy and can be 
obtained from most mafias in the world,”139 and encouraged his audience to carry out WMD 
attacks in Western countries. By the time he had finished The Global Islamic Resistance Call, 
more than three years after 9/11, and after the destruction of al-Qaeda’s sprawling training 
complexes in Afghanistan, he had apparently realized that obtaining WMD was beyond the 
reach of al-Qaeda. Although the role and importance of WMD are touched upon in his book, 
he emphasizes that his strategy is one of exhausting the enemy, and not demolishing it. 
Viewing the current security environment as extremely harsh, he argues that the era of 
hierarchical organisations has ended, and that resistance has to rely more on acts of 
“individual terrorism” (al-᾽irhāb al-farḍī) carried out by small cells with no organizational ties 
except a common ideology. Similar to Louis Beam’s ‘Leaderless Resistance’ concept, he 
envisions the ‘Global Islamic Resistance’ as a campaign of small- and medium-scale terrorist 
operations that are difficult to counter because they spring from individual initiatives, rather 
than from a central organisation.140 It is therefore a misconception that non-conventional 
weapons constitute a key part of al-Sūrī’s strategic theory, at least in his post-9/11 writings.141 
In the 1,600-page Global Islamic Resistance Call, the topic of WMD is granted less than one 
page in total. 
Reservations concerning CBRN use 
There are a few accounts of al-Qaeda members expressing a reluctance to use WMD, 
although these are hard to verify. When Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and Ramzī bin al-Šībh 
volunteered for an interview with al-Jazeera journalist Yousri Fouda in June 2002 to talk 
about the September 11 attacks, Muhammad stated that “... we first thought of striking at a 
couple of nuclear facilities but decided against it for fear it would go out of control”.142 
However he stated immediately afterwards, “The attacks were designed to cause as many 
deaths as possible and havoc and to be a big slap for America on American soil.”143 It is hard 
to assess the significance of this statement. It could simply indicate an unfamiliarity with, and 
thus a fear of using, WMD. Or it could express a reluctance to use more violence than deemed 
necessary, thus recalling Osama bin Laden’s belief at the time that a few conventional attacks 
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against the US would be sufficient. The idea of striking nuclear facilities, however, has been 
mentioned in other sources as well, although there is little evidence that such ideas have gone 
beyond the theoretical.144  
The view that humiliating America was more important than causing mass killing was also 
expressed by Yūsuf al-῾Ayīri, the former leader of al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (qā῾idat 
al-jihād fī jazīrat al-῾arab).145 In an audio lecture on guerrilla warfare given in 2002 or 2003, he 
stated that the goal of striking the World Trade Center in 2001 was not to kill as many people 
as possible; if this had been the case, the attacks would have been carried out later in the day 
after more people had arrived at work at the WTC. Rather he emphasizes that “...if you want 
to anger the enemy it is not by how many people you kill, but rather by showing its defeat in 
front of the world.”146  
5.1.2 Actual plans and activities 
As stated previously, this thesis will focus on the period from 1996-2006. With regards to the 
Sudan period and bin Laden’s alleged quest for nuclear weapons, the open sources have been 
summarized in the literature review in chapter two. I have not come across any new sources to 
shed light on these activities, or sources about bin Laden’s alleged attempts to buy a chemical 
weapons factory in Sudan. In this subchapter, I have chosen to focus on al-Qaeda’s activities 
in Afghanistan from 1996 onwards as reflected by documents and facilities discovered in 
Afghanistan, eyewitness accounts and interrogation reports.  
Chemical and biological research 
In late 2001, a Wall Street Journal journalist obtained a second-hand computer from a local 
merchant in Kabul. It turned out that the computer had actually been looted from an office 
used by al-Qaeda leaders, and contained hundreds of documents and video files dating back to 
1997. Among the users of the computer were two of al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, Ayman al-
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Ẓawāhirī and Muḥammad ῾Āṭif. According to the Wall Street Journal’s summary,147 some of 
the documents seemed to indicate that Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī was responsible for a biological 
and chemical weapons development programme codenamed al-zabādī (curdled milk). A 
memo apparently written by al-Zawahiri to Muḥammad ῾Āṭif in April 1999 notes that “the 
destructive power of these weapons is no less than that of nuclear weapons”, and that “despite 
their extreme danger, we only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to 
them by repeatedly expressing concern that they can be produced simply.”148 It appeared that 
al-Zawahiri had studied foreign scientific articles and wrote summaries of them in Arabic for 
Muḥammad ῾Āṭif.149 The memo also suggested studying various open sources on chemical 
and biological warfare, and provided a list of recommended articles published between the 
1920s–1950s in scientific journals such as Science and New England Journal of Medicine. A 
file dated 7 May 1999 indicated that al-Qaeda leaders had earmarked US$ 2,000-4,000 for the 
“start-up costs” of the programme. Further, the Wall Street Journal writes:  
In a letter dated May 23 and written under one of Zawahiri’s aliases, the author reports 
discussing some ‘very useful ideas’ during a visit to Abu Khabab [...]. Particularly 
encouraging, the letter in the computer files said, was a home-brew nerve gas made 
from insecticides and a chemical additive that would help speed up the penetration 
into the skin.150
In a letter dated May 26, the same author expressed that he was “very enthusiastic” about the 
al-zabādī  project, and that in particular, he was pleased with Abu Khabab’s “significant 
progress.” A memo from June 1999 suggested that the program should seek cover and talent 
in educational institutions, which it said would be “more beneficial to us and allow easy 
access to specialists, which will greatly benefit us in the first stage, God willing.”151
The Wall Street Journal account reveals some interesting details: first, it appears that Ayman 
al-Ẓawāhirī did not decide to pursue chemical and biological weapons due to a personal 
affinity for such weapons, but rather that he was inspired by Western threat assessments that 
said they were easy to manufacture. Second, that the amount of money dedicated to the 
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programme in 1999 was relatively small. Third, that the programme apparently focused on 
developing a crude chemical agent, indicated by the fact that it was to be made from 
insecticides and a “chemical additive that would help speed up the penetration into the skin.” 
According to a chemist at the Norwegian Defence Research Institute, insecticides can most 
likely not be used to manufacture military-grade nerve gases. Instead, the “chemical weapon” 
described in the Wall Street Journal’s documents sounds like a description of a common 
assassination tool that was taught about in al-Qaeda’s training camps, a poison (the 
insecticides) mixed with an oily liquid that facilitates skin penetration.152 Again, it is worth 
pointing out that the use of the word “home-brewed nerve gas” is not necessarily synonymous 
with militarily effective nerve gases (such as VX or sarin), although it cannot be ruled out that 
al-Qaeda was seeking such capabilities as well. 
The information revealed by the Wall Street Journal must be seen in relation to other sources. 
One indication that al-Qaeda was seeking more sophisticated chemical agents is an 
unclassified CIA report released in May 2003 that stated, “[a]nalysis of an al-Qa‘ida 
document recovered in Afghanistan in summer 2002 indicates the group has crude procedures 
for making mustard agent, sarin and VX”.153 The report does not give any further details, but 
shows a picture of a handwritten page from one of the manuals. Possessing instructions, and 
actually mastering the procedure, are of course two different things. More credible evidence 
of al-Qaeda’s chemical and biological activities would be the discovery of actual precursors 
or agents. Some reports have suggested that coalition forces actually found traces of anthrax 
and ricin at several sites during operations in Afghanistan.154 Another report states, however, 
that “the trace evidence turned out to be insufficient to permit an accurate determination.”155  
After the capture of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad in March 2003, some new details have been 
revealed. In his Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing on 10 March 2007, Muhammad 
stated that “I was directly in charge, after the death of Sheikh Abu Hafs Al-Masri Subhi Abu 
Sittah, of managing and following up on the Cell for the Production of Biological Weapons, 
such as anthrax and others, and following up on Dirty Bomb Operations on American Soil” 
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(Abū Ḥafṣ al-Maṣri, aka Muḥammad ῾Āṭif, was killed in a US air raid on 16 November 
2001).156 According to media reports, papers and computer hard drives recovered during his 
capture included orders to obtain Bacillus anthracis, as well as detailed production schedules 
and inventories of the necessary equipment. Judging by the uncovered documents, however, 
Khalid Sheikh Muhammad lacked knowledge of the specialist milling techniques required to 
produce military-grade, air-borne anthrax.157 This indicates that senior al-Qaeda members 
have been involved in chemical and biological research since at least 1999, possibly with the 
ambition to obtain militarily effective agents. At the time of Muhammad’s arrest in 2003, 
however, the plans appeared still to be at a rudimentary stage. 
What about al-Qaeda’s radiological and nuclear ambitions? 
Khalid Sheikh Muhammad also admitted during his tribunal hearing that he had been in 
charge of “following up on Dirty Bomb Operations on American Soil.”158 Various sources 
have claimed that al-Qaeda had expressed an interest in radiological and nuclear weapons in 
the Afghanistan period. In January 2002, CNN reported that they had found a stack of 
documents in a Kabul house “reportedly used by Al Qaeda operatives.”159 Among the 
documents there were several explosives manuals and formulations, as well as a document 
entitled “al-qanābil al-kubrā” (translated as “superbombs”) that appeared to describe a nuclear 
device. Experts who reviewed the document, however concluded that the device was 
unworkable.160 The CNN report goes on to claim that although the bomb design required 
plutonium to create a nuclear explosion, it “... could become something called a radiological 
dispersal weapon” if other types of radioactive material were used instead.161 However, it is 
unclear whether the option of making an RDD is actually described in the ‘superbomb’ 
document, or if this is mere speculation added by the CNN correspondent (especially since the 
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correspondent goes on to say, “the documents don’t reveal if al Qaeda tried to build such a 
weapon.”) This ambiguity is not reflected in an analysis by Jonathan Spyer, who wrote in an 
article in 2004 that the ‘superbomb’ manual “... contained a working blueprint for the 
production and detonation of a radiological bomb.”162 This reflects some of the difficulties of 
relying on second-hand sources. There is, in my opinion, an important difference between a 
document describing nuclear weapons, and a document describing a radiological dispersal 
device (RDD). Several other sources, however, have pointed out that al-Qaeda might have 
accessed radioactive material in Kabul, and according to British authorities there was 
evidence that al-Qaeda had already constructed a small dirty bomb in the Afghan city of 
Herat, using radioactive isotopes from medical equipment. No ready-made bomb was ever 
found, however.163
The documents found by CNN indicate that certain al-Qaeda members were interested in 
nuclear weapons on a theoretical level, but there is no indication that this was a central 
priority.164 David Albright, a nuclear-weapons expert consulted by CNN, concludes after 
reviewing the material that “there is no indication that al Qaeda’s nuclear work has gone 
beyond theory.”165 He noted, however, that the formulations for regular explosives were 
“much more polished” than those commonly circulated on the Internet, and that al-Qaeda had 
apparently made significant efforts to both test and improve  these formulae.166  
The training camps: educating chemical experts? 
The most infamous example of al-Qaeda’s CBRN activities in Afghanistan is probably a 
video obtained by CNN in 2002, which shows the testing of a poisonous gas on dogs.167 
Experts disagree as to what kind of gas was tested, but Ahmed Ressam, an al-Qaeda operative 
who was arrested in 1999, testified that he had witnessed such an experiment in which 
hydrogen cyanide had been used. The dog was kept in a confined area, and the gas was 
manufactured simply by mixing two reactants, a crude procedure commonly described in 
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manuals posted on al-Qaeda web pages.168 According to Ressam, the experiment he had 
witnessed had been part of a training course he had taken at the Derunta camp, located outside 
Jalalabad, Afghanistan. On the course he had also learned to mix poisons with another 
substance and “smear them on doorknobs,” with the aim of assassinating “intelligence officers 
and other VIPs.”169 Judging from Ressam’s testimony, the course was designed to teach crude 
poison-making methods, but not to pass on advanced CBRN knowledge, or even to test or 
develop crude CBRN devices. Ressam stated that that no delivery methods for cyanide gas 
were actually tested, although theoretical suggestions were given:  
Q: You were trained to use cyanide by placing the cyanide near the air intake of a 
building, correct? 
A: They gave us some examples, but we did not try them out actually.170
 
According to witnesses, the Derunta training complex offered a range of specialized courses, 
of which crude poison-making was only one of several disciplines that the operatives would 
be taught.171 Judging from Ressam’s testimony, there are no indications that the course was 
designed to teach battalions of “CBRN specialists” for al-Qaeda. Rather, the aim was 
apparently to widen the repertoire of the operatives’ tactics and the use of crude poisons or 
poisonous gases would be one of several options.  
5.1.3 The CBRN interest of Al-Qaeda central 
Based on the sources reviewed above, it appears that senior al-Qaeda members were 
interested in researching the topic of CBRN weapons, and possibly sought to manufacture or 
obtain chemical and biological agents. Due to the small amount of money allocated to the 
programme, and the fact that no viable warfare agents were ever confirmed found in 
Afghanistan, these efforts seem to have been limited. This leads to my conclusion that al-
Qaeda central showed no obsession with CBRN materials or with high-tech weapons, unlike 
Aum Shinrikyo. However, they wanted to research options in order to widen their repertoire 
of tactics, and were possibly also inspired by the threat assessments produced in the West that 
these weapons were easy to obtain.  
In addition to these efforts by senior al-Qaeda members, there also seems to have been an 
organized effort at certain training camps to teach recruits crude methods to make poisons and 
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poisonous gases. These courses appear to be part of a more comprehensive course to teach 
basic guerrilla tactics, not a course to pass on advanced CBRN knowledge or any joint effort 
to innovate CBRN devices. 
One weakness in the above argument is that most of my information regarding al-Qaeda 
Central’s actual CBRN activities is connected to the period before November 2001. There is 
very little open-source information on the activities of the al-Qaeda leadership after 2001, at 
least with regards to CBRN weapons. Other developments, however, indicate that the active 
pursuit of CBRN by al-Qaeda Central is less likely now than it was before 2001. One reason 
for this is that al-Qaeda now does not enjoy the freedom of operation it had before 9/11. 
Possibly, al-Qaeda still has access to training camps in the border region between 
Afghanistan/Pakistan, but these are small and mobile, rather than the permanent structures 
that existed in Afghanistan before the invasion. Secondly, there are no indications that al-
Qaeda has abandoned the ‘conventional’ option. On the contrary, most attacks planned by al-
Qaeda central after 9/11 rely on conventional explosives and hijackings. Khalid Sheikh  
Muhammad stated during interrogations that he had plans for a “second wave” of attacks on 
the US that was to be carried out in the same way as the 9/11 attacks. The so-called ‘20th 
hijacker’172, Zacharias Moussaoui, was instructed to take flying lessons in the US to this 
end.173 During his tribunal hearing in 2007, Muhammad claimed that he was responsible for 
organizing the second wave, and that it was supposed to target the Empire State Building and 
three other high-rise buildings on US soil. He was also alleged to have been involved in a 
number of other plots, a majority of which were aimed at destroying various buildings, 
bridges, planes and ships. CBRN weapons are not mentioned as a part of any of these plots, 
except in one instance when he claimed responsibility for “... surveillance needed to hit 
nuclear power plants that generate electricity in several U.S. states”.174 There is little doubt 
that al-Qaeda still has a strategy of staging spectacular, mass-casualty attacks, but there are no 
indications that al-Qaeda views CBRN materials as the only possible type of weapon.  
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5.2 Al-Qaeda affiliates 
Well-known al-Qaeda affiliates include Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (tanẓīm qā῾idat al-
jihād fī jazīrat al-῾arab); Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (qā῾idat al-jihād fī bilād al-
rāfiḍayn), currently known as The Islamic State of Iraq (dawlat al-῾irāq al-᾽islāmiyya); Al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb (tanẓīm al-qā῾ida bi-bilād al-maġrib al-islāmī), and Al-Qaeda in the Land 
of Khurasan (qā῾idat al-jihād fī bilād ḫarāsān).  
This sub-chapter will concentrate on al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates in Iraq, because very little 
documentation has been found on the CBRN interest of al-Qaeda affiliates elsewhere. It 
would be interesting to conduct a comparative study of the CBRN interest of various regional 
affiliates of al-Qaeda. However, this is beyond the scope of this study, as it would require a 
thorough investigation into each regional group. The purpose of this thesis is, rather, to get an 
overall picture of the al-Qaeda network and its internal dynamics. For this purpose, the Iraqi-
based al-Qaeda affiliates have been used as an example of a regional group that has published 
statements or conducted actions relating to CBRN. This does not mean that Iraqi al-Qaeda 
affiliates necessarily display the same interest in CBRN weapons as other al-Qaeda affiliates.  
The particular difficulty in using Iraq as an example is that it is sometimes hard to determine 
whether the group in question is an ‘al-Qaeda affiliate’ or not. In general, Abū Muṣ῾ab al-
Zarqāwī and his network are seen as al-Qaeda affiliates. However, his group did not adopt the 
name Qā‘idat al-jihād fī bilād al-rāfiḍayn until 2004. Before that, his network was known as 
al-Tawḥīd wal-jihād. It does not make sense, however, to only look at statements and actions 
taking place since the name change, as they might be more properly understood by seeing 
them in relation to previous activities. Moreover, both before and after al-Zarqāwī adopted the 
name of al-Qaeda, it has been disputed whether he should be labelled an ‘al-Qaeda affiliate’ 
or not. Several sources describe him as a rival of bin Laden, rather than an affiliate. In 
October 2006, his organization joined an umbrella organization, the Mujahedin Shura Council 
(majlis šūra al-mujāhidīn) along with other Sunni insurgent groups that changed their name to 
the Islamic State of Iraq (dawlat al-cirāq al-islāmiyya) in December the same year. Activities 
conducted by Sunni insurgents in Iraq are, therefore, not necessarily affiliated with the al-
Qaeda network or with al-Qaeda ideology. However, the activities of the al-Zarqāwī network 
and later, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISOI), can be assumed to be more ‘al-Qaeda-like’ than the 
activities of other insurgent groups.  
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5.2.1 The case of Iraq 
The al-Abud Network 
The most organized effort to acquire CBRN capabilities in Iraq was not carried out by an al-
Qaeda affiliate, but by locally based insurgents labelled the ”al-Abud network” by 
investigators.175 A short description of the case has been included here to show that it is not 
only al-Qaeda affiliates who have tried to pursue CBRN weapons in Iraq. In late 2003-early 
2004, the al-Abud network was reported to be actively seeking chemical weapons according 
to a 2004-report by the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).176 The 
al-Abud network is described as ”Fallujah-based insurgents belonging mostly to the Jaysh 
Muhammad organization”, a pro-Saddam insurgency group.177 According to the report, the 
network recruited two chemists and attempted to produce tabun and nitrogen mustard without 
success, but managed in March 2004 to produce small amounts of ricin cake “using widely 
distributed terrorist literature”.178 Coalition forces also discovered nine mortar rounds filled 
with poison. According to detainee accounts, the network planned to use these rounds against 
Coalition forces. This would most likely not have worked, however, because the poison 
would decompose due to the explosion. In general, the network’s CBW efforts were very 
primitive, but they could have developed further had the network’s activities not been 
disrupted by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) in 2004. The case of the al-Abud network suggests 
that chemicals were relatively easily accessible in Iraq at the time. According to the report, the 
network bought its chemicals at the chemical sūq (market) in Baghdad. 
The Amman plot and Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Zarqāwī’s statement 
In April 2004, Jordanian police reportedly thwarted a plot to attack several targets in Amman, 
Jordan with suicide truck bombs filled with explosives and possibly also chemicals. The 
leader of the cell was the Jordanian ῾Azmī al-Jayūsī, who claimed that he had acted on orders 
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from Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Zarqāwī, whom he had met in Afghanistan. In his confession al-Jayūsī 
stated:   
In Herat, I began training for Abū Muṣ῾ab, the training included high-level courses on 
explosives and poisons. I then pledged allegiance to Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Zarqāwī and 
agreed to work for him without any discussion.179
According to al-Jayūsī, al-Zarqāwī had sent him to Jordan to prepare for the plot along with 
some other operatives, and supplied them with money and the necessary documents. The plan 
was allegedly to fill trucks with explosives and carry out suicide attacks against Jordan’s 
General Intelligence Department, the Prime Minister’s Office and the US Embassy. During 
several police raids in April 2004, the police arrested six suspects and killed four, as well as 
seizing three trucks filled with more than 20 tons of chemicals and precursors for explosives. 
According to a report broadcast on Jordanian television on April 26, one of the trucks was 
supposed to contain a chemical bomb that “ ...could have killed 80,000 Jordanian citizens.”180 
This was most likely exaggerated by the Jordanian authorities. Based on the materials seized, 
it is very unlikely that the cell was capable of making such a deadly weapon. Most reports 
state that the chemicals found were common precursors for explosives, such as nitro-glycerine 
and hydrogen peroxide, although some sources claimed that cyanide and chlorine had also 
been seized.181 In any case, it is very hard to cause mass death by adding a toxic chemical to 
conventional explosives, as demonstrated by recent attempts to add chlorine to truck-bombs in 
Iraq (more on this below). According to a US official, what was recovered in Jordan “... was 
not a chemical weapon and did not include any poisons, but that it did include chemicals 
designed to increase its conventional explosive impact.”182 In October 2004, a total of 13 
suspects were charged with “conspiracy to terrorist attacks, manufacturing explosives, 
belonging to an illegal organization and possession of weapons for illegal use.”183 Nine of 
them (seven Jordanians and two Syrians) were present in court, while four, among them Abū 
Muṣ῾ab al-Zarqāwī, were charged in absentia. In February 2006, five out of nine suspects were 
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sentenced to death. Two were given prison terms, while the last two were acquitted of all 
charges. Al-Zarqāwī and the three others tried in absentia were also sentenced to death.184  
Afterwards, Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Zarqāwī himself released a statement in which he accepted 
responsibility for the plot, but denied the chemical aspect of it. Also, he denied the 
accusations of Jordanian intelligence that his intention was to “murder Muslims and kill 
innocent citizens.”185 However, he also stated that “... if we possessed such a bomb, we would 
not have hesitated for one moment to strike cities in Israel, such as Eilat and Tel Aviv and 
others.”186 Al-Zarqāwī’s unwillingness to use CBRN weapons in Muslim countries, due to a 
fear that they might harm large numbers of innocent Muslims, corresponds to views expressed 
by other al-Qaeda leaders. At the same time, he seemed to have no restrictions with regards to 
carrying out large-scale conventional attacks in Muslim countries, presumably because it 
would be easier to direct them against a specific target and to justify the amount of collateral 
damage caused by them.  
On 23 November 2004, Iraqi and coalition forces discovered what they labelled a 
”chemical/explosive weapons laboratory” in Fallujah, Iraq. The laboratory contained simple 
laboratory equipment such as beakers, flasks and gloves, and chemicals that could be used to 
make poisons and explosives. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) released a list of 
chemicals found: three substances were connected to chemical weapons, potassium cyanide, 
hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid. One of the notebooks found was reported to contain 
”formulas for anthrax, chemical blood agents and explosives.” The amount of chemicals was 
not stated, but pictures showed two shelves of plastic bags, one of them labelled “potassium 
cyanide.” Inside the laboratory was the banner of al-Zarqāwī’s group, al-Tawḥīd wal-jihād.187
The statement of Abū Ḥamza al-Muhājir 
On 28 September 2006, Abū Ḥamza al-Muhājir, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, issued an 
audiotape in which he urged scientists from various fields, including non-conventional 
weapons, to come to Iraq, noting that ”...the American military bases, with their large areas, 
are an ideal environment for trying out your non-conventional bombs: the biological and the 
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so-called 'dirty' bombs...”188 While it is a rare example of an operational al-Qaeda commander 
openly calling for experts within non-conventional weapons to join the battlefield,189 it 
remains unknown whether anyone followed his call. 
The wave of Chlorine attacks in 2007190
In January 2007, it was reported that Iraqi insurgents had started to combine truck-bombs with 
chlorine canisters.191 The first attack occurred on January 28 in Ramadi, in which 16 people 
were killed by the explosion, but no one was reported to have been killed or hospitalized due 
to exposure to poisonous gas. In later attacks, however, it was reported that up to hundreds of 
victims were treated for symptoms resulting from chlorine-gas exposure. A few have also 
been reported killed due to chlorine-gas exposure, but there are no firm data to confirm this. It 
appears that in most cases the fatalities are caused by the conventional explosion, while the 
chlorine gas may have led to additional casualties, panic and fear. As of June 2007, around 11 
such attacks had taken place, although it is not clear whether chlorine was used in all these 
attacks. One of the largest attacks occurred in Fallujah on 16 March 2006, in which tens of 
victims showed symptoms of chlorine gas exposure. The attacks were strongly condemned by 
the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq, that stated in a communique that the attacks were 
“... neither moral, nor human, nor legal according to Islamic law”.192 After June, the chlorine 
attacks apparently stopped. 
Spokesmen for both the US and Iraqi authorities have repeatedly blamed these attacks on al-
Qaeda’s local branch in Iraq, which since October 2006 has been a member of the Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISOI), an umbrella organization for several Sunni insurgent groups. The ISOI 
itself, however, has not admitted to having used chlorine in any of its attacks. In a 
communiqué issued on March 22, the ISOI denied “targeting common people with poisonous 
gas”, and here the ISOI was probably referring to the chlorine attacks in Fallujah and Ramadi 
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on March 16, and claimed that “...these lies are a part of the continuous information campaign 
to tarnish the jihad of the Islamic State.”193
One possible explanation can be found by looking at the current situation in Iraq, and the fact 
that the chlorine gas has affected mostly Iraqi civilians. This is at present a sensitive subject 
for the ISOI, because over recent months there seems to have been disputes between the ISOI 
and other Sunni insurgent groups, and between the ISOI and local Sunni tribes in the Anbar 
province, where most of the attacks have taken place. The ISOI has been accused of killing 
members of other Sunni insurgent groups, and is also resisted by local tribal leaders, who 
accuse the ISOI of targeting civilians. Some of these tribes, therefore, have aligned with the 
Iraqi government in order to rid the region of al-Qaeda members. In return, the ISOI has 
carried out several attacks against local tribal leaders, whom they consider traitors. Perhaps 
the ISOI has not taken responsibility for the chlorine-bomb attacks because it knows it would 
certainly be used in propaganda against it to decrease local support for the foreign fighters.  
Some of the chlorine bombs were used in combination with other weapons, such as mortars 
and handguns. At least two of the attacks also involved multiple truck-bombs. It is therefore 
unlikely that a small group was behind the attacks, such as a small, breakaway faction or 
individuals who act on their own. The complexity of some of the attacks points to a larger, 
organized group which is capable of carrying out coordinated attacks. The fact that the attacks 
have taken place in several regions also point to the possibility that they have been carried out 
by various actors who were perhaps inspired by each other’s tactics. 
5.2.2 The CBRN interest of al-Qaeda affiliates in Iraq 
While the “al-Abud Network” allegedly recruited chemists and attempted to manufacture 
warfare agents such as tabun and nitrogen mustard, the CBRN efforts of other Sunni 
insurgents (al-Qaeda affiliates included) appear to have relied on the use of crude chemical 
agents (hydrogen cyanide and chlorine). I interpret this as an attempt to cause additional 
disruption and chaos, using whatever materials that were at hand, but not an attempt to 
develop a CBRN capability to replace conventional tactics such as explosives, sniper attacks 
and ambushes.  
Al-Qaeda affiliates operate in a local setting, and in Muslim countries. This makes 
indiscriminate targeting more problematic, both because it kills civilian Muslims (which is 
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presumably more controversial than killing non-Muslims), but also because it might provoke 
the local population to actively resist the group (this was the case, for example, in the Anbar 
province in Iraq in 2007). However, this has not prevented insurgent groups in Iraq killing 
thousands of civilian Muslims with conventional bombs. As the quote by al-Zarqāwī 
illustrates, killing civilians with conventional bombs appears to be less controversial than 
killing with CBRN materials. But is this only due to the potential number of victims? I would 
argue that this is not necessarily the only reason, because while it is true in the case of the 
‘catastrophic’ use of CBRN weapons, it does not explain why there has not been more 
‘tactical’ utilization of CBRN materials. In my opinion, this is due to the groups’ fear that this 
will be used in propaganda against them. The case of Iraq is interesting because it is an 
environment where several groups ‘compete’ to reach similar goals. This would theoretically 
increase the need to innovate. The case of Iraq shows, however, that competition can also 
decrease innovation, at least as far as ‘controversial’ tactics are concerned (such as the use of 
CBRN materials), out of a fear that this will be used by rivals in propaganda to make the 
group lose support.      
The use of chlorine in vehicle bombs in Iraq appeared to have stopped by the summer of 
2007. The direct reason for this appears to have been specific US countermeasures, such as 
restricting the import of chlorine to Iraq, and arresting bomb-making cells (the manufacturing 
of Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq appears to be monopolized by a few parties). 
Another reason why the chlorine bombs stopped might have been that insurgents found the 
tactic an ineffective way of reaching their goals, for the various reasons mentioned above. 
It should be stressed that the example of Iraq is probably not very representative of the 
‘network’ level as a whole. On the other hand, the case study of Iraq revealed a number of 
interesting points, such as the dilemmas regarding the use of CBRN weapons within a local 
arena. While a competitive jihadi environment might promote innovation on the part of each 
group, it may also prevent innovation within certain tactics that can be exploited in enemy 
propaganda. It appears that CBRN may easily be regarded as such a tactic, especially due to 
the danger of hitting innocent Muslims. CBRN will not necessarily kill more civilians than a 
conventional bomb, but it appears to be easier to use in propaganda against rival groups. 
5.3 Al-Qaeda locals  
In this subchapter, I have examined four cases to illustrate the CBRN interest of al-Qaeda 
locals. I have only included cases in which suspects were put on trial, because they are 
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generally better documented than other cases. The cases include both individuals who 
received instructions from al-Qaeda’s central leadership, as well as more ‘home-grown’ 
initiatives. 
5.3.1 Jose Padilla 
In May 2002, Jose Padilla, a US citizen of Puerto Rican extraction, was arrested at the O’Hare 
International Airport in Chicago, and was accused of planning to carry out a “dirty bomb” 
attack within the United States. He was designated an enemy combatant by the President and 
spent the next three and a half years in military prisons. According to the interrogations of 
Padilla and other detainees, Padilla had apparently proposed such an operation to senior al-
Qaeda operatives in early 2002, but the plan had been rejected. Instead, Padilla had been 
tasked with blowing up several high-rise apartment buildings with natural-gas heating, and 
received training and financing for this purpose.194  
In November 2005, however, he was indicted and transferred to the civilian court system. The 
indictment does not mention the dirty bomb plot, nor any other plans to carry out attacks on 
US soil. Instead, he is accused of belonging to a North American support cell that conspired 
to “murder, kidnap, and maim persons in a foreign country” and to “provide material support 
for terrorists.”195 The trial was scheduled to start in May 2007 and is estimated to last four 
months.196 Although Padilla is not formally charged with planning to carry out acts of CBRN 
terrorism against the US, the documents released in the case nevertheless reveal interesting 
details with regards to al-Qaeda’s CBRN intentions.  
Jose Padilla was a gang-member and petty criminal before converting to Islam sometime in 
the 1990s.197 He appears to have been recruited for jihad by a North American cell led by 
Kifah Wael Jayyousi.198 According to Padilla’s own testimony, he became interested in going 
to Afghanistan after meeting a “Recruiter” on his ḥajj pilgrimage to Mecca in March 2000. He 
completed “basic training” at al-Qaeda’s al-Farouq training camp in Afghanistan in 
September-October 2000, and was approached several times by Muḥammad ῾Āṭif, al-Qaeda’s 
military commander, apparently because of his US citizenship. In July or August 2001 he was 
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tasked by ῾Āṭif with a terrorist operation on US soil that involved blowing up apartment 
buildings with natural-gas heating. He and another operative received explosives training for 
this purpose, but apparently the mission was abandoned because Padilla and the other 
operative could not get along. After Muḥammad ῾Āṭif was killed in November 2001, Padilla 
fled with several other al-Qaeda operatives to Pakistan. In Faisalabad, Padilla states, “he and 
his accomplice approached Abu Zubaydah with an operation in which they would travel to the 
United States to detonate a nuclear bomb they learned to make on the Internet”.199 Abu 
Zubaydah thought the idea unfeasible, but that “explosives wrapped in uranium (i.e. a “dirty 
bomb”)” might be more realistic. He was still sceptical, however, and warned Padilla that it 
was more difficult than he thought. Padilla, on the other hand, was convinced he was able to 
carry it out. Abu Zubaydah then sent them to Khalid Sheikh Muhammad to present the plan, 
while at the same time advising Khalid Sheikh Muhammad that “he did not think it 
practical.”200 Padilla and the accomplice met with Khalid Sheikh Muhammad in March 2002. 
The plan was apparently to obtain radioactive material inside the US rather than smuggling it. 
Apart from this, it is unclear how developed the plot was at this point. In any case Khalid 
Sheikh Muhammad rejected the plan, suggesting instead that they undertake the original 
mission of blowing up apartment buildings with natural-gas heating. According to Padilla, 
Muhammad found the dirty bomb plan “a little too complicated.”201 Padilla’s account is 
largely confirmed by other al-Qaeda-detainees, although with some inconsistencies regarding 
the target.   
If the accounts are true, it reveals some interesting points. The alleged plot to use nuclear or 
radiological materials was not initiated by al-Qaeda central, but by a loosely affiliated 
operative (Padilla) who appears to be no skilled nuclear scientist, but who relied on 
information on the Internet. Al-Qaeda central, who apparently did not judge him capable of 
such a complex mission, chose instead to send him to attack a number of easily obtainable 
“soft targets” (regular apartment buildings). This indicates a willingness by al-Qaeda central 
to select low-profile targets and tactics if high-profile targets are not regarded as feasible.  
5.3.2 The Courneuve-Romainville group (“The Chechen Network”) 
In December 2002, a group of North Africans were arrested in the Paris suburbs, as they were 
suspected of planning to carry out terrorist attacks in Europe. They were primarily based in 
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the Courneuve-Romainville suburbs of Paris, hence French authorities have usually referred 
to them as the Courneuve-Romainville group. In media reports they have usually been dubbed 
“the Chechen Network”, because they were believed to have received training with militants 
in the Caucasus. Most of the group’s members were of Algerian origin, and some of them had 
previous experience from militant groups in Algeria. During the summer of 2001, several of 
the group’s members had travelled to Georgia in an attempt to join the Chechen rebels, 
apparently without success, and most of them returned to France a few months later. At the 
time of their arrest, the group had allegedly planned to attack the Russian Embassy in Paris, as 
revenge for Chechen militants killed in the Dubrovka theatre in October 2002, but other 
targets in Paris had also been discussed. 202  
In addition, however, it was widely believed that the group had ties to al-Qaeda, and that they 
intended to carry out chemical and biological attacks across Europe. The claim is largely 
based on interrogations of Abu Zubaydah, who was captured in Pakistan in April 2002. 
According to the CIA, Abu Zubaydah had revealed during interrogations that a man named 
Abu Atiya, an associate of Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Zarqāwī who was operating out of a remote area of 
the Caucasus, had dispatched nine North African men to Europe to prepare chemical and 
biological attacks in 2001. The information was allegedly passed on to the French authorities, 
and was said to have contributed to the arrests in the Paris suburbs in December 2002. Three 
of the arrested suspects had been named by Abu Zubaydah.203 This information was also used 
by Colin Powell in February 2003 to convince the UN Security Council that Abū Muṣ῾ab al-
Zarqāwī, who was based in Northern Iraq at the time, intended to carry out chemical attacks 
in Europe.204   
Although uncorroborated by other open sources, Abu Zubaydah’s story seems to correspond 
to the activities of the Courneuve-Romainville group, who left Georgia during the autumn-
winter of 2001 after spending several months with militants in the Pankisi Gorge. Mérouane 
Benahmed, the leader of the group, was reportedly in contact with Abu Atiya during this stay. 
During 2000 or 2001, Abu Atiya was said to have met both Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Zarqāwī and Abu 
Zubaydah, and he had specifically told Abu Zubaydah about “the situation of Arab 
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combatants in Georgia and Chechnya.” 205 Abu Atiya, who was arrested in Baku in March 
2003, admitted that he was responsible for all foreigners wanting to fight in Chechnya, and 
that he during this period in 2001 had requested they go back home, advising them that jihad 
could be fought outside Chechnya and Afghanistan as well. He does not mention anything 
about giving the Algerians specific instructions to carry out attacks, and it is therefore unclear 
whether the cell was part of a larger command structure, or operating on its own.206 After a 
second wave of arrests in the case in January 2004, however, French officials claimed to have 
obtained more evidence in the case. They confirmed that one of the group’s members, Menad 
Benchellali, had attended an al-Qaeda poisons course in Afghanistan, and that there was 
further evidence that the cell “... was trying to manufacture chemical and biological weapons 
for attacks around Europe.”207 Several of Benchellali’s family members had testified that 
Benchellali had been conducting “chemical experiments” in his mother’s sewing room, the 
products of which were filled in small bottles and given to another cell member.208 
Furthermore, Benchellali had told several of the group’s members that he wanted to carry out 
chemical or biological attacks.209  In March 2006 the case was finally brought to the court. On 
14 June 2006, 24 out of 27 defendants were found guilty of “participation in a criminal 
association, with the purpose of preparing an act of terrorism”, and received jail sentences of 
up to ten years. One was found guilty of document fraud, while two were acquitted. 
Benahmed, the leader, and Benchellali, the “chemist”, both received ten years. Although the 
case reveals that members of the group had ties with other militant Islamists in Spain, Great 
Britain, Germany and elsewhere, there is very little concrete evidence that an al-Qaeda- or al-
Zarqāwī -organized “poison conspiracy” was in the making. No poisonous substances were 
confiscated in the case, although an unused NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical)-protection 
suit was found in one of the group’s apartments. In addition, the police found a variety of 
electronic equipment, equipment to make false documents, and some usual bomb-making 
chemicals. But what was the nature of the Courneuve-Romainville group’s CBRN efforts? 
According to the verdict, the group’s alleged chemical expert, Menad Benchellali, was born in 
France and had dual French/Algerian citizenship. He went to vocational school in France and 
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obtained a certificate in electronics in 1991. He made several trips in Europe and the Middle 
East, and from 1998 he lived for a period in London where he frequented radical mosques. 
Apparently, he went to Afghanistan around 1999, assisted by the Abu Doha (Amar 
Makhloulif) network, and stayed there for about a year. According to his brothers, he was 
very proud of his training when he came back, and he told them that he attended various 
courses at “the Algerian house” in Jalalabad, including a course on how to make ricin poison. 
His brother Hafed also remembered him talking about “testing on rabbits”.210 Initially, his 
expressed goal was to fight a jihad in Chechnya. He departed for Georgia on June 2001, and 
returned in December the same year, staying with a jihadi group in the border area but never 
participating in combat. According to his own account, he only got to do physical training and 
practice-shooting Kalashnikovs during his stay. Upon his return, he started conducting 
chemical experiments in his mother’s sewing room. According to another cell member, 
Mourad Merabet, Benchellali had returned from Chechnya “loaded with hate”, and had stated 
that he wanted to produce “chemical and biological arms in order to mount attacks in 
Europe”, in particular against Russian interests. Benchellali had also told him that he and 
some others had rented an apartment outside Paris in order to start up preparations. 
Furthermore, he had kept some toxic formulae on his laptop, which Mourad Merabet admitted 
to having deleted at Benchellali’s order, after the first arrests occurred in the case. Hafed 
Benchellali described his brother Menad as having “gone completely mad” after taking the 
poison course in Afghanistan.211  
It is unclear, at least according to open sources, whether the cell was acting independently, or 
as part of a larger “poison conspiracy”. There were several indications that they were 
preparing improvised explosives, and that they planned attacks in Paris. The alleged plan to 
carry out biological or chemical attacks, however, seems to have been only at the idea stage. 
Notably, there was no concrete evidence that the cell had been able to produce any biological 
or chemical agents at the time of their arrest, or even obtained the necessary materials, except 
for an NBC-protection suit. The desire to carry out biological and chemical attacks in Europe 
was mostly voiced by one member, Benchellali, who apparently was inspired by the poisons 
course he had attended in Afghanistan. As he had no formal education in natural sciences, let 
alone advanced biochemical engineering, he clearly underestimated the technical challenges 
of producing effective chemical or biological weapons. This belief, combined with his 
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expressed hatred against the West, is perhaps a sufficient explanation why he embarked upon 
his mysterious experiments, and it explains why they apparently failed.     
5.3.3 Kamal Bourgass and the “ricin plot” 
On 5 January 2003, police raided an apartment in Wood Green, North London, and arrested 
several Algerians suspected of being part of a terrorist cell and for planning to carry out 
chemical attacks in Great Britain. The tip allegedly came from the Algerian secret service 
which had arrested an Algerian Islamist, Mohammed Meguerba, in December 2002. 
Meguerba had said during interrogations that the cell had “an amount of poison they are 
prepared to use”, and that the poison was hidden in two jars of Nivea cream.212 During a 
search of the Wood Green apartment, the police found, among other things, a locked bag 
containing ₤4,100 in cash, several hand-written formulations (in Arabic) about poisons and 
explosives manufacturing, various plastic bottles with chemicals “which could have formed 
the ingredients for the manufacture of ricin and cyanide”, as well as other items, including a 
pestle and mortar with a white, powdery material on it that was initially said to contain traces 
of ricin.213 Some 20 castor beans had also been found in the apartment.214 Subsequently, the 
case was given wide media coverage and the group was dubbed a “ricin ring” with ties to al-
Qaeda. Later it was revealed that the ricin test had been a false positive, and that in fact, no 
ricin had been found, either in the Wood Green apartment or anywhere else.215 There were 
clear indications, however, that the cell had intentions of manufacturing poisons for unlawful 
purposes. On 13 April 2005, the alleged leader of the cell, Kamal Bourgass, was sentenced to 
17 years in prison for having “conspired together with other persons unknown to commit 
public nuisance by the use of poisons and/or explosives to cause disruption, fear or injury”.216 
However, there was not enough evidence to charge him with a “conspiracy to commit acts of 
Islamist terrorism by killing innocent civilians,” the most serious charge against him. 
Bourgass was already serving a life-sentence for killing a policeman during his arrest. The 
other four defendants in the case, all Algerians, were acquitted of all charges, while charges 
                                                 
212 Jason Burke, quoted in “Revealed: how secret papers led to ricin raid”, The Observer, 17 April 2005,  
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,6903,1461715,00.html (accessed 5 July 2007). 
213 “R v Bourgass”, England and Wales Court of Appeal, Judgment of 19 July 2005, via British and Irish Legal 
Information Institute (BAILII), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2005/1943.html (accessed 5 July 
2007).  
214 “The deadly recipes”, BBC News, 13 April 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4433679.stm (accessed 5 July 
2007). 
215 See for example, Walter Pincus, “London Ricin Finding Called a False Positive”, Washington Post, 14 April 
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49564-2005Apr13.html (accessed 5 July 2007). 
216 “Key figures in ricin case”, BBC News, 13 April 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4433649.stm 
(accessed 4 July 2007). 
 69
were dropped against three Algerians and a Libyan.217 Thus, in spite of numerous allegations, 
there was not enough evidence to link the “ricin cell” to militant Islamist networks. What was 
the nature, then, of the so-called ricin plot?  
Kamal Bourgass, born 1973, is an Algerian refugee who applied for asylum in the United 
Kingdom on 31 January 2000 using the name Nadir Habra. The application was refused, and 
his appeal was finally dismissed on 11 December 2001. After this he seems to have changed 
his name to Kamal Bourgass and continued living in the UK clandestinely. In July 2002, he 
was allegedly arrested in East London for shoplifting three pairs of jeans, and spent one night 
in jail.218 He was wanted by the police on 6 January 2003, after several passport photos of 
him had been discovered along with the ‘ricin equipment’ found in the Wood Green 
apartment. He was arrested in Manchester a few days later, and during this arrest, he killed 
one policeman and wounded several others with a kitchen knife. His fingerprints were found 
on the ‘ricin equipment’, and handwriting analysis showed that he was the author of the 
handwritten formulae. The fingerprints of others arrested in the case were also found on the 
seized material.219 Bourgass changed his explanations about the bag several times, but during 
the trial he tried to blame Mohammed Meguerba, stating that it was Meguerba’s equipment 
and that he had only copied the notes on his behalf.220 There is little open-source information 
available on Bourgass’ alleged links with militant islamists and al-Qaeda. During his trials, 
Bourgass did not stand out as a hardcore jihadi or al-Qaeda professional. Regarding the killing 
of a British policeman during his arrest, for example, he stated that it had not been his 
intention, that he sincerely regretted it and that he was “extremely sorry.”221 It seems he had 
several acquaintances in radical Islamist circles in London, and he used the infamous 
Finsbury Park mosque as his mail address. It is unclear, however, whether he had ever been to 
a training camp in Afghanistan. The only person to confirm this, at least according to open 
sources, was Mohammed Meguerba, who told Algerian authorities that he and Bourgass had 
been to training camps in Afghanistan. Later he withdrew the confession, claiming that it had 
been extracted under torture. Meguerba’s statements, therefore, were not used as evidence 
against Bourgass.  
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Jason Burke, who has analyzed the Algerian interrogation reports, argues that Meguerba 
provided so many details from the training in Afghanistan that it was reasonable to believe 
that he had actually been there himself. According to information obtained by Burke, 
Meguerba left Algeria in 1995 and travelled around Europe before settling in Ireland, where 
he came into contact with radical Islamists in 2000. Then, activists in London sent him to 
training camps in Afghanistan. Back in London, he allegedly started practising the 
manufacturing of poison, “as he had been shown in the Afghan camps.”222 The poison 
formulations presented as evidence in the case were, in fact, similar to those found in 
Afghanistan, but they could also have been copied from open sources.223 In September 2002, 
Meguerba was arrested for carrying false documents, then he jumped bail and fled to Algeria, 
where he was arrested in December the same year. He told the interrogators about the ricin 
conspiracy and the Wood Green flat, and that it was “occupied by an Algerian affiliated by al-
Qaeda”, apparently referring to Bourgass. He also said that Bourgass had planned to smear 
ricin on door handles, also a method well-known from al-Qaeda training manuals.224 Even if 
Bourgass had managed to produce ricin, this delivery method would most likely not work due 
to the large size of the ricin molecules that renders it incapable of penetrating the skin. The 
plot, therefore, seemed very amateurish. 
The significance of the London “ricin cell” was probably exaggerated due to the upcoming 
war on Iraq. The alleged discovery of ricin in London was heavily used by the US 
administration to prove that there were connections between Iraq, al-Zarqāwī and a European 
poison conspiracy (it was not until long after the Iraqi invasion that it became publicly known 
that no ricin had been found in the Wood Green apartment).225 The urgent need to justify the 
US-led invasion of Iraq probably led to overhasty conclusions with regards to the nature of 
the London plot.   
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It has also been alleged that the London and the Paris cases were connected, and that the 
London “ricin cell” was in fact part of the “Chechen network”.226 There is little evidence to 
support this claim, even though it cannot be totally disregarded. It appears that individuals 
affiliated with the Courneuve-Romainville group had met or knew affiliates of the circle 
around Bourgass,227 but it is unclear whether they were cooperating in the field of terrorism, 
or whether they were simply acquaintances because they both belonged to the same exile 
community of Algerian Islamists living in Europe.  
In any case, there are many principal similarities between these two cases. The idea to make 
poison was driven by individuals with no scientific training, but who were clearly inspired by 
crude poison-making methods that are well-known from American paramilitary literature. 
Such methods have also been taught on jihadi “poison courses” in Afghanistan and elsewhere, 
and it is likely that both Benchellali and Meguerba could have attended such courses in 1999-
2000, sponsored by a European Islamist network based in London. If they did attend a poisons 
course in Afghanistan, they were probably encouraged by the instructors to use their 
knowledge for jihad, but the plots themselves, the way they turned out, carried very few 
hallmarks of an al-Qaeda organized conspiracy.  
5.3.4 Dhiren Barot 
The Dhiren Barot case is probably the most serious CBRN incident related to militant 
Islamists in the West. On 3 August 2004, British police arrested the 34-year old UK citizen 
Dhiren Barot and several others, and charged them with “conspiracy to commit a public 
nuisance by using radioactive material, toxic gas, chemicals or explosives,” as well as 
conspiracy to commit murder. On 12 April 2005, Barot and two others were also indicted by a 
US court for “conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against persons within the 
United States”, as well as conspiracy to aid terrorists and to damage commercial buildings.228 
At the time of his arrest, Barot had been working on his plans for more than four years. In 
2000 and 2001, he and an accomplice went to the US to conduct surveillance of potential 
targets, such as the World Bank headquarters in Washington and the New York Stock 
Exchange, and he also carried out extensive research based on open sources. He wrote very 
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detailed plans of attacks both in the US and the UK, which were later found on various 
computers. The plans included a series of co-ordinated attacks inside the UK, including plans 
to detonate a dirty bomb.229 The cell was found with a large cache of smoke detectors 
containing small amounts of americium-241. Most officials believe it is unlikely that the 
amount was sufficient to cause casualties or radiation sickness, but “it would be sufficient to 
trigger sensors in enclosed places.” In November 2006, Barot was sentenced to life 
imprisonment by the British court. In June 2007, seven co-conspirators received jail sentences 
between 15-26 years for playing supporting roles in the plot.230
Dhiren Barot (aka Abū ῾Iṣṣa al-Hindi, ῾Iṣṣa al-Brīṭāni), born 1971, is a British citizen with an 
Indian mother and Kenyan father and grew up in North London. He is described as an 
“average student” who converted to Islam in his early twenties and started attending radical 
mosques in London.231 He went to Kashmir in 1995 and fought with jihadi groups there, and 
later wrote a book about it called The Army of Madinah in Kashmir, published in 1999.232 
Around 1998 he went to Afghanistan and worked for one year as an instructor at the jihadi 
camps. Afterwards he moved to the Philippines, where he allegedly received further training 
in “firearms, munitions and explosives handling”.233 In March 2007, Khalid Sheikh 
Muhammad admitted responsibility for “surveying and financing for the destruction of the 
New York Stock Exchange and other financial targets after 9/11”,234 possibly referring to 
Barot’s surveillance trips conducted in August 2000 and March 2001. It seems that after 9/11, 
Barot concentrated his plans on attacking targets within Britain. He allegedly presented his 
final plans to senior al-Qaeda commanders in Pakistan in February-March 2004, before 
returning to Britain on 21 April.235
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Barot had made a detailed project proposal, which was summarized in a 39-page document 
released by the Metropolitan Police.236 The core of his plan was the so-called “Gas Limos 
Project”, which consisted of blowing up limousines filled with explosives and gas canisters in 
several underground car parks. In addition he discusses radiological dispersal devices (RDD), 
various types of train attacks and attacks using hijacked petrol tankers.237 The documents 
reveal that Barot had conducted considerable research into RDDs and drew from open 
sources. In particular, he had copied and pasted sections from a report published by the Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies in 2003, in which the dangers of commercially available 
radioactive sources were discussed.238 When discussing what radioactive material would be 
most suitable, he emphasizes that ease of access is more important than the strength of the 
hazard. Americium-241, which can be found in small amounts in smoke detectors, is therefore 
a more attractive choice than for example the powerful radioactive sources found in hospitals, 
as “security is tight in these places”. He notes that an RDD “... does not need to cause 
casualties to be effective” as long as it causes disruption and panic, and requires a costly 
clean-up.239 After discussing the pros and cons of various alternatives, he proposes a plan to 
collect 10,000 commercially available smoke detectors, and then disperse the radioactive 
material by fire, rather than explosives, as he argues that the radiological pollution will be less 
effective if dispersed over a large area. The accumulation of smoke detectors was estimated to 
take ten months using ten operatives, and the whole project would require at least ₤70,000, 
according to Barot’s calculations. It seems that his plans were formulated to be presented to a 
higher level for approval and funding.  
His “keep-it-simple” philosophy was not restricted to the manufacture of CBRN weapons. In 
his project proposal, he states that the whole project is based on the method of “...mak[ing] 
use of that which is available at your disposal and to bend it to suit your needs, (improvise) 
rather than wasting valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your 
reach”, an idea he claims to have learnt from “observing senior planners.”240
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Dhiren Barot appears to have made the most comprehensive attempt to carry out a CBRN 
terrorist attack in the West. He did not regard the CBRN plan sufficient, however; the purpose 
of the ‘dirty bomb’ was to create fear and disruption in addition to the large numbers of 
casualties that his conventional bombs would create. He also suggested, in his “gas limos” 
project, to paint some of the gas cylinders in yellow colour in order to give the impression that 
they contained poisonous gas. This, he believes, “... will help spread terror and chaos when 
the emergency service (Hazmat) teams arrive”.241  
5.3.5 The CBRN interest of al-Qaeda locals 
The CBRN attacks planned by al-Qaeda locals all relied on crude, readily available materials, 
and the planned ‘delivery methods’ were very unsophisticated. The Jose Padilla case shows 
that although the initial ambitions were high (a nuclear bomb), the actual plan was modified 
(gas explosion) to reflect the operative’s capabilities. This has also been the case in other al-
Qaeda-related plots in Europe. There is a willingness to attack with crude weapons if high-
tech weapons are not available; and there is a willingness to attack ‘soft’ targets (civilians) if 
‘hard’ targets (for example, US military bases) are too well protected.242
The cases also show that the al-Qaeda locals acquired their CBRN knowledge either from 
open source-literature (clearest in the Barot case), or from crude poison courses taught in 
Afghanistan. However, several hundred people took part in these courses, but only a few 
decided to actually use the knowledge. This indicates, again, that the purpose of the course 
was not to ‘indoctrinate’ the trainees to start carrying out attacks with CBRN materials. The 
decision to use CBRN materials appears to have been made by the operatives themselves due 
to a personal preference for such tactics. In some cases they might have presented the plans to 
senior al-Qaeda members for approval and funding, in other cases not. The cases show that 
although al-Qaeda central has also displayed an interest in CBRN weapons, it seems that it 
has not yet initiated such a plot. 
In order to judge the significance of the reviewed cases, they must be seen in relation to the 
other types of plots and attacks that have occurred in Europe and the United States during this 
period. Unfortunately, there is not enough space to go into detail here. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that out of 24 ‘substantially documented’ incidents that occurred in Europe between 
1998-2007, only four involved possible use of CBRN agents. The count is based on a 
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chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe developed by Petter Nesser, and includes both 
planned, prepared and executed attacks.243 All four incidents, moreover, occurred between 
2002-2004, meaning that there is no apparent increase in these types of incidents.244 
Undoubtedly, the cases reviewed in this study should be seen as the exception rather than the 
rule.    
5.4 Al-Qaeda sympathizers 
The final ‘level’ of al-Qaeda I have looked at is al-Qaeda sympathizers. In my analysis, I have 
chosen to let this group be represented by al-Qaeda supporters who are active on the Internet 
through jihadist web pages and discussion forums. This subchapter will provide an overview 
of CBRN manuals and handbooks available on jihadist web pages, examine their technical 
quality, and explore CBRN-related postings and discussions, with a view to determining the 
nature of the CBRN efforts on this level of the al-Qaeda network.        
5.4.1 Jihadism Online 
It is well-known that the Internet today plays an important role for al-Qaeda and its loose 
network of affiliates and sympathizers. It serves both as a communication channel, a reference 
library and a virtual meeting place. This, of course, is due to obvious factors such as 
anonymity, ease of access, and nearly unlimited storage space.  
Al-Qaeda uses the Internet today for a variety of purposes:  
- For propaganda and indoctrination purposes.  
- For specific communication purposes such as boosting the morale of members and 
sympathizers and “terrorizing” the enemy through graphic footage of damage and 
losses inflicted upon their enemies. Furthermore, the web is also a key media outlet 
for official communiqués, and to a lesser extent for outlining doctrines and 
strategies. 
- For command-and-control purposes, including dispatching operative instructions 
as coded emails. 
- For training purposes by distributing manuals and videos in small-arms training, 
explosives, poison, surveillance evasion, information gathering, reconnaissance, 
etc. 
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- For fund-raising and recruitment purposes. 
- For waging “e-jihad” which is a term frequently used about information attacks on 
enemy websites by jihadi sympathizers, resulting in defacement, the theft of 
sensitive data, denial-of-service attacks etc.245 
After the disappearance of the training camps in Afghanistan, it has become popular to view 
the Internet as al-Qaeda’s new ‘training camp’ or ‘virtual Afghanistan,’246 and this refers to 
the numerous training manuals and handbooks available online, including high-quality 
instruction videos. In addition, there are specialized sub-forums in which the members 
exchange information and experiences on a range of military and technical subjects such as 
bomb-making, secure communication, how to build a cell, and so on. While it seems obvious 
that a cyber environment could never replace a real-life situation, some jihadist publications 
have recognized the potential of Internet as a tool for training. Most notably, the online 
magazine Mu῾askar al-Baṭṭār (al-baṭṭār means ‘sabre’ but is also the nickname of Yūsuf al-
῾Ayīri, the leader of al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula) stated in its first issue from January 
2004: 
In order to join the great training camps you don’t have to travel to other lands. Alone, 
in your home or with a group of your brothers, you too can begin to execute the 
training program. You can all join the al-Baṭṭār camp.247  
The magazine was issued on a bi-monthly basis from January-October 2004, and contained 
ideological articles as well as practical lessons on elementary military skills.  
The idea that anyone can start training at home based on material downloaded from the 
Internet is most clearly articulated by the al-Qaeda strategist Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Sūrī, who argues 
in The Global Islamic Resistance Call (da῾wat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya al-῾ālamiyya) that 
rather than calling Muslims to join training camps in other countries, such as Afghanistan, 
“[i]t is necessary to move the training to every house, every quarter and every village of the 
Muslim countries..”248 He explicitly calls for “the spread of a culture of preparation and 
training […] by all methods, especially the Internet…”.249 He also provides a rough outline of 
a training program, in which he recommends learning basic military skills from manuals “that 
are available today on the Internet”, while emphasizing that “explosives manufacture should 
                                                 
245 The list is based on Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The new arena, the new challenges 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006). 
246 See for example, Stephen Ulph, “A Guide to Jihad on the Web,” Terrorism Focus 2, no. 7. Available: 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369531 (accessed 28 February 2007).  
247 Mu῾askar al-Baṭṭār 1 (January 2004), downloaded via al-Qā῾idūn, www.qa3edoon.com.  
248 Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Sūrī, “ ” (The Global Islamic Resistance Call), 1425.  ﺔﻴﻤﻟﺎﻌﻟا ﺔﻴﻣﻼﺳﻹا ﺔﻣوﺎﻘﻤﻟا ةﻮﻋد
249 Ibid., 1424. 
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only be done under supervision of an experienced chemist”. Though he provides a list of 
recommended training manuals to read, CBRN manuals are not mentioned.250  
As indicated above, training is only one of many ways that al-Qaeda uses the Internet, and the 
subject remains relatively small. In one of the largest discussion forums, Muntadayāt al-firdaws 
al-jihādiyya, which at the time of access contained some 19,000 threads, 750 threads (or 3.9 
per cent) were posted in the sub-forum for equipment and preparation (muntadā al-῾udda wal-
i῾dād). In comparison, 24 per cent of the threads were posted in the sub-forum for 
communiqués and reports (muntadā al-bayānāt wal-taqārīr). A survey of other forums showed 
a similar distribution.251
That said, there is in any case a considerable amount of training material and manuals 
available online, as well as daily activity in discussions related to weapons and preparation. A 
well-known collection of training manuals is the Encyclopaedia of Preparation (mawsū῾at al-
i῾dād), a 400-MB collection of training handbooks divided into categories such as ‘Weapons’, 
‘Home-Made Production’ (covering explosives and bomb-making, including CBRN materials 
and weapons), ‘Guerrilla Warfare’ and ‘Regular Military Operations’.252 In addition to Arabic 
documents and manuals, it also contains a large corpus of English manuals and links to 
recommended web pages. In 2004 the Encyclopaedia contained around 300 Arabic documents 
amounting to some 10,000 pages,253 and its most popular files are frequently posted on jihadi 
discussion forums. It should be noted that the sources of this encyclopaedia vary greatly; 
some manuals are written by veterans of the Afghan war, others by Palestinian insurgents, 
while still others by Internet activists with little or no battle experience. Some manuals are 
apparently translated from US Army Field Manuals, while others seem to be derived from The 
Poisoner’s Handbook and other underground literature.254
Overall, there are relatively few CBRN manuals available on jihadi web pages. By mid-2007, 
around 10 CBRN manuals had been identified in addition to one English-language video on 
                                                 
250 Ibid., 1428. 
251 The percentage for the other forums were: muntadayāt al-nuṣra al-jihādiyya: 2.8 per cent 
(http://www.alnusra.net/vb/), šabakat ᾽abū al-buḫārī al-᾽islāmiyya: 3.9 per cent 
(http://www.abualbokhary.info/vb3/), muntadayāt risālat al-᾽umma al-jihādiyya: 3.9 per cent (www.al-
ommh.net/vb/). All forums were accessed on 19 December 2006. 
252 In the introduction to the 3rd edition, the editors write: “In order to improve the military knowledge of our 
brothers in the Islamic movements, we present to you our third edition of the Encyclopedia of Preparation (for 
Jihad) to enable the capable Jihadist cadres with God’s help to reestablish the Islamic Khalifate.” Available at 
http://geocities.com/m_eddad/ (3rd ed.) and http://www.geocities.com/i3dad_jihad4/ (4th Ed.) (accessed 2 March 
2007).  
253 The estimate is based on a version of the Encyclopaedia’s 4th ed., which was downloaded by the FFI on 6 
June 2005. 
254 Maxwell Hutchkinson, The Poisoner’s Handbook (El Dorado: Desert Publications, 2000.  
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how to extract ricin. In comparison, there are more than 40 Arabic-language videos available 
on conventional weapons and how to make various explosives. CBRN weapons are not a very 
popular discussion topic. An analysis of the al-Firdaws forum revealed that of 764 threads 
posted in the sub-forum for Equipment and Preparation, 35 (4.6 per cent) were CBRN-
related.255 The analysis also showed no indication that the topic of CBRN has become more 
popular, or that new handbooks or formulations have been produced. In 2005, 20 CBRN-
related threads (4.7 per cent of total) were posted, while in 2006, 15 CBRN-related threads 
were posted (4.4 per cent of total). These threads include discussions of how to make and 
deliver different CBRN agents, copies of newspaper articles on al-Qaeda and CBRN, 
formulations for CBRN agents or links to manuals, many of which are from the 
Encyclopaedia of Preparation.  
This is a summary of the topics most frequently discussed on the al-Firdaws sub-forum for 
equipment and preparation. The statistics are based on an analysis of 764 threads that were 
posted over a period of roughly two years (February 2005-December 2006). The topic of each 
thread was determined by looking at the topic of the first message within the thread.  
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Figure 2: Discussion topics in a typical jihadi discussion forum 
 
                                                 
255 Al-Firdaws was chosen because it had the largest archive of threads in addition to having a separate sub-forum 
for equipment and preparation. The archive dates back to February 2005. 
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Other forums, although with much smaller archives, showed a similar pattern. In both 
Muntadayāt al-nuṣra al-jihādiyya and Muntadayāt al-muhājirīn, the sub-forums for preparation 
only contained around 5 percent of CBRN-related threads (15 of 278 threads in al-Nuṣra; 7 of 
154 threads in al-Muhājirīn).256  
 
Type257Arabic title English translation Format Pages
258
ṣinā῾at al-sumūm (mawsū῾at al-
jihād) 
The Making of Poisons  
(from: Encyclopaedia of Jihad) 
BC pdf 8 
durūs ῾askariyya fī jihād al-ṭawāġīṭ Assassinations with Poison (from: 
Military Studies in the Jihad Against 
the Tyrants) 
BC paper259 6 
The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook 
(in English) 
The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook BC pdf 19 
dawrat al-sumūm wal-ġāzāt al-
sāmma al-ša῾biyya 
Course in Home-Made Poisons and 
Poisonous Gases 
BC pdf 30 
dawrat al-sumūm wa᾽l-ġāzāt al-
sāmma al-kubrā (mawsū῾at al-
sumūm) 
Comprehensive Course in Poisons 
and Poisonous Gases (The Poisons 
Encyclopaedia) 
BC pdf 99 
al-risāla al-sāmma The Poisonous Letter C JPEG 1 
ḥarb al-sumūm Poison Warfare BC HTML 10 
al-mubtakar al-farīd The Unique Invention C pdf 12 
al-silāḥ al-biyūlūji Biological Weapons B word 19 
taḥḍir samm al-būtūlīzm (sāmm al-
ta῾ām al-fāsid) 
Preparation of Botulism Toxin 
(rotten meat poison) 
B pdf 28 
al-talawwuṯ al-᾽iš῾ā῾ī Radiological Pollution R HTML 2 
al-qunbula al-nawawiyya al-
jihādiyya wa kayfiyyat al-taxṣīb al-
nawawi 
The Nuclear Bomb of Jihad and How 
to Enrich Uranium 
N pdf 479 
 TOTAL   713 
Figure 3: List of CBRN manuals and documents 
According to the list above, roughly 700 pages of CBRN manuals have been found online 
(noting, however, that 479 of these belong to one single manual). Only manuals written or 
produced for jihadi purposes have been included in the list. Other examples of CBRN-related 
material posted on jihadi forums include:   
- Handwritten notes on poisons, explosives and electronics (the notes on poisons are 
very similar to formulations found in other jihadi poison manuals, indicating that 
the content of the manuals may correspond to poison courses taught in jihadi 
camps). 
                                                 
256 Muntadayāt al-nuṣra al-jihādiyya, http://www.alnusra.net/vb/; and Šabakat muhājirūn al-᾽islāmiyya, 
http://www.mohajroon.com/vb/. Both forums are inactive as of November 2007. 
257 C=Chemical, B=biological, R=Radiological, N=Nuclear. 
258 Pages are based on the given format. The manuals may exist in other formats, with different pagination.  
259 This manual was originally uncovered in paper format during a police raid in Manchester in 2000. I have not 
recovered the original version, thus I had to rely on an English translation of the document. 
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- Two manuals on chemical and biological warfare, issued by the Iraqi Army in the 
1980s. 
- Research paper on nuclear fuel (written in Arabic, but with no references to jihad). 
- English CBRN handbooks and manuals, such as the American ‘survivalist’ Kurt 
Saxon’s video on how to make ricin (with no references to jihad). 
This thesis has only considered CBRN manuals produced by the jihadists themselves; it 
should be noted, though, that there is a vast amount of open-source information on CBRN 
weapons available online. Sometimes this has also been used by jihadists, such as in the Barot 
case discussed above. It has not been included here because I have assumed that the CBRN 
interest of the al-Qaeda network is most clearly reflected in self-produced materials and 
discussions on jihadist web pages.  
5.4.2 Chemical and biological manuals 
Overview of chemical and biological manuals 
Eight of the twelve documents examined are dedicated to chemical agents and weapons (they 
are labelled ‘BC’ in the table because they also contain recipes of how to produce toxins), 
while two are related to biological agents and weapons. They differ in length, quality and 
content, but most documents fall into one of three categories:  
1. Collections of crude poison-making methods, similar to those found in The Poisoner’s 
Handbook.  
2. Recipes requiring advanced laboratory equipment and skills. Based on scientific 
articles, college textbooks. 
3. Recipe of a crude, chemical device, including a fully developed dispersal mechanism 
Category 1 
“The making of poisons” (ṣinā῾at al-sumūm) is not a separate manual, but a section of a larger 
jihadi manual, “The Encyclopaedia of Jihad” (mawsūcat al-jihād). It is a 1500-page manual 
which is frequently posted on forums.260 According to the editors, the text was originally 
“written by the Arab Mujahedin during their jihad against the Soviets”, and published by the 
Service Bureau (maktab al-ḫidamāt) after the war.261 The electronic version, which claims to 
                                                 
260 For example, a link to this document was posted on al-Firdaws 18 August 2006 as part of a collection named 
“al-Mawsū῾a al-῾Askariyya”, www.firdaws.org/vb. The manual is also included in the Encyclopedia of 
Preparation. 
261 “  دﺎﻬﺠﻟا ﺔﻋﻮﺳﻮﻣﻲﻧﺎﺜﻟا ءﺰﺠﻟا: ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻌﻟا تاروﺪﻟا ”  (Encyclopaedia of Jihad Part 2: Practical lessons), First electronic 
edition, issued by Anṣār al-Jihād (1423 h.): 2. 
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be a re-production of the original text, is dated 1423 h. (approx. 2002).262 The manual has an 
8-page section entitled ‘the making of poisons,’ which is divided into the sections ‘poisonous 
plants,’ ‘poisonous alkaloids,’ ‘poisonous chemicals,’ ‘poisonous gases’ and ‘poisonous 
explosive substances.’ The text seems to be more or less directly translated from The 
Poisoner’s Handbook by Maxwell Hutchkinson.263 It is not surprising, therefore, that a page 
from The Poisoner’s Handbook was among the documents found in Afghanistan after the fall 
of the Taliban.264
Another well-known manual is “Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants”, also 
known as “The Manchester Manual” since it was first uncovered by the British police in 2000 
in Manchester, England during a search of the home of Abū ᾽Anas al-Lībī, a suspect in the US 
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.265 It was among the first so-called ‘al-
Qaeda-handbooks’ to be translated into English and made publicly available, and thus drew a 
great deal of media attention. It has been thoroughly analyzed and the English translation of it 
can easily be accessed on the Internet.266 On jihadi websites, however, the manual is rarely 
spotted. The origins of the manual are unknown, but according to Jerrold Post, parts of the 
manual may originate from radical Islamist circles in Egypt.267 The manual covers a range of 
topics, and only 6 of the 180 pages are dedicated to chemical agents. Lesson 16, 
“Assassinations using Poisons and Cold Steel” was initially deleted from the publicly 
available translation, but was later declassified and released following a Freedom of 
Information Act request. Lesson 16 provides crude instructions on how to make poisons such 
as ricin and botulinum toxin. As in the Encyclopaedia of Jihad, the formulations appear to be 
direct translations from The Poisoner’s Handbook.268 These two manuals do not talk about 
the agents as ‘weapons of mass destruction’, but rather as a means of assassination. It is 
interesting to note, however, that many of the “CBRN manuals” distributed later include 
formulations that are fundamentally similar to these.  
                                                 
262 This year would correspond to the period March 2002 – March 2003.  
263 See Maxwell Hutchkinson, The Poisoner’s Handbook (El Dorado: Desert Publications, 2000). 7-14, 29-33, 
45-49, 54-56. 
264 C.J. Chivers and David Rohde, “The Jihad Files”, The New York Times, 17 March 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/international/20020317terror_DOCUMENTS/index5.html (accessed 9 
May 2007). 
265 This analysis is based on the translated version of the manual, as the original was not available.  
266 The manual can be accessed, for example at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/jihadmanual.html 
(accessed 19 December 2007). For an analysis of the manual, see Jerrold M. Post, ed., Military Studies in the 
Jihad Against the Tyrants: The Al-Qaeda Training Manual (Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 
2005). 
267 Post, Military Studies in the Jihad, ix; Roy Gutman, “Training in Terror”, Newsweek Web Exclusive, 26 
October 2001, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3067505/site/newsweek/from/RL.2/ (accessed 9 May 2007). 
268 Hutchkinson, The Poisoner’s Handbook, 7-14, 25-26. 
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 “The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook” is a 19-page English manual signed by Abdel-Aziz and 
dated 7 February 1996. The document has been distributed as part of the Encyclopaedia of 
Preparation, and may be found on a host of other militant websites. The author claims that the 
manual is based on “a poisons course” that he attended with “certain” groups whose “first 
language was not English.”269 The manual describes 26 different chemical and biological 
agents270, one-third of which appears to have been tested on rabbits. The manual includes six 
formulations for poisonous gases, but none of these was tested on animals. The delivery 
methods suggested in the manual include adding the poison to food or drink, “air-gun pellets 
and to make poison-tipped arrows” or in an oily cream to be applied to the skin of the victim. 
As for the gases, it proposes putting each of the two reactants for the poisonous gas in a glass 
bottle, strapping them together and throwing them at the target.271  
The manual “Course in Home-Made Poisons and Poisonous Gases” (dawrat al-sumūm wal-
ġāzāt al-sāmma al-šacbiyya) is produced by the Islamic Media Center (IMC).272 It is 27 pages 
long, and consists of a scanned document entitled “Chapter 2: Poisons... and how to use them 
in killing”. The content is similar to the Mujahideen Poisons Handbook, but the descriptions 
of experiments are slightly more detailed, and it also includes experiments with poisonous 
gases (hydrogen cyanide and hydrogen sulphide) on rabbits. The manual also contains a 4-
page section on how to deliver the agents, including crude sketches of how to fill artillery 
shells with poisons or poisonous gases. It mentions the prospect of “causing mass death of 
people”, and it is also suggested to spread the poisons by “spraying them from a plane at a 
low altitude”.273 Other methods described are poisonous bullets and arrows, poisonous home-
made “hand grenades” and the use of skin-penetrating liquid (this section appears to be 
inspired by The Poisoner’s Handbook). None of the delivery methods is attributed to specific 
agents, it is simply stated that all the mentioned poisons and gases can be used. The manual 
ends with a section on how to treat poisoning. Although the delivery methods described 
                                                 
269 Abdel-Aziz, “The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook” (7 February 1996): 1-2. Downloaded from Mawsu῾at al-
i῾dād,4th ed., 6 June 2005. http://www.geocities.com/i3dad_jihad4/. 
270 The paragraph “poisonous/useful drugs” is counted as one agent, as it is merely a list of drugs and their lethal 
dose. 
271 Abdel-Aziz, “The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook”, 6, 10, 13, 16. 
272 The Islamic Media Center (IMC) can be viewed as one of al-Qaeda’s first ‘media agencies.’ It claims to have 
existed since 1991 or earlier, and has distributed and/or produced thousands of pages of jihadi training manuals. 
Its online activity seems to have vanished since 2005. For more on this, see Brynjar Lia, “Jihadi Web Media 
Production: Characteristics, Trends, and Future Implications”, Paper presented at “Check the Web” Conference 
in Berlin, 26-27 February 2007, 
http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00092/Jihadi_Web_Media_Pro_92100a.pdf (accessed 10 July 2007). 
273 Abū Ḥuḏayfa al-Šāmi, “ﺔﻴﺒﻌﺸﻟا ﺔﻣﺎﺴﻟا تازﺎﻐﻟاو مﻮﻤﺴﻟا ةرود” (Course in Home-Made Poisons and Poisonous Gases), 
Islamic Media Center (file modified 16 September 2004): 58-59. Downloaded from Mawsu῾at al-i῾dād 4th ed., 6 
June 2005. http://www.geocities.com/i3dad_jihad4/. 
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would hardly have any mass-casualty outcome, this mentioning of “causing mass death of 
people” makes this manual somewhat different from the ones previously discussed, as they 
were for assassination only.  
“Comprehensive Course in Poisons and Poisonous Gases” (dawrat al-sumūm wa’l-ġāzāt al-
sāmma al-kubrā) is the largest chemical manual of the available CBRN manuals online. The 
manual is divided into six chapters entitled “Poisons”, “Home-Made poisons”, “Some 
poisonous gases”, “Chemical poisons”, “Natural poisons”, “How to use the poisons and 
treatment”.274 The first chapter is a general introduction to toxicology. The rest of the manual 
consists of descriptions and formulations of various poisons and poisonous gases, as well as 
descriptions of experiments on rabbits. Parts of the text are very similar to the Course in 
Home-Made Poisons and Poisonous Gases, and the Mujahideen Poisons Handbook. These 
similarities can be found both in the formulations and in the descriptions of experiments. It 
thus appears that parts of the manuals have been written based on the same notes, or based on 
each other. The chapter about delivery methods is also similar to the one in the Course in 
Home-Made Poisons and Poisonous Gases, with some additions. It describes methods for 
causing mass death, but also describes how agents can be used for assassination.  
“The Poisonous Letter” (al-risāla al-sāmma), is a short text that describes how to make a 
‘poisonous letter’ by soaking it in a cyanide solution. “Poison Warfare” (ḥarb al-sumūm) talks 
about how to target Americans in Saudi Arabia, and suggests a number of suitable poisons, 
like cyanide, agricultural poisons, snake venom and others, but does not provide details about 
how to manufacture them. With regards to cyanide, the author simply suggests to “go to one 
of the shops that sell poisons, and ask for cyanide (rat poison)...”275 But he also suggests a 
range of delivery methods, like mixing cyanide with skin cream and applying it to car doors, 
injecting the poison into food items in the target’s shopping basket “when he is not looking”, 
or spraying the agent into the air-conditioning system of houses or cars, noting that “in the car 
it is more effective”.276 Apparently the manual is focused on targeting individuals, and does 
not mention “mass-casualty” or simultaneous attacks. There are no descriptions of 
experiments.   
  
                                                 
274 “ىﺮﺒﻜﻟا ﺔﻣﺎﺴﻟا تازﺎﻐﻟاو مﻮﻤﺴﻟا ةرود” (Comprehensive Course in Poisons and Poisonous Gases), Islamic Media 
Center (file modified 9 December 2002): 14. Downloaded from Mawsu῾at al-i῾dād, 6 June 2005, 
http://www.geocities.com/i3dad_jihad4/
275 “مﻮﻤﺴﻟا بﺮﺣ” (Poison Warfare). Islamic Media Center, file modified on 8 November 2003. Downloaded from 
Mawsu῾at al-i῾dād 4th ed., 6 June 2005. http://www.geocities.com/i3dad_jihad4/. 
276 Ibid. 
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Category 2 
There are two longer manuals on biological weapons, which both are based on scientific 
textbooks and articles, rather than crude underground literature such as The Poisoner’s 
Handbook. The first manual, “Biological Weapons” (al-silāḥ al-biyūlūji), is a 19-page 
document that is supposed to describe methods for growing the bacteria Yersinia pestis 
(causing the plague) and Clostridium botulinum (producing botulinum toxin). The author 
states that the content of the manual is taken from the book Microbiology by Pelczar, Reid 
and Chan, as well as an Arabic book on bacteriology and “some articles on the Internet”.277 
The author has chosen the plague bacteria “due to the relative easiness of getting hold of it 
and because of the possibility of using it in the form of spray (aerosol). Thereby it can easily 
be spread in the air, striking an innumerable number of people with lethal pneumonic plague”. 
He does not, however, discuss the major technical difficulties of creating such an aerosol 
weapon, nor does he mention the fragility of the plague microbe, which makes it unsuitable as 
an air-delivered weapon. The author briefly suggests some delivery methods, such as 
spreading the toxin “in aerosol form or in artillery charges”, and also suggests combining 
biological weapons with a suicide bombing, claiming that “the explosion will disperse the 
weapon over a wide range”.278 The other manual is entitled “Preparation of Botulinum Toxin 
(Rotten Meat Poison)” (taḥḍir samm al-būtūlīzm (sāmm al-ta῾ām al-fāsid)). The 28-page manual 
aims to describe how to grow Clostridium botulinum bacteria, and is divided into six chapters: 
1) searching for the bacteria, and its isolation; 2) ideal requirements for the production of the 
toxin; 3) isolation of the toxin, and its purification; 4) assay [sic] of the toxin; 5) storing of the 
toxin and its stability; 6) how to use the toxin as a biological weapon. The section on 
weaponizing the agent consists of less than one page and most of the manual is dedicated to 
describing how to produce the toxin. Parts of the text were found to be identical to English-
language articles available on the Internet,279 and the text seems to be copied from other 
sources rather than having been developed and tested by the author. This is confirmed by the 
author himself, who states in the introduction:  
In preparing this report, I relied on a study on the theoretical characteristics of the 
toxin and the various methods to purify it, and I tried to pick the method which was 
                                                 
277 Parts of the manual were found to be similar to passages in Michael J. Pelczar, Roger D. Reid and E.C.S. 
Chan. Microbiology. 4th edition. United States: McGraw-Hill, 1977. 
278 “ﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﻴﺒﻟا حﻼﺴﻟا” (Biological Weapons). Publisher unknown, file modified 25 September 2005: 16. 
Downloaded from Mawsu῾at al-i῾dād, 6 June 2005. http://www.geocities.com/i3dad_jihad4/. 
279 For example, parts of the manual were found to be identical to the text in an article on the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration’s home page. “Chapter 17: Clostridium botulinum”, Bacteriological Analytical Manual 
Online, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~ebam/bam-17.html (accessed 7 March 2007). 
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easiest and most effective, but at the same time most inexpensive. However, I was 
unable to implement it in practice, because I lacked the opportunities to do so.280   
The author also stresses that in order to carry out the procedures described in the manual, “a 
person with a scientific background is needed (student or graduate)”.281  
Category 3 
“The Unique Invention” (al-mubtakar al-farīd) is the only manual that actually describes a 
relatively complete, chemical device. Figure 4 is taken from the manual, showing the device 
from above.282 It consists of a metal box containing four glass bottles filled with acid, 
surrounded by two chemicals. The idea is to break the glass bottles with a small explosive 
charge, causing the acid to mix and react with the two other chemicals and produce poisonous 
gases, which will be released through holes in the device. The manual contains detailed 
explanations and illustrations on how to assemble it, as well as suggestions on what kind of 
places to target and from where to obtain the chemicals. However, in spite of its relative 
sophistication, the manual does not appear to be more popular or more discussed than other 
online CBRN material. No reports on tests or experiments using the device have been found, 
although the author states in the manual that “the Invention, which is presented on these 
pages, is the result of experiences from the months and years of preparations and 
planning...”283 The document is nevertheless interesting, because it is the only CBRN manual 
among those examined that reflects a comprehensive attempt at designing an improvised 
chemical device for use against an indiscriminate target. Ron Suskind claimed in The One 
Percent Doctrine (2006) that al-Qaeda had planned to use this device (referred to as 
“mubtakkar” [sic]) on the New York subway in 2003, but that the plan had been aborted by 
Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī for unknown reasons.284 No evidence of the plot was ever found, 
however. 
                                                 
280 “(ﺪﺳﺎﻔﻟا مﺎﻌﻄﻟا ﻢﺳ ) مﺰﻟﻮﻴﺗﻮﺒﻟا ﻢﺳ ﺮﻴﻀﺤﺗ” (Preparation of Botulinum Toxin (Rotten Meat Poison)). Mawsu῾at al-i῾dād 
(date unknown): 2. Obtained via e-mail correspondence with Rebecca Givner-Forbes, Terrorism Research 
Center, July 2006. 
281 Ibid. 
282 “ ﺮﻔﻟا ﺮﻜﺘﺒﻤﻟاﺪﻳ ” (The Unique Invention). Publisher unknown (file modified 2 November 2003): 8. Downloaded 
from Mawsu῾at al-i῾dād 4th ed., 6 June 2005. http://www.geocities.com/i3dad_jihad4/. Names of some of the 
chemicals have been omitted from the figure. 
283 “  ﺪﻳﺮﻔﻟا ﺮﻜﺘﺒﻤﻟا ”, 1. 
284 Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 218-220.  
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Figure 4: The unique invention  
What is the technical quality of the chemical and biological formulations?285
As noted above, the chemical and biological manuals can roughly be divided into three 
categories. The formulations in the first category of manuals are generally very crude, and can 
be carried out in an improvised facility such as a kitchen or a garage. Also, they are often 
based on materials that are relatively easy to obtain, such as castor beans, nicotine, 
hydrochloric acid, potassium cyanide and so on. The recipes on how to extract ricin from 
castor beans, found in several of the manuals, are illustrative of the technical quality of these 
manuals. The formulation is essentially similar to the procedure described in The Poisoner’s 
Handbook, and is based on rinsing castor bean pulp with acetone in order to remove the oil 
from the pulp. After drying the pulp, a white powder is obtained, which is described as “the 
poison” and sometimes as “pure ricin”.286 In reality, the result is far from pure. A Spanish 
laboratory which tested the above-mentioned recipe, obtained extracts containing 0.01-0.33% 
ricin, depending on what variety of the castor plant the seed was taken from (the jihadi 
manuals do not specify what variety should be used). The Spanish test concluded that the low 
content of ricin makes the agent unsuitable as a “weapon of mass destruction”, although it 
might be used against “selective targets, limited to one or several persons.”287  
The second category of manuals describe procedures requiring advanced laboratory 
equipment and skills, but these manuals also lack effective instructions on how to weaponize 
the agents. They appear to be based on open sources only, such as scientific articles and 
                                                 
285 For a more comprehensive evaluation of the technical quality of these manuals, see Anne Stenersen and 
Brynjar Lia, “Al-Qaida’s online CBRN manuals: A real threat?” FFI-Report no. 2007/02405 (forthcoming). 
286 Maxwell Hutchkinson, The Poisoner’s Handbook (El Dorado: Desert Publications, 2000); Kurt Saxon, The 
poor man’s James Bond greets the russians, downloaded from www.ozooo.tk (accessed 30 May 2006).  
287 Pita René et al., “Extracción de ricina por procedimientos incluidos en publicaciones paramilitares y 
manuales relacionados con la red terrorista al-Qaeda” (Extraction of ricin by procedures featured on paramilitary 
publications and manuals related to the Al Qaeda terrorist network), Medicina Militar 60, no.3 (2004). 
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textbooks, and have not been developed through experiments and testing. There is generally 
little interest in these manuals on jihadi Internet forums (more on this below). 
The third category of manuals differs from the two others as it is the only type of manual that 
actually describes a realistic delivery mechanism for a chemical or biological agent. Among 
all the manuals examined, the mubtakar is probably the only document that reflects an 
innovative effort on part of the jihadists. One should keep in mind, however, that the manual 
does contain certain technical shortcomings, and that the actual effectiveness of the device is 
debatable. Another point worth noting is that there are still no known attempts by jihadists to 
assemble or use the device, although the manual has been available online since at least 
2004.288    
The nature of the experiments 
As mentioned above, several of the manuals describe experiments with poisons and poisonous 
gases on rabbits. The description of the experiment typically consists of how much poison 
was given to the rabbit, how it was given, and the time until death. Some also include a 
description of the symptoms, and whether the rabbit was “strong” or “small”. Most 
experiments are repeated several times, using different methods such as applying poison to 
the rabbit’s skin, injecting it and adding it to the animal’s food and water. These experiments 
are used as ‘proof’ that the formulations work. The problem with these experiments is that 
symptoms are often vaguely described, and with a few exceptions, placebo tests are not 
conducted. Thus, we do not know whether the rabbit died from the poison, the solvent or from 
other substances manufactured instead of the intended poison. The following excerpt may 
serve as an illustration. Here, the author describes an experiment in which a substance thought 
to be botulinum toxin is tested on a rabbit. The procedure for making the substance is well-
known from English literature; it consists of mixing meat with droppings or soil, putting the 
ingredients in a jar, filling it with water and closing it tightly, and leaving it in a tempered 
place for some days.289 After providing a description of the manufacture procedure, the 
manual states, 
                                                 
288 This author’s version of “The Unique Invention” was downloaded by the Norwegian Defence Research Est. 
(FFI) in the fall of 2004. The file was created on 3 November 2003. Ron Suskind claimed in 2006 that an al-
Qaeda cell had planned to use the device against the New York Metro in 2003, but that the plan had been aborted 
by Ayman al-Zawahiri. The claim is hard to verify. The information was given by a CIA informant, and has not 
been confirmed by other open sources. A manual describing the device was also found on a computer belonging 
to an al-Qaeda-suspect arrested in Bahrain, January 2003, but there were no indications that the arrested had 
made experiments with the device. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
289 Maxwell Hutchkinson, The Poisoner’s Handbook (El Dorado: Desert Publications, 2000), 25-26. 
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After ten days, a coffee-brown piece appeared on the surface of the water and on the 
glass walls. Then I took this brown substance and dissolved a small amount of it, 
about 0.1 g or less, in ethyl alcohol (about 5 mL). We took 1 mL of this solution and 
injected it into a strong-built rabbit, and it died eighteen (18) hours after the 
appearance of the above-mentioned symptoms...290  
The claim that the “brown substance” manufactured in this procedure is the botulinum toxin is 
a myth, however. In reality, the experiment is likely to yield a host of different bacteria, many 
of which may be capable of killing a rabbit. Even if the experiment was carried out the way it 
is described, the rabbit’s death is no proof that botulinum toxin was produced, nor illustrative 
of how potent the manufactured ‘poison’ is. The description of the experiments may, on the 
other hand, serve to convince an unskilled reader of the formulation’s validity. 
The gases tested on rabbits included hydrogen sulphide, chlorine, phosgene, carbon monoxide 
and hydrogen cyanide. For all these gases, the tests are conducted by leaving the rabbit in a 
small, confined area and releasing the gas by simply mixing two reactants. The method is 
similar to the one seen in the video found in Afghanistan and later shown on CNN, in which a 
poisonous gas appears to be tested on a dog. Ahmed Ressam, who was convicted of plotting 
to bomb L.A. airport in 2001, stated in a testimony that in Afghanistan he saw a 
demonstration in which hydrogen-cyanide gas was used on a dog.291 Scientists disagree, 
however, as to which gas was actually used in the infamous dog video. Ressam told the court 
that experiments with gases on dogs were carried out because ”we wanted to know what the 
effect of the gas is”. He also testified that he had learned to mix cyanide with an oily 
substance and smear it on doorknobs. Thus, it seems that Ressam’s testimony corresponds 
well with the content of the online chemical and biological manuals.  
No accounts were found of anyone actually testing a biological or chemical device. The only 
“delivery system” for poisons reported tested is poison dissolved in di-methyl sulphoxide 
(DMSO) and applied to the skin of rabbits. 
By comparing the different chemical and biological manuals available online, it seems clear 
that for chemical manuals there has been a certain development in terms of sophistication and 
technical quality. While early documents were mere translations of The Poisoner’s Handbook, 
other documents seem to have been further developed by the jihadis themselves, including lab 
experiments and testing the agents on rabbits, though most of them seem very amateurish. 
The Islamic Media Center played an important role in compiling and distributing this 
                                                 
290“ىﺮﺒﻜﻟا ﺔﻣﺎﺴﻟا تازﺎﻐﻟاو مﻮﻤﺴﻟا ةرود”, 14.  
291 Ahmed Ressam’s testimony in “United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari, Defendant”.  
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material. The manuals seem to be compiled from several sources, probably including notes 
from poison-training courses. With one exception, however, the online manuals have not yet 
presented any effective delivery methods for the agents. In the Comprehensive Course in 
Poisons and Poisonous Gases, for example, half of the chapter on delivery methods provides 
crude sketches of poisonous artillery shells for use on a battlefield (the target is described as 
“troop concentrations” and “enemy trenches”), while the other half is taken from the chapter 
on assassination methods in The Poisoner’s Handbook. However, The Unique Invention 
indicates that a certain amount of innovation has taken place, as it includes instructions on 
how to manufacture a crude dispersal device for a chemical agent. It does not appear to be 
copied and pasted from other sources, but is instead a product of jihadists’ own efforts. It 
should be noted that this manual has not replaced other online chemical manuals, but is 
available alongside other, less developed chemical formulations and manuals that are equally 
popular among the online jihadist community.   
5.4.3 Radiological and Nuclear manuals 
Nuclear manuals  
A manual entitled ”The Nuclear Bomb of Jihad and How to Enrich Uranium” (al-qunbula al-
nawawiyya al-jihādiyya wa kayfiyyat al-taxṣīb al-nawawi) has been available on jihadi forums 
since at least January 2006.292 Since that time, the manual has been circulated on various 
forums, and it seems to be very popular. For example, in January 2007 it had the status of a 
‘sticky’ link on the al-Firdaws sub-forum for equipment and preparation, and it was the most 
visited thread with more than 13,000 viewings. In comparison, the second most popular link 
at that time, entitled “Rockets (very, very important)” was viewed 2,628 times.293
The manual has a total of about 470 pages, and is divided into 19 lessons. It is authored by an 
active forum member with the nickname ‘No1’, who admits he learned his skills from the 
Internet. In the introduction he writes: 
I have spent two years studying nuclear physics on scientific and jihadi forums, as 
well as studying rocket science, and different kinds of explosives and bombs. I have 
been convinced that the strategic balance of power in the military field for the 
mujāhidūn will not change without true scientific progress. In order to make this 
progress and to experiment, it is absolutely necessary to have laboratories. Therefore, 
                                                 
292 “(  ﺮﺒآأ ﷲا : رﻮﺼﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﻳوﻮﻨﻟا ﺔﻠﺒﻨﻘﻟا ﻊﻴﻨﺼﺗ ﻰﻓ ﺎﺳرد ﺮﺸﻋ ﺔﻌﺑرا)ﻞﻴﻤﺤﺘﻟﺎﺑ عرﺎﺳ ”, Šabakat  risālat al-umma al-jihādiyya (January 
2006), http://www.alommh.net/forums/showthread.phpt=911 (accessed 17 February 2006).  
293 Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, www.alfirdaws.org/vb/ (accessed 12 January 2007). 
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try to keep the experiments easy and at an arm’s length, my mujāhid brother, or, as 
they say, in the kitchen.294
The manual itself confirms this picture. It consists of a collection of texts, illustrations and 
articles from various sources that seem to be randomly put together without much regard as to 
whether the information is correct or not. One example of the numerous technical errors in 
this manual is found in lessons 10-12 where the author claims that melting exactly 80,1 kg of 
radium with a mixture of iron oxide and aluminium (so-called ‘thermite’) will cause a nuclear 
explosion similar to the Hiroshima bomb. More realistic options such as merging radium with 
regular explosives in order to manufacture a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) are not 
mentioned. The chapter about how to obtain radioactive material is equally far-fetched. 
Lesson 18 of the manual describes how to extract uranium and other radioactive substances 
from black sand.295 Any thoughts about how to obtain the material illegally on the black 
market are not offered. To be sure, the manual does provide a general introduction to nuclear 
physics and the history of the nuclear bomb, but not much more.  
The forum discussions related to radiological and nuclear weapons seem to be on the same 
elementary level as the manual, begging the question whether these discussions are to be 
taken seriously at all. The lack of basic technical knowledge on the subject is striking. The 
discussions seem to deal with the topic in a serious manner, though. Members ask specific 
questions, and other members (having gained status as “experts” due to their previous 
postings) give answers and explanations, often by referring to texts in the nuclear manual, or 
posting their own answers which are not necessarily any more scientific. When asked how to 
protect oneself from radioactive material, for example, one “expert” answers that putting the 
radioactive material in the freezer will stop the radiation.296  
Dirty bombs 
There are extremely few references to radiological weapons in the online jihadi discourse and 
literature. The manual “The Nuclear Bomb of Jihad” mentions the word “dirty bomb” 
(qunbula qaḏira), but the kind of “dirty bomb” directions it provides consists of putting a piece 
                                                 
294 “يوﻮﻨﻟا ﺐﻴﺼﺨﺘﻟا تﺎﻴﻔﻴآو ﺔﻳدﺎﻬﺠﻟا ﺔﻳوﻮﻨﻟا ﺔﻠﺒﻨﻘﻟا” (The nuclear bomb of jihad and how to enrich uranium), date and 
publisher unknown, downloaded from Šabakat risālat al-umma al-jihādiyya (January 2006): 2. 
http://www.alommh.net/forums/showthread.phpt=911 (accessed 17 February 2006). 
295 The concept could be carried out in practice, but would require large industrial complexes. For example, 
13,000 tons of sand would have to be processed to obtain enough uranium for one nuclear weapon. See 
“Production of nuclear materials”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/technical4.asp (accessed 9 July 2007).  
296 “ﻪﻌﻴﻨﺼﺗ و يوﻮﻨﻟا حﻼﺴﻟا لﻮﺣ ﺔﺸﻗﺎﻨﻤﻟا بﺎﺑ ﺢﺘﻓ”, thread started by ‘Layṯ al-᾽Islām’ on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-
jihādiyya (20 August 2006), www.alfirdaws.org/vb (accessed 10 January 2007). 
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of uranium “under the bed of the person you want to get rid of”, with the claim that this will 
kill him “instantly and without a scar”.297 This has of course nothing to do with realistic ways 
of assembling a radiological dispersal devices (RDD). In general, members of jihadi 
discussion forums have very little knowledge of the nature of “dirty bombs”, and usually 
suggest using a form of uranium in them, although natural uranium would be a highly 
ineffective agent for this purpose, due to its low radioactivity. Sometimes, there are glimpses 
of realism in the discussions. One participant noted, for example, that a dirty bomb “will have 
a propaganda effect only”.298  
In the autumn of 2006, however, a document entitled “Radioactive Pollution” (al-talawwuṯ al-
išcāci) was uploaded to the Internet, and this was of a very different category to the material 
discussed above. The document was located inside a folder entitled “Guerrilla Warfare” (ḥarb 
al-caṣābāt) and one would have to download the whole zip file and unzip it before actually 
noticing the document. The document was undated, but the file was modified on 14 August 
2005. The 2-page document starts by describing the effects of radioactive pollution, and refers 
to two specific cases in which radioactive material was dislocated. The first incident took 
place in Goiania, Brazil in 1987, in which a container of Caesium-137 was stolen from an 
abandoned radium clinic and later dispersed. In Mississippi, USA the same year, small 
packages of Thallium-67 and Iodine-131 were spread along the highway due to a traffic 
accident. The description includes technical data on the substances involved, the extent of the 
pollution, as well as the costs of the clean-up. The aim of the author is, obviously, to show 
how even tiny amounts of such materials can cause major havoc and economic loss. He then 
provides suggestions as to where such material can be “easily obtained”, for example from 
“modern smoke detectors” and various medical equipment, and he notes that an easy and 
secure way of obtaining such material is “during its transportation between the place of 
production and the places of use or storage”. Details on how to manufacture the dirty bomb 
are not provided, the author simply suggests taking the radioactive material and putting it 
around “the explosives you have available”. However, the method and rationale for such an 
attack are carefully explained:   
                                                 
297 “يوﻮﻨﻟا ﺐﻴﺼﺨﺘﻟا تﺎﻴﻔﻴآو ﺔﻳدﺎﻬﺠﻟا ﺔﻳوﻮﻨﻟا ﺔﻠﺒﻨﻘﻟا”, chapter 18. 
298 However, the same user displays a lack of knowledge about the nature and characteristics of RDDs. The 
message started with the following definition: ”The dirty bomb is a bomb made of regular explosives, where 
radioactive material has been added, like we add to the thermit uranium oxide with iron oxide and pieces of 
aluminium, knowing that radioactive materials consist of all the elements following after mercury in the periodic 
table”. Layṯ al-᾽Islām, “ﺔﻳدﺎﻬﺠﻟا ﺔﻳوﻮﻨﻟا ﺔﻠﺒﻨﻘﻟا”, Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya (6 October 2005), 
www.alfirdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?p=16731&page=2 (accessed 22 May 2006). 
 92
Put the bomb in a city crowded with large markets and commercial shops. Explode it, 
even if it is time for the shops to close, in the evening for example, because the 
important thing is to spread the radioactive material in that commercial area, so that 
the government will close that area and everything around it because of the power of 
the material and the area of its dispersal. By this, you cause a large economic crisis to 
this country...299
Although such documents exist, it is remarkable how little interest is devoted to radiological 
weapons in the forums compared to the great interest and details found in the discussions of 
regular explosives: especially when bearing in mind that the Western media repeatedly talk 
about the propaganda effect such an attack would cause, and also that the materials are easy to 
obtain.  
5.4.4 The nature of online CBRN discussions 
Most of the CBRN manuals discussed above have existed for several years, and are circulated 
online as part of a larger ‘online curriculum’ for aspiring jihadists. Because of the large 
amount of material, however, it is hard to estimate the significance of these manuals. Are they 
actually being read, or do they just drown in all the other material published? The CBRN-
related discussions taking place on jihadi forums might give some further indications of the 
CBRN ambitions of al-Qaeda’s online sympathizers. 
The first thing that can be noted is that forum members that involve themselves in CBRN-
related discussions do not appear to be highly trained or professional scientists. Rather, they 
seem to draw their knowledge from the media and Internet. In a discussion about ricin, for 
example, one of the participants stated that he had used Google to find information.300 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the most ‘popular’ online recipes are those that are quick and easy 
and do not require advanced laboratory equipment, such as recipes inspired by The Poisoner’s 
Handbook. When a member started a discussion about biological weapons, encouraging 
others to ask him questions, another replied,  
Our mujāhid brother ... are we able to manufacture them with simple equipment and 
available substances, and will they harm the person who manufactures them, and how 
                                                 
299 Abū al-᾽Usūd, “ﻲﻋﺎﻌﺷﻹا ثﻮﻠﺘﻟا” (Radioactive pollution), publisher unknown (file modified on 14 August 2005), 
downloaded from Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, 5 September 2006,  
http://www.alfirdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?t=15942. 
300 See for example, “ ﺑﺮﻟا روﺬ ي  ﻦﻴﺳ...ﷲا نﺎﺤﺒﺳ ”, thread started by ‘hamoda’ on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, 9 
July 2006, www.alfirdaws.org/vb (accessed 10 January 2007). One forum member says, “I advise you, my 
brother, to search in Google to learn about this substance and its importance and risk.” Another member later 
reports, “this is what I found from Google”.  
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far away are they able to harm our infidel enemies? ... Please teach us in a very 
simplified way, because we are not trained in biology.301
This is also confirmed by the low interest in discussing biological weapons on the forum. In 
the autumn of 2006, a member attempted to start an “online lesson on biological weapons” at 
least twice, without getting much response.302 On 9 November 2006, another member posted 
on a forum a lengthy English text on Biological Weapons originally written by an American 
professor in Microbiology.303 He asks forum members to translate it, but the only response he 
gets is a request to put English-language messages in the English part of the forum.  
A commonly asked question is how to obtain the required chemicals or ingredients. Forum 
members often enquire about the commercial name of chemicals, and what kinds of stores to 
obtain them from. Due to a relatively high security awareness in these forums, the requests are 
seldom country- or region-specific, but there have been a few exceptions, with members 
stating they are from Palestinian areas or the Arab Peninsula.304 Operational security in 
connection with obtaining chemicals has also been an issue of discussion. One forum 
member, enquiring where to get hydrochloric acid, stated “... I’d like to avoid chemical stores 
and their questions on what you want with that [chemical], and so on.“ Subsequently, other 
members suggested that he obtain some information on ceramics and glazing in order to use 
that as an excuse.305 In another discussion, a forum member sought help to set up a laboratory 
without raising suspicion, saying: “I have some theoretical knowledge of chemistry and I 
would like to develop it in practice, but buying the equipment requires me to sign papers, and 
I cannot ask someone else, because no one wants to get involved. Then, I will be discovered.” 
He received several suggestions about how to conceal his intentions, for example by starting a 
laboratory for perfumes or chemical fertilizers, or enrolling in a scientific university.306  
                                                 
301 “ﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﻴﺒﻟا حﻼﺴﻟا ﻲﻓ ةرود”, thread started by ‘modjahede’ on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, 8 November 
2005, www.alfirdaws.org/vb (accessed 10 January 2007).   
302 See “ﷲا ﻪﻤﺣر يوﺎﻗرﺰﻟا ﺎﻨﺨﻴﺷ ﻰﻟا ةاﺪﻬﻣ ﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﻴﺒﻟا حﻼﺴﻟا ﻲﻓ ةرود” (17 June 2006); and “ ﻟا ﻲﻓ ةرودةﺮﻣ ﺮﺧﻻا ﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﻴﺒﻟا حﻼﺴ ” 
(20 October 2006), posted by ‘modjahede’ on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, www.alfirdaws.org/vb 
(accessed 11 January 2007)  
303 “CHAPTER XV, ADDENDUM: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS; MALIGNANT BIOLOGY”, posted by ‘al-
Fadā’i al-Yamānī’ on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya,  9 November 2006. The text is available in 
“Microbiology 101 Internet text”, updated 3 January 2000, 
http://www.slic2.wsu.edu:82/hurlbert/micro101/pages/ 101biologicalweapons.html (accessed 23 January 2006). 
304 See for example, “يوﺎﻤﻴﻜﻟا حﻼﺴﻟا”, thread started by ‘Azzām2000’ on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, 5 July 
2006, www.alfirdaws.org/vb (accessed 22 September 2006). 
305  “يوﺎﻤﻴﻜﻟا حﻼﺴﻟا”, thread started by ‘Azzām2000’ on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, 5 July 2006, 
www.alfirdaws.org/vb (accessed 22 September 2006). 
306 “ةﺪﻋﺎﺴﻤﻟا ءﺎﺟﺮﻟا ؟رﺎﻈﻧﻷا ﺖﻔﻠﻧود اﺮﺒﺘﺨﻣ ﺰﻬﺟأ ﻒﻴآ”, thread started by ‘sajy_79’ on Muntadayāt al-nuṣra al-jihādiyya, 
25 Oct 2006, www.alnusra.net/vb (accessed 19 Nov 2006).  
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Safety precautions have also been a topic of discussion, especially when dealing with 
biological weapons. In a discussion started on al-firdaws in November 2005, for example, 
several participants voiced concerns regarding the safety risks involved in the production of 
biological agents. One forum member regarded the subject as “very dangerous” due to the 
lack of isolation and containment procedures.  Further, he stated: “In case of a mistake or 
leak, it will become extremely dangerous for all Muslims in the area. It is not like an 
explosion, which is limited to the person working with it only.”307 The apparent unfamiliarity 
with biological agents, and the perception of them being deadly and uncontrollable, may 
explain why the online interest in biological agents appears to be much less than in chemical 
ones.  
One of the most common discussion topics remains the question of how to deliver or 
weaponize the agents. From July-November 2006, for example, there was a lengthy 
discussion on al-firdaws about how to manufacture and weaponize ricin. Significantly, one of 
the forum participants claimed to have already manufactured ricin and to have conducted 
experiments with its delivery. When a member wondered whether adding acid to ricin would 
produce ricin in gaseous form, he replied, “I poured concentrated sulphuric acid over the ricin 
poison but nothing happened, and no gases were produced, only the ricin turned brown.”308 
Although displaying a rather shallow knowledge of chemistry, this is nevertheless a rare 
example of a delivery method actually being tested and reported on the forum. For the most 
part discussions of delivery methods remain theoretical, based on common knowledge, past 
cases or information found on the Internet. By contrast, the discussions about regular 
explosives more often have the shape of ”on-line tutorials” where users conduct experiments 
and consult other members with their problems. Occasionally, forum members may also seek 
to discuss more untraditional solutions such as delivering chemical weapons using remote-
controlled model aircrafts.309 A more common suggestion is to weaponize the agent by simply 
mixing it with explosives, but no specific ‘recipes’ for this seem to have been developed, and 
forum members have also expressed doubts with regards to the efficiency of this method. 
Interestingly, the use of chlorine in Iraqi truck-bombs during the first half of 2007 seems not 
to be a topic of discussion, although it has received wide coverage in the media. One should 
                                                 
307 “ رودﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﻴﺒﻟا حﻼﺴﻟا ﻲﻓ ة ”, thread started by ‘modjahede’ on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, 8 November 
2005, www.alfirdaws.org/vb (accessed 10 January 2007).  
308 “ ﺑﺮﻟا روﺬ ي  ﻦﻴﺳ...ﷲا نﺎﺤﺒﺳ ”, thread started by ‘hamoda’ on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, 9 July 2006, 
www.alfirdaws.org/vb (accessed 10 Jan 2007). 
309 “ﻢﻬﻣ لاﺆﺳ”, thread started by ‘saifo allah’ on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, 8 June 2005, 
www.alfirdaws.org/vb (accessed 10 Jan 2007). 
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keep in mind, however, that none of the Iraqi jihadi groups have so far admitted to using such 
bombs. As far as online jihadists are concerned, the alleged ‘chlorine bombs’ are therefore 
viewed as part of a propaganda campaign to tarnish the reputation of the Islamic State of Iraq, 
rather than being a tactic currently employed by jihadists.310  
In at least a few cases, the forum members have been encouraged to think in more realistic 
ways when it comes to selecting and delivering CBRN materials. In one instance, a member 
who proposed spreading ricin by placing the powder in the air-conditioning vents of large 
buildings, was given the following advice: “My brother, don’t get carried away ... my 
suggestion to you is to select a target, find its mailing address and write a threatening letter, 
then you put rat poison in the envelope and send it. A small step for you, but a large step for 
the Muslims.”311 Although such examples are rare, there seems to be an increased awareness 
among jihadists that small-scale but feasible operations are better than large-scale operations 
with slim chances of succeeding. As one jihadi forum member recently put it: “a hand 
grenade that explodes in one of New York’s streets, is better than a nuclear bomb capable of 
destroying half of New York that does not explode!”312  
5.4.5 The CBRN interest of the al-Qaeda sympathizers  
Generally, the interest in CBRN materials among al-Qaeda’s internet sympathizers is very 
low. This is reflected by both the number of CBRN manuals available, the number of CBRN-
related threads in a forum, and lists of the most viewed topics. An exception to this is the 
topic of nuclear weapons, which seems to be very popular, but where forum members also 
display the greatest lack of knowledge. The topic of radiological weapons or “dirty bombs” is, 
by comparison, surprisingly marginal. The current production of new CBRN material is also 
low. When a formula is posted in a forum, it is usually taken from one of the older manuals, 
and many of the manufacturing techniques are fundamentally similar to recipes found in the 
Poisoner’s Handbook. This indicates that there is little interest in testing and developing the 
formulations, nor in developing one’s own skills. 
The various CBRN manuals that are available online can be seen as not only a reflection of 
the CBRN interest of the al-Qaeda symphatizers, but also the interest of the other ‘layers’ of 
                                                 
310 See for example, “ﺔﻴﻣﻼﺳﻹا قاﺮﻌﻟا ﺔﻟود ﻰﻠﻋ بﺬﻜﻟا ‘نﻮﺛارﺎـــــﻣ’ ”, thread started by ‘Mujāhidat al-Šām’ on Šabakat 
al-᾽iḫlāṣ al-᾽islāmiyya, 15 May 2007, http://www.alekhlaas.net/forum/showthread.php?t=59489 (accessed 12 July 
2007). 
311 “ ﺑﺮﻟا روﺬ ي  ﻦﻴﺳ...ﷲا نﺎﺤﺒﺳ ”, thread started by Hamoda on Muntadayāt al-firdaws al-jihādiyya, 9 July 2006, 
www.alfirdaws.org/vb (accessed 10 Jan 2007). 
312 “ﺔآرﺎﺒﻤﻟا ﺔﻳدﺎﻬﺠﻟا ﺎﻳﻼﺨﻠﻟ ﺔﻠﺟﺎﻋ ﺔﻟﺎﺳر”, thread started by ‘ibn al-tanẓīm’ on Šabakat al-᾽iḫlāṣ al-᾽islāmiyya, 1 July 
2007, www.alekhlaas.net/forum/ (accessed 2 July 2007). 
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al-Qaeda, as it appears that several of the manuals are based on notes from training camps or 
courses. However, since the origin of the online manuals is most often dubious, it is hard to 
attribute them to a particular ‘layer’ of al-Qaeda. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the contents 
of the manuals correspond to the CBRN interest of the al-Qaeda network as a whole. 
Although there has been a certain development from mere ‘assassination handbooks’ towards 
handbooks of ‘mass destruction’, it needs to be emphasized that while the intention of the 
manual may have changed, the quality of the formulae remains very low, and the manuals 
usually lack key information on how to effectively weaponize the CBRN materials. A 
possible exception is The Unique Invention, which remains one of the most specific examples 
of ‘CBRN innovation’ within the al-Qaeda network as a whole, albeit on a technologically 
crude level. It should be stressed that the device represents low-end, and not ‘catastrophic’ use 
of CBRN materials, but on the other hand, even a low-end attack might have a considerable 
psyhological effect. 
5.5 Summary of the main findings 
In the previous subchapters, I have sought to describe the history of al-Qaeda’s quest for non-
conventional weapons as reflected by statements and activities attributed to the various levels 
of the network. I will now summarize the findings by answering the three sub-questions 
defined at the outset of this analysis: 1) what kinds of CBRN weapons are al-Qaeda interested 
in? 2) how important are CBRN weapons in relation to other weapons and tactics? 3) how has 
al-Qaeda’s interest in CBRN weapons evolved?  
5.5.1 What kinds of CBRN weapons are al-Qaeda interested in? 
The first thing that can be noted is that al-Qaeda seems to make a distinction between WMD 
on one hand, and crude CBRN materials and devices on the other. On the strategic and 
conceptual level, al-Qaeda leaders have often used the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ 
(asliḥa al-ḍamār al-šāmil), referring to state-level chemical, biological or nuclear weapons with, 
literally, capabilities of mass destruction. In contrast, crude, chemical and biological agents 
meant for tactical use are often referred to in al-Qaeda manuals as ‘poisons’ (al-sumūm) or 
‘poisonous gases’ (al-ġāzāt al-sāmma). Sometimes they are also labelled ša῾biyya (‘popular’ or 
home-made). With regards to the al-Qaeda network’s actual CBRN activities, there appears to 
have been theoretical research into weapons-grade chemical, biological and radiological 
materials, as well as into nuclear weapons. However, when it comes to acquisition attempts, 
possession and use, in a vast majority of cases the agents have been crude and relatively easily 
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obtainable, such as ricin, hydrogen cyanide, chlorine and so-called “rotten meat poison” 
thought to be botulinum toxin. The empirical cases that have been reviewed, the material and 
‘laboratories’ discovered in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the discussions taking place on the 
Internet all convey the impression of a relatively elementary level of technical expertise in the 
field of CBRN.  
Although there have been various reports stating that al-Qaeda attempted to buy nuclear 
material in the nineties, and possibly recruited skilled scientists, it appears that al-Qaeda 
central have not dedicated a lot of time or effort to developing a high-end CBRN capability. 
This corresponds to Abū Walīd al-Maṣrī’s account of the discussions within al-Qaeda’s Shura 
Council. Al-Qaeda central never had a coherent strategy to obtain CBRN: instead, the 
members were divided on the issue, and there was an awareness that militarily effective 
weapons were extremely difficult to obtain. Some members, however, believed that al-Qaeda 
should pursue a ‘primitive’ CBRN capability. Al-Maṣri observed:  
Another group [within the Shura council] believed that this type of weapons, if bin 
Laden could obtain them, would be tactical by virtue of its primitiveness and weak 
destructive capability. However, they will continue to call it ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ to create fear [emphasis added].313
5.5.2 How important are CBRN weapons in relation to other types of 
weapons and tactics? 
The review of existing sources shows that all levels of the al-Qaeda network have displayed a 
certain interest in exploring and using non-conventional weapons to obtain their goal. 
However, there is little doubt that the importance of CBRN weapons has by no means 
surpassed the importance of conventional weapons and tactics, such as simultaneous 
explosions and ‘suicide operations’. CBRN weapons are not a dominant topic in al-Qaeda’s 
official discourse: on the contrary, bin Laden has stressed on various occasions that it is the 
faith of the Muslims, as demonstrated through martyrdom operations, that will ensure the 
ultimate victory over the technologically superior, but spiritually weak West. While this 
should be interpreted as propaganda, and not necessarily as indicative of al-Qaeda’s military 
strategy, it is an undeniable fact that also the majority of al-Qaeda’s planned and executed 
operations have relied on conventional modes of attack. This is true of  the central, affiliate 
and local levels of the network. As for the sympathizers, they also appear to be predominantly 
concerned with conventional explosives and weapons in their discussions. The CBRN 
                                                 
313 al-Maṣri, “نﺎﺒﻟﺎﻃ ﻊﻣ جوﺮﺨﻟا ﻰﻟا نﺎﺘﺴﻧﺎﻐﻓأ ﻰﻟإ لﻮﺧﺪﻟا ﻦﻣ بﺮﻌﻟا نﺎﻐﻓﻻا ﺔﺼﻗ”. 
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manuals available on jihadi web pages reflect a certain effort to spread CBRN technology, but 
the technical level of these documents is generally very low. Also, the CBRN manuals appear 
to be drowning in all the other tactical training material being published in the same forums. 
5.5.3 How has al-Qaeda’s interest in CBRN weapons developed? 
Reuven Paz argued in a 2006 article that after 9/11, “al Qaeda’s interest for WMD has 
increased exponentially.”314 When judging from al-Qaeda’s actual statements and activities, 
however, there is very little evidence to support this claim. When analyzing al-Qaeda’s 
statements, one can argue that there has been a certain ‘shift’ in attitude from a defensive 
towards a more offensive use of CBRN weapons against the West. This is most clearly 
illustrated by Sheikh Nāṣir bin Ḥamd al-Fahd’s fatwā from 2003, which gives religious 
legitimization to using weapons of mass destruction as a first-strike weapon against the 
United States. Based on the small amount of quotes, however, it is hard to draw any firm 
conclusions. Al-Fahd’s fatwā could simply be reflective of the general tendency since 2003 to 
take a more hostile stance to the US, caused by the loss of Afghanistan as a permanent base, 
and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. I would argue that the Sheikh’s fatwā should not be 
interpreted as a sign that al-Qaeda now places greater emphasis on CBRN weapons than 
before. Rather, it can be seen as a confirmation of al-Qaeda’s expressed desire to carry out 
“destructive attacks” on the US315, whether with conventional or unconventional methods. 
To summarize, the first part of this thesis has argued that an interest in CBRN materials has 
been present on all levels in the al-Qaeda network. However, this interest is relatively low, 
and it has been concentrated on developing a crude CBRN capability. In the next part of the 
thesis, I will analyze why al-Qaeda has not dedicated more time and resources to pursuing a 
CBRN capability. This will be performed by discussing three hypotheses that have been 
formulated based on existing literature: CBRN is not deemed necessary to achieve the goal; 
al-Qaeda does not have the necessary ‘emotional attraction’ to CBRN; or organisational/ 
structural factors prevent innovation although there is an interest in it. 
 
                                                 
314 Reuven Paz, “Global Jihad and WMD: Between Martyrdom and Mass Destruction,” Society for Internet 
Research, 25 September 2005, http://www.sofir.org/sarchives/005026.php (accessed 29 Aug 2007). 
315 ᾽Ādam Yaḥyā Ġadan, “ﺔﻋوﺮﺸﻣ ﺐﻟﺎﻄﻣ ” (Legitimate demands), al-Ṣaḥāb (May 2007), downloaded via Šabakat al-
᾽aḫbār al-῾ālamiyya, http://www.w-n-n.net/showthread.php?t=26057 (30 May 2007). 
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6 Explaining the lack of CBRN innovation 
“Terrorist devices will be innovative in their simplicity” 316
- Bruce Hoffman 
 
Why is there a lack of CBRN innovation within the al-Qaeda network? This question is often 
answered by saying that “CBRN weapons are too difficult to obtain”, “al-Qaida does not have 
the necessary capabilities”, etc. However, this does not take into account the various internal 
driving factors behind CBRN terrorism or innovation. In my opinion, the al-Qaeda network is 
an interesting case analytically because several factors are present that would theoretically 
promote CBRN innovation. As the previous chapter has shown, all levels of the network have 
also considered the option of using CBRN materials to achieve their goals. In spite of this, 
however, CBRN innovation has only taken place to a very limited degree. In this chapter, I 
will attempt to identify the most important explanatory factors why al-Qaeda has not been 
more innovative in the field of CBRN weapons. This is performed by discussing the validity 
of three hypotheses.  
6.1 CBRN weapons are not necessary to obtain the goal 
Al-Qaeda’s lack of efforts in the field of CBRN can be explained by arguing that CBRN 
weapons are not viewed as necessary to obtain al-Qaeda’s goals, and they are not defined as 
having a central role in al-Qaeda’s strategy.  
Some case studies have shown that groups who pursued CBRN weapons had a goal that 
required the use of CBRN weapons. The Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA) had as 
a goal to hasten the return of the Messiah by bringing on certain catastrophic events predicted 
in the Bible. Similarly, the goal of the environmentalist organization R.I.S.E. was to eradicate 
all of humankind except a small group of survivors.317 These goals were of such a nature that 
they could not be achieved by using conventional weapons.  
Although al-Qaeda’s goal is disputed and somewhat vague, I would argue that it is of a quite 
different nature than those mentioned above. As stated previously, in this thesis I have defined 
the main goal of the al-Qaeda network as that of disengaging the United States from 
influencing the Middle East and other Muslim countries, as well as arousing the Muslim 
                                                 
316 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorist targeting: Tactics, trends and potentialities”, Terrorism and Political Violence 
Vol. 5, Issue 2 (1993).  
317 For more on these cases, see Tucker, Toxic Terror.  
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nation to fight against Western ‘oppression’. In order to achieve this goal, al-Qaeda has so far 
pursued a strategy of carrying out violent attacks against the United States, its allies and 
interests. The label ‘global guerrilla warfare’ is in many ways descriptive. Although attacks 
should preferably be spectacular, and preferably be carried in the ‘enemy’s homeland’, the 
network has shown a willingness to ‘downsize’ their operations for the sake of feasibility; for 
example, by attacking softer targets rather than ‘hard’ ones, by attacking American interests in 
the third world, rather than in the United States, and by making wide use of low-tech tactics 
such as suicide operatives rather than surface-to-air-missiles. 
On the one hand, the use of CBRN weapons against the US, even ‘catastrophic’ ones, does 
not seem to contradict this strategy. It could also be argued that the use of catastrophic CBRN 
weapons would be preferable to using conventional means, because it could make al-Qaeda 
achieve its goal faster. According to my analysis, however, there is nothing in al-Qaeda’s 
present goal or strategy that has required the use of CBRN weapons as opposed to 
conventional ways of causing mass casualties. On the contrary, al-Qaeda’s strategy of ‘global 
guerrilla warfare’ has shown great flexibility when it comes to the choice of tactics. This may 
partly explain why there has not been a strong push for CBRN innovation within the network. 
If CBRN weapons were not a central part of al-Qaeda’s strategy, how do we explain the 
‘poison courses’ that were systematically given to recruits in the camps in Afghanistan? As 
illustrated by the cases of Bourgass and Benchellali, the courses may even have served as an 
inspiration for CBRN plots in Europe. However, this can hardly be called an organized 
attempt by al-Qaeda to spread CBRN technology, because the knowledge taught was 
apparently very crude, and the courses were given alongside other courses on guerrilla 
warfare tactics. Also, of the several hundred trainees who took these ‘poison courses’, only 
very few actually tried to use this knowledge afterwards. At the same time, there were 
individuals who completed poison courses who afterwards chose to attack with conventional 
explosives.318    
As I have argued, CBRN weapons do not play a central part in al-Qaeda’s strategy. However, 
this is not a sufficient explanation for clarifying why al-Qaeda has not innovated more in the 
field of CBRN. There are several examples of groups that have pursued CBRN weapons, 
although they did not have a goal or defined strategy that demanded the use of CBRN 
weapons.319 Clearly there are other factors than the purely ‘rational’ ones that can contribute 
                                                 
318 For example Ahmed Ressam, see “United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari”. 
319 See Tucker, Toxic terror. 
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to explaining why al-Qaeda has not pursued CBRN capabilities, as opposed to conventional 
capabilities, more actively. 
6.2 Lack of ‘emotional attraction’ to CBRN 
The ‘irrational factor’ is frequently mentioned as the most important explanatory factor why a 
certain group chooses to pursue CBRN weapons. As Dolnik has concluded: 
The presence of the non-rational component such as the expressive emphasis to 
innovation, overly high ambitions in the operational realm, and ideological or 
expressive attachment to a particular type of weapon or technology serves as the 
strongest and most universal pre-indicator of the propensity of a terrorist group to 
innovate.320
In order to pursue the option of CBRN weapons, the group, or key leaders within the group, 
have to have a certain ‘emotional attraction’ to this particular weapon or tactic. The case of 
Aum Shinrikyo is used as a clear example. Aum Shinrikyo’s powerful leader, Shoko 
Ashahara, seemed to be obsessed with the prospect of developing high-tech weapons, and 
CBRN weapons in particular. 
Based on the reviewed source material, it appears that al-Qaeda does not display such an 
attraction on any level in the organization. Osama bin Laden himself has barely ever made 
public statements about CBRN weapons, except when answering direct questions from 
journalists, which he has done in about five interviews given between 1998-2001.321 In these 
statements he emphasizes that Muslims have the right to obtain WMD to defend themselves, 
and although he stresses that it is a “religious duty” to obtain them, his statements appear 
motivated by political grievances, not religious fanaticism. This interpretation also 
corresponds better with Abū Walīd al-Maṣri’s account that claimed bin Laden did not support 
the idea of obtaining WMD during the Shura Council discussions, because he did not regard 
them as necessary to defeat the United States.  
Other al-Qaeda leaders, in particular Muḥammad ῾Āṭif, seemed to be more attracted to the 
idea of pursuing CBRN weapons. However, it does not appear that anyone within al-Qaeda 
central was particularly obsessed with CBRN weapons at the expense of other tactics, if other 
tactics were found to be more feasible. This was illustrated in the case of Jose Padilla, whose 
                                                 
320 Ibid., 175. 
321 Osama bin Laden answers questions about al-Qaeda’s attitude towards non-conventional weapons in 5 out of 
17 media interviews given between 1993-2002. The count is based on Thomas Hegghammer’s “Dokumentasjon 
om al-Qaida - intervjuer, kommunikéer og andre primærkilder, 1990-2002” FFI-Report no. 2002/01393 (2002).  
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plan to explode a ‘dirty bomb’ in the US was denied by Khalid Sheikh Muhammad because 
he thought a conventional attack would have a greater chance of succeeding.  
On the regional level, it is not easy to find arguments for al-Qaeda leaders displaying an 
emotional attraction to CBRN materials. Although ‘poison laboratories’ have been connected 
to Abū Muṣ῾ab al-Zarqāwī’s network in Iraq, he is probably more notorious for his ‘tactic’ of 
decapitating hostages and publishing a video of it afterwards. And while Abū Ḥamza al-
Muhājir issued a communiqué in which he encouraged experts in non-conventional warfare to 
come to Iraq to try out their “biological and radiological weapons” on American bases, he 
also called for, in the same sentence, experts within administration and electronics. The 
chlorine bombs in Iraq appear to have been the result of a competitive environment 
(increasing the need to innovate in order for the group to stand out from the rest) and 
relatively easily obtainable chemical materials, but not an emotional attraction to CBRN 
materials among Sunni insurgents per se. This is strengthened by the fact that the chlorine-
bomb campaign was relatively insignificant and short-lived: 11 chlorine attacks in six months 
is not very many when bearing in mind that the average number of daily attacks in Iraq in this 
period was estimated to be around 150.322
On the local level, it can be argued that those individuals who sought to use CBRN materials 
did so out of an ‘emotional attraction’ to such weapons. According to witnesses, for example, 
Menad Benchellali came back from Afghanistan “obsessed” with ricin poison, and apparently 
decided to manufacture it on his own, even though the cell he was part of was apparently 
considering more conventional methods. In the other cases, it is hard to determine exactly 
what was the motivation for using CBRN materials. In most of the plots revealed in Europe, 
however, there seems to have been no strong emotional attraction to CBRN materials 
involved at all. In some plots, there seems to have been an initial plan to use non-conventional 
weapons, but it was abandoned out of practical reasons. In other plots, perhaps there was an 
emotional attraction to a certain tactic, but not to CBRN materials. It is a paradox that in cells 
with highly educated members, such as in the Glasgow airport bombings in 2007, the cell still 
chose to carry out attacks with extremely crude tactics.323 In order to explain why, an in-depth 
                                                 
322 The estimated number of attacks in Iraq varies from source to source, depending on how one defines an 
‘attack’. This estimate is based on “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam 
Iraq”, The Brookings Institution, 15 November 2007, 
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2007).  
323 See for example, Bilal Abdullah, “ Bomb plot: Arrests and releases”, BBC News (5 October 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6264230.stm (accessed 19 December 2007). 
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study of several local cells is needed, which there has not been room for in this thesis that has 
only considered cells that have pursued CBRN materials. It is obvious, however, that the 
cases examined here are the exception rather than the rule. 
While some of the Internet sympathizers might be particularly interested in CBRN materials 
and weapons, the statistics from message topics and the amount of instruction manuals 
available indicates that there is no particular ‘obsession’ with CBRN weapons among the 
Internet sympathizers as a group.  
In sum, the emotional attraction to CBRN weapons that might have been displayed by certain 
individuals on various levels within the network is not sufficient to influence the network as a 
whole, and it does not change the general observation that al-Qaeda has a flexible attitude 
towards the choice of tactics, and that there is no particular ‘obsession’ with CBRN weapons 
on any level. The question is whether there perhaps is an emotional attraction to other types of 
tactics. I will discuss this further in relation to al-Qaeda’s organizational structure. 
6.3 Organizational structure 
Even though there was an emotional attraction to CBRN weapons from certain individuals in 
the network, this did not translate to the network as a whole. Similarly, the lack of such an 
attraction has not prevented certain elements within the network pursuing CBRN capabilities. 
The reason for this, I argue, can be found in the organizational dynamics of the al-Qaeda 
network. 
The organizational dynamics of al-Qaeda: Promoting or preventing innovation? 
Al-Qaeda central is not a strong hierarchy with bin Laden as the supreme and all-powerful 
leader. According to Maṣri’s account, Osama bin Laden was not particularly fond of 
Muḥammad ῾Āṭif’s ‘WMD programme’, though it was nonetheless pursued. Al-Maṣri even 
hints that bin Laden, while not wanting to create an open conflict with Muḥammad ῾Āṭif, 
instead let him pursue it, but at the same time, silently thwarted it. While it is hard to find 
other sources that can confirm al-Maṣri’s speculations there are, at least, several other sources 
confirming that the al-Qaeda leadership indeed had internal conflicts and disagreements.324 
There are also several sources confirming that al-Qaeda continued to plan conventional 
                                                 
324 See for example, Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006,  
http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/Harmony_3_Schism.pdf (accessed 19 November 2007). 
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attacks, even after 11 September. This might explain why the CBRN efforts of al-Qaeda 
central ended up being rather half-hearted.  
The networked structure of al-Qaeda should theoretically promote innovation in at least two 
ways. First, the decision-making process of al-Qaeda was not strictly top-down, but allowed 
any militant islamist to design his or her own operational plans, and then present them to 
senior leaders for approval. Second, when using a broad definition of the al-Qaeda network, 
which I have chosen to do in this thesis, individuals do not even have to present their plans for 
‘approval’, they can simply decide to act on their own in al-Qaeda’s name. With this wide 
pool of potential tactical planners, why have the majority of al-Qaeda attributed attacks been 
carried out by ‘conventional’ methods?  
It can be argued that in the first case (where operatives present their plans to senior al-Qaeda 
members), al-Qaeda central could simply have dismissed the plans that they did not regard as 
feasible. This is what apparently happened to Jose Padilla’s “dirty bomb” proposal to Khalid 
Sheikh Muhammad. As for the Dhiren Barot case, it is not clear whether his plan of making a 
“dirty bomb” out of smoke detectors was approved by senior al-Qaeda members or not, 
although he allegedly went to Pakistan for this purpose. In any case, it is hard to draw any 
conclusions about whether innovative CBRN operations were rejected by al-Qaeda central 
without actually knowing how many such proposals were made in the first place. Details of 
this have only been revealed in a few, specific cases.  
It is easier to analyze the second option, namely when operatives act in al-Qaeda’s name but 
without direct funding and earlier approval from al-Qaeda central. Why have there not been 
more attempts to use CBRN materials or other innovative tactics by this layer of the al-Qaeda 
network? According to Jones’ theory, this layer should be ‘innovative improvisers’ with 
highly innovative skills but low capability. What we see instead, however, is that the method 
of choice is often highly ‘traditional’. This could be explained by the factor of ‘personal 
choice’, but over time, and after a large number of cases, one would still expect to see a 
certain variation. I would argue that the case of the al-Qaeda network shows that a networked 
structure does not necessarily promote innovation, as Jones has argued, but it might also 
simultaneously prevent innovation. 
First of all, al-Qaeda is a global, dispersed network operating all over the world. It is therefore 
not pushed to innovate by immediate battlefield needs or countermeasures, because it could 
simply move its operations to a different country. This might be one explanation why the 
network has not been more innovative.  
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Another important factor may be that in a loose, networked structure, there is a stronger need 
on the lower levels of the network to carry out operations that can immediately be identified 
with the al-Qaeda ‘brand’. Therefore, the lower levels are not necessarily more prone to 
innovation as Jones has argued. On the contrary, the networked structure promotes an 
adherence to ‘traditional’ al-Qaeda modes of attack, such as plane hijackings and 
simultaneous bomb explosions targeting buildings or commuter traffic.325 The networked 
structure also promotes a trend for younger and perhaps more ‘impatient’ operatives, who 
prefer immediate results rather than long-term planning.326 This means that the tactics to be 
used are, to a larger degree, determined by immediate capabilities and available means rather 
than capabilities that it takes long time to acquire. According to this alternative explanation, 
the four cases of CBRN plots carried out by al-Qaeda locals are therefore not confirmations of 
Jones’ theory, but are rather seen as exceptions that may be explained by the presence of other 
factors, such as an ‘emotional attraction’ to CBRN materials.     
 
                                                 
325 Such traditional modes of attack appear to be the trend in Western Europe. See Petter Nesser, “Chronology of 
Jihadism in Western Europe 1994 – 2007; planned, prepared and executed terrorist attacks”, forthcoming.  
326 Nesser, “Jihadi training in Europe”.  
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7 Conclusion 
What is the nature of al-Qaeda’s interest in CBRN weapons, as reflected by statements and 
activities on various levels within the network between 1996-2006? My answer to the research 
question has been two-fold: first, I have argued that by looking at statements and activities at 
various levels within the al-Qaeda network, it becomes clear that the network’s interest in 
using unconventional means is in fact much lower than commonly thought. Actual efforts 
have been concentrated on crude and easily obtainable CBRN materials, not on developing 
actual warfare agents, although the option has been researched at least on a theoretical level. 
The analysis shows that separate quotes from al-Qaeda leaders, such as Nāṣir bin Ḥamd al-
Fahd’s fatwā about WMD, should not be interpreted as indicative that al-Qaeda prefers CBRN 
weapons to other types of weapons, but rather as a reflection of al-Qaeda’s stated desire to 
carry out ‘mass destructive’ attacks against the United States with whatever means available. 
After having established the nature of al-Qaeda’s interest in using CBRN means, the next part 
of the answer to the research question is to explain why al-Qaeda has not shown more 
innovation in this field. The al-Qaeda network clearly lacks some of the characteristics typical 
of past ‘CBRN terrorists’, such as an ideology or strategy that clearly defines the use of 
CBRN materials; or an ‘expressive attachment’ to this particular type of weapon. This might 
be used to argue why Jones’ argument (that al-Qaeda’s networked structure promotes 
innovation) does not fit very well with the empirical case study of al-Qaeda: there is simply 
not an ‘ideological environment’ to push for innovation within the field of CBRN weapons. I 
would argue, however, that al-Qaeda’s networked structure itself also might prevent 
innovation in tactics, a factor which has not been discussed in Jones’ article: first of all, the 
global nature of the network makes mobility an alternative to innovation: instead of 
innovating new tactics to evade countermeasures, al-Qaeda could simply move its tactics to a 
different part of the world where such countermeasures are not yet in place. Al-Qaeda’s main 
enemy, the United States, is represented all over the world through embassies, businesses and 
other interests. Secondly, al-Qaeda’s loose organizational structure does not only increase the 
pool of potential operational planners, as Jones argues, but it also increases the need for 
carrying out operations that can immediately be identified with the al-Qaeda ‘brand’. Further 
research is needed, however, to test the validity of these new hypotheses. In particular, I 
believe it would be useful to conduct a comparative study of cases where CBRN materials 
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were involved, and cases where traditional tactics were used, in order to better understand 
why al-Qaeda seems to adhere to traditional modes of attack.  
There is little doubt that al-Qaeda still has a strategy of staging spectacular mass-casualty 
attacks, but there are no indications that al-Qaeda views CBRN materials as the only possible 
type of weapon with which to pursue this strategy. In my opinion, this makes the al-Qaeda 
network a more resilient threat than any ‘superterrorist’. 
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